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I.  INTRODUCTION
Over the course of its history, the income tax in the United States has
reflected  an  attempt  to  maintain  progressive  rates,  avoid  marriage  and
singles  penalties,  and  tax married couples  with  the same total  household
income equally.  However, serving all three traditional goals is impossible,
and  at  least  one  of them  must  be  sacrificed.  To  answer  this  central
"trilemma"  of household taxation, it has  been universally  assumed  that  a
progressive  rate  structure  entails  weighing  the  relative  merits  of  two
choices: joint filing versus individual filing.  This Article will explore  and
defend a third alternative, which I will call "intermediate filing,"  and under
which couples  would  choose a ratio to govern both  income tax  treatment
and division  of the broadest range of assets  on divorce.  Considering  this
alternative  of intermediate  filing  will  allow  us  to  analyze  the  role  that
sharing plays  in the taxation of married couples  and  other  multitaxpayer
groups.
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The trilemma is  easily illustrated.  In his  1972 testimony  before  the
House Ways and Means Committee, Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for  Tax Policy,  offered  a widely-cited  proof of the exis-
tence  of the trilemma,1 which  can be summarized-as  follows.  Consider
four cases:
Case 1, a single person, A, who earns $20,000.
Case 2, two single persons, B and B', who each earn $10,000.
Case 3, a married couple, in which C earns $20,000 and C' earns zero.
Case 4, a married couple, D and D',  in which each earns $10,000.
First consider marriage neutrality.  If there is to be no penalty  on re-
maining single, A, who earns  $20,000 in Case  1, must pay the same tax as
C who earns the same amount in Case 3 but who is married.  Similarly, if a
marriage penalty  is to be avoided, then the two singles in Case 2, each of
whom earn  $10,000, must pay the same total tax as Case 4's married cou-
ple, in which each spouse earns  $10,000.  Finally, if we want couples with
the same total  household income to  pay  the same  amount of tax-a con-
cept known  as "couples  neutrality"--then  the couple in Case 3  must pay
the same tax as the couple in Case 4.
Thus,  the tax in Case  1 must equal that in Case 3,  the tax in Case  2
must equal that in Case 4, and the tax in Case 3  must equal that in Case 4.
Therefore, the tax  in Case  1 must equal that in Case 2;  in other words,  a
single person earning $20,000 must pay the same level of tax as two single
persons each earning $10,000.  But this is  impossible under a progressive
rate structure.  Generally,  under progressive  rates, a single person making
twice as much as each of two other single people must pay a higher level
of tax than the other two do collectively.  Thus,  marriage neutrality,  cou-
ples neutrality, and progressive rates are incompatible.
This fact has  given rise to extensive literature about how to come to
grips with this inevitable trade-off.2  In addition, the example cases above
1.  See Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married  Persons Where Both Spouses Are Work-
ing: Hearings  Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 78-79  (1972)  (statement  of
Edwin S.  Cohen, Assistant Secretary for the Tax Policy of the Treasury).
2.  See,  e.g.,  MICHAEL  J.  GRAErz  THE  DECLINE  (AND  FALL?)  OF THE  INcoME  TAX  29.40
(1997)  (discussing marriage  penalty  in terms  of societal  values);  EDWARD J.  MCCAFFERY,  TAXING
WOMEN  19-23 (1997)  (arguing inter alia for individual filing); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxa-
tion and the Family,  27  STAN.  L. REV.  1389, 1396 (1975)  [hereinafter Bittker, Taxation and the Fam-
ily]  (summarizing  trade-offs  and arguing  that abandonment  of joint  filing  entails  unwanted  conse-
quences); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital  Status as a Factor  in Allocating Income Tax Burdens,
59 TEX. L. REV.  1, 67 (1980)  (concluding that mandatory separate returns is the best reform followed
by choice of filing status and earned-income  deduction);  S.L. Hurley, The Unit of Taxation Under an
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can  be used to  illustrate two  further aspects  of the problem  of household
taxation: the "stacking effect" and the nontaxation of domestic labor.
The  current  tax  system,  like  any  joint-filing  system,  leads  to  a
"stacking  effect"  that  burdens  the  decision  to  work  outside  the  home.
Consider Case  3  again.  The secondary earner-the  lower-earning  spouse
whose decision to work outside the home is more tentative than that of the
other (primary) earner-faces a large barrier to working outside the home.3
Under progressive rates and joint filing, the secondary  earner's income is
in effect  "stacked"  on top of the primary earner's income because the sec-
ondary earner faces the couple's marginal rate, which will be pushed up by
the primary earner's larger income.  The more the primary earner  makes,
the higher the couple's-and  hence the secondary eamer's-marginal  rate
climbs.  The  secondary  earner  will face  a much  higher  marginal  rate-
where behavior is influenced-than will an individual-filing  single person.
These  considerations have led to  a gradual  shift among  commentators  to-
ward favoring individual filing.4
Further,  the  nontaxation  of  domestic  labor  also  affects  secondary
earners'  work decisions.  Both individual and joint filing tax market  labor
Ideal Progressive  Income Tax, OXFORD  J. LEGAL  STUD.  157,  157-60  (1984)  (arguing  that choice of
progressive  taxation and  unit of taxation  are  not independent  questions);  Marjorie  E.  Komhauser,
Love,  Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 63  (1993)  [hereinafter Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS] (arguing  for individual  filing be-
cause  of nonpooling  of income  and burden  on secondary  earner);  Edward  J. McCaffery,  Slouching
Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,  Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103  YALE L.J. 595
(1993)  (discussing  the appeal  of the efficiency  analysis);  Edward  J.  McCaffery,  Taxation and the
Family: A  Fresh Look at Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA  L. REV.  983  (1993)  [hereinafter
McCaffery,  Fresh Look]  (arguing  that  tax  laws  contribute  to  the marginalization  of  women in  the
workplace);  Michael J. McIntyre,  Individual  Filing in the Personal  Income Tax: Prolegomena  to Fu-
ture Discussion,  58 N.C. L. REV. 469, 484, 488-89 (1980)  (defending joint filing as reflecting pooling
of  married  couples'  income);  Michael  J. McIntyre  & Oliver  Oldman,  Taxation of the Family in  a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income  Tax,  90  HARV.  L.  REV.  1573  (1977)  (defending  income-
splitting under joint filing as reflecting joint benefit from marital income); Harvey  S.  Rosen, Is It Tite
to Abandon Joint Filing?,  30 NAT'L TAX J. 423 (1977)  (arguing  primarily  on  efficiency  grounds  for
individual filing); Lawrence  Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, 67  S.  CAL. L. REV.  339  (1994)
[hereinafter Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax] (arguing  for separate returns);  Laura Ann Davis,
Note, A Feminist  Justification  for the Adoption of  an Individual Filing  System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.  197
(1988)  (arguing from impact on women for individual over joint filing).
3.  This Article uses masculine pronouns  for the  less elastic earner and  feminine pronouns  for
the more elastic earner both to reflect a traditional pattern that persists to some  degree and to highlight
the resulting feminist issue.  See infra notes 4-8 and accompanying  text.
4.  See, e.g.,  MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 164-68 (discussing optimal-taxation  approach to the
taxation of women  in light of labor supply  elasticities).  See also, e.g., Martin  Feldstein  & Daniel  R.
Feenberg,  The  Taxation  of Two-Earner Families, in  EMPIRICAL  FOUNDATIONS  OF  HOUSEHOLD
TAXATION  39, 69-71  (Martin Feldstein  & James  M. Poterba eds.,  1996)  (estimating deadweight  loss
from taxation in light of women's labor supply elasticities).
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but  do nothing to  tax  domestic  labor that  is  compensated  for by  marital
sharing of resources.  Marital  "sharing"  of income is itself a concept  that
covers  a spectrum of situations  from exchange-for example,  money in-
come  for domestic services-at  one end  to pure gift-giving  at the other.
Although  there  may be  no  clear-cut  line dividing  exchange-sharing  and
gift-sharing, we must worry  about  the close  substitution relationship  be-
tween market labor that is remunerated  by wages  and  domestic labor that
is compensated with marital "sharing."  In a no-tax world, B would  make
some trade-off between the two.  But, under both individual and joint fil-
ing,  B  is  taxed  on  the  market-labor  income,  while  B  is  not taxed  on
"shared"  income  from  A.  Even  under  individual  filing,  which  is  com-
monly believed to benefit secondary  earners, net cash transfers to the sec-
ondary  earner  within  the  marriage  do  not  raise  the  secondary  earner's
marginal rate.  Thus, the payment for domestic services  is untaxed to the
secondary  earner,  thereby  increasing  the attractiveness  of domestic  over
market labor relative to the situation in a no-tax world.5  As we will see,
this situation  is further complicated by home  production: The differential
tax rates under individual filing makes the relative attractiveness  of using
each spouse's time in the home different from what it would be in a no-tax
or joint-filing world.
The  largest  group  of "secondary"  earners  are  married  women, 6 for
whom the stacking effect and  the nontaxation  of imputed income (and  of
maritally-exchanged  domestic labor) create incentives pushing them in the
direction of labor in the home rather than in the marketplace.7  The some-
5.  Taxpayers  with and without  imputed income can be put on a more even footing  either by
taxing  imputed income, which is usually  thought impractical,  or by giving deductions  (or credits)  to
those wage-earners who incur the corresponding expenses of hiring third parties to render the services
in question.  A child-care  deduction, credit, or other subsidy can lessen the effects of the nontaxation
of imputed income and of maritally exchanged domestic labor.  See,  e.g.,  MCCAFFERY, supra note 2,
at  114-18; Daniel C. Schaffer & Donald H. Berman, Dissents and Concurrences: Two Cheers for the
Child Care Deduction,  28 TAX  L. REV. 535,  536-45  (1973).  The Internal Revenue  Code currently
provides  for a child-care tax credit, see I.R.C. § 21  (1994 & Supp. 111996), and an exclusion for up to
$5,000 in dependent  care assistance provided  to the taxpayer, see id. § 129.  Less  targeted  to child
care are the child tax credit, see id. § 24 (West Supp. 1998)  (principal element of Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997 providing credit against tax of $500 ($400 for 1998)  for each child under the age of 17)  and
the dependent exemption, see id. § 152 (1994).
6.  See, e.g.,  MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 19-23.
7.  As  explained in Part  II.B.4 infra, the benefit of these  services  constitute  (i) "imputed in-
come" and (ii) one leg of a marital exchange of domestic work for shared income.  Both of these are
not  taxed.  Imputed  income  is the increase in economic  well-being from  self-performed  services  or
from property.  For example, consider two people with similar preferences and  facing the same  wage
rate.  Person A works  10 hours more than Person B and earns an extra $200 but has to use that $200 to
hire a third party to provide child care or housecleaning  services.  Person B uses the  10 hours  to per-
form  the services herself.  In that case,  A  and B  are equally  well-off, and  the increase in economic
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what unfortunate term  "secondary"  does not mean  that women's  work  in
the  marketplace  is  somehow  normatively  less  important  than  men's.  It
does  mean that, because  women face lower wages  in the marketplace  and
continuing  gender  stereotypes  about  domestic  labor,  married  women's
choice of whether to work outside the home is far more sensitive to incen-
tives than that of their husbands.'  In light of these realities, it is essential
that the tax system be reformed  in order that it not aggravate-as  it now
does-the disincentives for married women to work.
The present joint-filing system is clearly not an optimal  approach  to
the trilemma.  It  combines  a  marriage  penalty  for  many  couples  and  a
penalty on work for many secondary  earners.9  Changing patterns of fam-
ily  life toward more two-earner  couples make the marriage  penalty  loom
ever larger,1 0  and calls for reform are becoming more insistent.1  On the
other hand, despite its popularity in the literature, individual filing takes no
account of sharing within marriages, provides no incentive to share control
over earned income, and taxes  market but not domestic  labor.  Moreover,
household taxation in the United States has veered from individual filing at
the dawn of the income tax to various forms of joint filing, and this history
strongly suggests that we will never achieve equilibrium at either pole, in-
dividual or joint filing.'2
well-being  that B achieves  through the self-rendered services  is called imputed income.  Because  the
concept of imputed income is an unintuitive one and because taxing it would be administratively  dif-
ficult, imputed income escapes taxation.  See,  e.g., Thomas  Chancellor, Imputed Income and the Ideal
Income Tax, 67 OR. L. REv.  561, 605-09  (1988);  McCaffery,  Fresh Look, supra note 2, at  1055-58;
McIntyre  & Oldman, supra note 2, at 1617-20.
8.  See, e.g., Feldstein & Feenberg, supra note 4, at 40, 69-71;  Mark R. Killingsworth & James
J.  Heckman,  Female  Labor Supply: A  Survey, in  I  HANDBOOK  OF LABOR ECONOMICS  103  (Orley
Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds.,  1986).  See also infra Parts II.B.3 and III.D.I.
9.  See  I.R.C. § l(a) (West Supp.  1998).  Under the Code,  couples  do have  the  option to  file
separately, see id. §  I(d), but the rate schedule is designed to make the combined tax liabilities of the
two spouses higher under the separate filing option than under joint filing.  There  can sometimes be an
advantage in separate filing where a deductible  expense  is subject to a floor defined  in terms  of per-
centage of adjusted  gross  income:  The lower adjusted  gross  incomes  of the  spouses under separate
filing reduces such  floors.  See, e.g., id. § 67(a) (1994) (subjecting miscellaneous  itemized  deductions
to a disallowance  of 2% of adjusted  gross income);  id. § 165(h)(2) (West Supp.  1998)  (allowing net
casualty  losses only to the extent they exceed  10%  of adjusted  gross  income);  id. § 213(a) (1994  &
Supp. II  1996) (allowing  deduction for uncompensated  medical expenses only  to extent that such ex-
penses exceed  7.5% of adjusted gross  income), but only in rare cases  will such  "floor-lowering"  ad-
vantages outweigh the disadvantage built into the married-filing-separately  rate schedule  of § 1(d).
10.  See CONGRESSIONAL  BUDGEr  OFFICE,  FOR BETTER OR  FOR WORSE:  MARRIAGE AND  THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997)  (documenting lack of marriage and singles penalties in present income
tax and surveying traditional solutions).
11.  See,  e.g.,  Marriage Tax  Elimination Act,  H.R. 2456,  105th Cong.  (1997)  (proposing legis-
lation  that  would  implement  a  traditional  solution  of allowing  married  couples  a  choice  of filing
jointly or separately).  See also infra  Part V.
12.  On some lessons to be drawn from this tortuous history, see infra Part IV.HOUSEHOLD TAXATION
In  this  Article,  I  will  explore  a  third  alternative,  which  I  call
"intermediate filing."  Instead of allowing couples  to "split"  their income
as joint filers or forcing them to file as individuals, intermediate filing pre-
sents couples with  a choice of individual filing  as a default  or fractional
splitting. The ratio of the split would govern both tax treatment and prop-
erty  division  (broadly  defined)  on  divorce.  If  the  couple  negotiated  a
50/50 ratio,  then the couple  (and the primary  earner in particular)  could
lower taxes by as much  as they would under joint filing, but all property
including  human  capital  built up  during  the marriage  would  be  divided
equally on divorce.  If the negotiated  ratio were  60/40, the primary earner
and the household overall would have to pay higher taxes in order to avoid
the even split on divorce.
As elaborated  below,  intermediate  filing carries  with  it a number of
practical advantages.  First, intermediate filing is designed to calibrate tax
treatment to the amount of sharing in the marriage, but it does not face the
need  to measure  sharing  directly.  Instead,  the  countervailing  incentives
facing  the higher-income  spouse  (to  wish for a relatively  even ratio  for
taxes  but a less even one for divorce) force him into receiving the tax ad-
vantage  only to the extent that he is willing to share ownership.  By tying
the tax and family law treatments of marital property, the system to a large
extent defines the ownership rights of the spouses.
This tie-in  leads  to  an  incentive  structure beneficial  from both effi-
ciency  and  feminist  standpoints.  The  ratio under  intermediate  filing  has
the effect of taxing household labor that is compensated for by sharing.  As
I will show, intermediate filing is likely to be a good compromise between
eliminating distortions in labor supply and home production.  Furthermore,
the  system  gives  primary  earners  an  incentive  to  share:  At the margin,
further sharing under the system will lead to lower taxes.
The  contractarian  nature  of  the  intermediate-filing  system  shows
promise  of improving  the process  of marriage  formation.  This  system
would  serve  as  a particularly  effective  penalty  default  on the  better-off
spouse, forcing that spouse to reveal  information  about his intentions  for
the marriage whether or not he contracts around  default individual  filing.
Also, by functioning as a system of liquidated damages, the use of the ratio
as a division rule on divorce would both tend to benefit women and induce
the efficient level of precaution in the first place.
That  intermediate  filing  has  never been  proposed  is  not surprising,
because  the conventional  wisdom  rests  on  two  unfounded  assumptions,
which, if true, would present great obstacles to such a system.  These two
assumptions  have made the trilemma seem  more  dire than it is  and have
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led many to believe that progressive  rates inevitably lead to unacceptable
trade-offs. 3
First, it is almost universally assumed that we must base our choice of
taxpayer for any given  income on existing categories  of ownership  of the
income  or of the underlying asset.  However, the existing set of such  con-
cepts  is not adequate  for tax purposes.  Any filing  system requires  some
basis  for  deciding how  much  splitting  to allow.  The  Internal  Revenue
Code fails  to provide  a comprehensive  definition  of ownership. 14   There-
fore, it is natural,  but far from necessary,  to look to  existing concepts  of
ownership  to decide whom to tax on what income.  It would appear that if
we wish  to  allow  some type  of splitting  other  than pure joint filing, we
would need to find some definition of spousal rights to supply the basis for
the split.  A definition might be expected from family or property law.  For
example, a splitting system might allow splitting to the extent of commu-
nity property: Income that constitutes  community property would be split,
but separate  income  would  not.  As  discussed  below,  no  such  existing
categories,  including  even  those  of  community  property,  furnish  a  re-
motely fair or efficient basis on which  to allow splitting. 1 5  Thus,  if inter-
13.  Before turning to questions  of marriage  neutrality  and the taxation  of couples, it is  worth
remarking that it is true that giving up on progressive rates-the remaining  "horn" of the  trilemma-
would remove this trade-off between the penalties (for singles or married people) on  the one hand and
"equal" treatment of couples with equal total household income on the other.  In the Article, however,
I will assume progressive rates for several reasons.  First, progressivity is an important issue in its own
right.  See,  e.g.,  WALTER J.  BLuM  &  HARRY  KALVEN,  JR.,  THE  UNEASY  CASE  FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION  39-104 (1953)  (challenging arguments  for progressive  taxation);  CHARLES  0.  GALVIN  &
BORIS  I. BIrrKER, THE INcoME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE  SHOULD IT BE?  25-52 (1969)  (arguing  un-
easiness of the  case for any tax  base including  proportional  taxation);  Joseph Bankman  & Thomas
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:  A  New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL.  L.
REV.  1905,  1966-67 (1987)  (arguing  from optimal tax theory  for some version  of progressive  rates);
Walter  J.  Blum, Revisiting the  Uneasy  Case for Progressive Taxation, 60  TAXES  16,  21  (1982)
(arguing that progressive  taxation  is even more  uneasy in  the 1980s  than  in the  1950s);  Michael  J.
Graetz, To Praise  the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259,  259-86  (1983)  (arguing  that an
estate  tax  has important role in enhancing progressivity  of the  tax  system).  The endurance of pro-
gressive  rates reflects a long-held  commitment by Congress  to effecting  some  redistribution through
the Internal Revenue Code.  See Michael L. Roberts  & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive  Taxation, Fairness,
and Compliance, 16 L. & POL'Y 27,44 (1994)  (reporting results of a nationwide survey in which 60%
to 66% of respondents supported a progressive tax system).  But, as soon as we allow some degree of
progressivity,  we  are presented  with the unattractive  choices  outlined above.  Indeed,  the  trilemma
only arises on the assumption that progressive rates are a priority, and, therefore,  the real challenge of
the trilemma is to accommodate this basic assumption of progressive  rates with the least objectionable
of the remaining alternatives.
14.  See  Noel  B.  Cunningham  &  Deborah  H.  Schenk,  Taxation  Without  Realization: A
"Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV.  725, 727 (1992)  (arguing  for extension of
approach behind the rules of I.R.C. § 1286 (1994) for bonds with attached coupons  to defining owner-
ship under the Code generally).
15.  See infra Part V.HOUSEHOLD  TAXATION
mediate filing is desirable, it cannot rest on these established property-  or
family-law categories.
Second, it is believed that giving couples a choice of filing  status in-
evitably  leads to  an overuse of joint filing.  Given  a choice,  couples  sup-
posedly will opt for joint filing to lower their overall household taxes, even
if they share income  less than joint filing would  suggest.  The history  of
household taxation in the United States16 is taken  to suggest that allowing
couples  a  choice  of  filing  status-whether  joint  versus  individual  or
somewhere in between-would  present  a clear-cut incentive  to elect joint
filing to minimize taxes, regardless  of the fairness  or efficiency.  Given a
choice between  lower and  higher  taxes, couples  would  opt for the lower
taxes under joint filing regardless of whether this reflects  a sensible  posi-
tive or normative description of marriage  and regardless of the social con-
sequences.1 7  This historical experience has probably  contributed to the fo-
cus on forcing all marriages  into a model that justifies either individual or
joint filing.
These  first  two assumptions-that  the Code  must  rely  on  existing
categories  from  property  and  family  law  and  that  any  choice  of  filing
status degenerates  into joint filing-are erroneous  and have prevented  us
from seeing the possibility of doing better than the traditional alternatives
of individual  and joint filing.  These two  mistaken  assumptions have ob-
scured the role in household taxation of a third assumption that is actually
more of a value judgment: Sharing is an important determinant  of how to
tax married couples.
The nature of this relationship between marital sharing and household
taxation, however, will become clearer when intermediate filing is consid-
ered.  Indeed,  as  we will  see,  intermediate  filing  can  be  regarded  as  a
thought experiment  that lays bare the role that sharing  plays  in our atti-
tudes toward the taxation of various  groups of taxpayers, not just married
couples.  Examples of such groups include parents and their children, other
relatives,  cohabiting couples, religious orders,  communes,  and the vast ar-
ray of other groups that social life gives rise to.
The  next part  of this  Article  will  introduce  the problem  of marital
taxation by examining various models of marriage  and the conflicting les-
sons  drawn from them for the long-standing individual-versus-joint-filing
debate.  In Part  I,  I will present the proposed system of intermediate  fil-
16.  See infra Part IV.
17.  This assumes similar rates for joint filers.  On  the present system of special rates  for those
who could file jointly, see supra note 9.
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ing based  on a self-assessed ratio  for income-splitting.  That section  will
demonstrate the wide range of equity and  efficiency  advantages of such a
system over either of the two traditional  alternatives.  It will also consider
issues of federalism, geographical disparity, and joint and several liability.
Part IV will reexamine the history of household taxation with an eye to the
possibility  and  historical absence of intermediate  filing.  In Part V, I will
compare  self-assessed  intermediate  filing  to  other  "intermediate"  ap-
proaches.  Part VI  will  generalize  the  intermediate  approach  to  marital
taxation  explored here to  provide  a new  theory of the role in  taxation  of
sharing  by  "conduit"  taxpayers  with  other  members  of  a  given  social
group.  Part VII concludes the Article by suggesting  that intermediate  fil-
ing merits  consideration that will help enhance  awareness  of attitudes  to-
ward sharing in marriage.
H.  PARTIAL SHARING IN MARRIAGE
In this part, I will show that our attitude towards joint or separate fil-
ing  should depend  to a large extent on the degree of sharing that occurs
within  a given  marriage.  Individual filing  reflects  an understatement  of
sharing and joint filing overstates  sharing in most marriages.  Neither sys-
tem is fine-grained  enough to capture the wide range of sharing occurring
in marriages, and the perverse equity and efficiency consequences  of either
joint- or individual-filing  systems  stem directly  from  the one-size-fits-all
approach that each system takes.
A.  BENEFITS AND  BURDENS OF MARRIAGE
Because  intermediate  filing  will  address  the overstatement  and  un-
derstatement  of certain  benefits and burdens  of marriage,  this section  will
first survey those aspects of marriage  that have been featured  in the joint-
versus-individual-filing  debate.  Afterwards,  I will point out the role  that
the full range of sharing in marriages should play in our thinking about the
questions of income-splitting and filing in the income tax.
1.  Untaxed Benefits and Burdens of Marriage
With marriage comes  a variety  of untaxed benefits  and burdens.  Al-
though some of these benefits and burdens are not unique to marriage,  the
associated incentive effects  do have special implications  in  the context of
marriage.
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The  main  benefits  from  marriage  include  what  are  often  termed
"economies  of scale"-many of which are really public goods18 within the
marriage-and  the sum of imputed  income.19  Neither  of these  types  of
marital benefits  is taxed, but, although characteristic of marriages, neither
is unique to them.  Nontaxation  of imputed income occurs widely  outside
of marriage  as well.20
However, nontaxation  of the imputed income from household  labor,
as well  as the nontaxation  of a marital exchange  of such labor for shared
income,  increases  the incentive  for  the secondary  earner  to  work in  the
home  rather than  in the marketplace.  That  the income  tax  thus  pushes
women  in particular toward traditional housework is a central problem of
marital  income  taxation.21  Moreover,  even (as  is customary)  calling  the
domestic  labor  here  "imputed  income"  reflects  an  implicit,  but  by  no
means  obvious,  choice  of the  family  rather  than  the  individual  as  the
"economic  unit"  that makes  decisions  and  experiences  utility.22   As  we
will see,  if we focus  on the individual  members  of the marriage,  it may
turn out that one spouse is trading domestic  services  in return for money
income  from  the other spouse.  If so,  then the traded  component  of the
domestic services are not imputed income because the services  are traded
rather than rendered simply for oneself (as is required for true imputed in-
come).  Although the benefits  of housework are often imputed income, es-
pecially if done by a single person living alone, the common but erroneous
assumption that the benefit  of housework  is  always  imputed  income  re-
flects  an  implicit  acceptance  of the  "family-unity"  model.23  In  such  a
18.  A public good is one whose consumption is nonexcIusive  and (usually) nonrival.  In a clas-
sic example,  national defense  cannot be allocated only to  those  citizens who  are willing  to pay,  and
one citizen's enjoyment of security from national defense does not diminish the benefit to other citi-
zens or reduce consumption elsewhere.  See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson,  The Pure Theory of Public Ex-
penditure,  36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387-89  (1954);  Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic  Exposition
of a Theory of  Public Expenditures,  37  REV. ECON. & STAT. 350, 350 (1955).
19.  On imputed income, see supra note 7 and accompanying  text.
20.  This  is true most notably  in the context of owner-occupied housing.  Compare A, who  in-
vests $100,000  and uses  the return to pay  rent, and B, who  spends the $100,000  on home ownership.
A  must pay tax on the return to her investment but B, although economically no better or worse off
than A,  does not pay tax on the benefit of living in the housing B owns-B's imputed income from the
asset.  See, e.g., Richard Goode, Imputed Rent of Owner-Occupied  Dwellings Under the Income Tax,
15 J. FIN. 504, 504-25 (1960)  (discussing implications  of excluding from income tax  imputed income
from owner-occupied housing and possible responses to discriminatory effects).
21.  See, e.g.,  MCCAFFERY,  supra note 2,  at 20-26;  Davis,  supra note  2, at 210-14; Zelenak,
Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra  note 2, at 372-75.
22.  See infra Part II.B.
23.  See,  e.g., MCCAFFERY,  supra note 2, at 26,  120-26,  178-79.  Edward  McCaffery  asserts
that:
Virtually all of the services  that the spouse who stays at home performs  constitute untaxed
imputed income, and it is clear that the need for such services increases, first with marriage,
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view,  domestic  services  are performed  by  the marital  unity  for  "itself."
However,  once  we take  into account  the individuals  within  the  marriage
and  the  possibility  of nonmarket exchange  between  them,  there  is  little
reason to regard the entire benefit of domestic  services  as just another in-
stance of imputed income.
Recall  that  a  secondary  earner  like  C'  in  Case  3  of  the  trilemma
(where  C earns $20,000 and  C' earns $0)14  is often faced with a choice of
working in the marketplace  and using after-tax  income to pay  for services
such as child care or staying at home and providing them herself.  If child-
care costs $10,000  and C' faces  a marginal rate of twenty  percent, for in-
stance,  C' will have to earn  $12,500 just to have enough  to pay  for child
care that she could have provided herself tax-free.25  Thus, while it is true
that marriage gives rise to benefits that are not taxed otherwise, in the case
of imputed income the incentive effect within the marriage is of great con-
cern.26  Further, strong empirical studies show that two-earner families  in-
cur  substantial  additional  expenditures  that  correspond  to  items  of
"imputed  income" in  a one-earner family;  these include child care, clean-
ing,  and  convenience  food  expenditures.27  Furthermore,  employed  mar-
ried women spend significantly less time on housework than wives who do
not work  outside the home, but husbands  whose wives  work  in the mar-
ketplace generally do not perform significantly  more housework than hus-
bands whose wives are not employed outside the home.28  Thus, the trade-
and later, dramatically, with children ....  The family would [if the secondary earner works
outside  the home]  have to pay  for a variety  of services-child  care  and housekeeping  pri-
mary among them-with after-tax dollars.
Id. at 121.  See also Note, The Case for Mandatory  Separate Filing  by Married  Persons, 91  YALE L.J.
363,  377 & n.57 (1981)  (arguing  against joint filing because housework done by the secondary earner
is imputed income  exchanged for resources  from the primary eamer).  But cf. Zelenak, Marriage  and
the Income Tax, supra note 2, at 356 n.85 (criticizing justification of nontaxation  of wife in exchange
relationship based on nontaxation of imputed income and noting that exchange element is inconsistent
with imputed income).
24.  See supra  note 1 and accompanying  text.
25.  That is, $12,500 - ((.2) X $12,500)  = $10,000.  More generally,  the amount x that the sec-
ondary earner will have to earn in the marketplace to pay for the child care can be given by x = S I (I -
r), where  S is  the amount  that child care (or other relevant services)  costs and r is the  earner's mar-
ginal rate.  Of course, as r increases-say because of large earnings of the primary earner under a sys-
tem of joint filing-so does x, the amount the secondary earner has to make just to break even with the
imputed income situation.
26.  It is a concem for both feminist and efficiency reasons.  See infra Parts III.D and lII.E.
27.  See  Sandra  L.  Hanson  &  Theodora  Ooms,  The  Economic Costs and Rewards of Two-
Earner,  Two-Parent Families,  53 J. MARRIAGE  & FAM. 622 (1991).
28.  See, e.g., BARBARAR.  BERGMANN,  THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE  OF WOMEN  261-66 (1986);
PHILIP BLUMSTEIN  & PEPPER  SCHWARTZ,  AMERICAN  COUPLES:  MONEY,  WORK,  SEX  144-46  (1983).
See also, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices,
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off between market earnings and imputed income falls heavily on the wife,
who is typically the secondary (more elastic) earner.
As  for  public  goods  within  the marriage,  the consumption  benefit
from heating  and lighting or even  one kitchen, for example, may not de-
crease  with the use of the other spouse, making  such goods truly public.
Under  the heading  of "scale  economies"  in  home  consumption,  studies
going back  to Ernst Engel's  landmark  study29  a century  ago  have found
that there  are  significant  public  goods  or  scale  economies  in household
consumption.30  The same aspect of nonexclusive enjoyment can be found
in a common  driveway,  for instance, but we do not tax each neighbor  on
the full consumption benefit as long as we use income as an index to tax-
able  well-being.31   Furthermore,  the  nontaxation  of  the  benefit  of  the
common driveway  can be seen as an instance  of the general point that, in
using income as a rough index to well-being, we do not tax consumer sur-
plus.32  That is, instead of trying to tax utilities, the Code taxes on the basis
of market price, which reflects utility to the marginal consumer.
But the nontaxation  of consumer  surplus  and  domestic  labor within
the marriage more generally  may well have incentive effects that are dis-
turbing from a feminist point of view.  If the primary earner-more often
the husband  than the wife-is the  one whose earned income  is supplying
the public good within the marriage, the husband-especially if he controls
the  expenditure  and  is  therefore  more  secure  in  the benefit-may  well
drive more utility from it.  In that case, the utility is not evenly distributed
(as  it  more  likely  would  be  between  the  neighbors  with  the  common
driveway).  Instead,  the husband may derive more utility for which he  re-
ceives more of a tax advantage than does the wife.  That is, if utility were
taxed  directly,  the husband  would  have  more  incentive  to  share  the  re-
96 COLUM.  L. REV.  2001,  2023 & n.89 (1996)  (noting that men's  domestic labor still "lag[s]  far be-
hind the increase in women's market work" and citing studies with data on labor-force participation).
29.  See Ernst Engel, Die Lebenskosten Belgischer Arbeiter-Familien  Friiher  und Jetzt,  9  INT.
STAT.  INST. BULL.  1 (1895).
30.  See, e.g.,  ANGUS  DEATON & JOHN  MUELLBAUER,  ECONOMICS  AND CONSUMER  BEHAVIOR
192 (1980)  (noting economies in home consumption and surveying literature); Reuben  Gronau, Home
Production-A Survey, in I HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 273, 289.
31.  On approaches  to the question of taxable well-being, especially in the  marital context, see
infra  Part II.B.4.
32.  Consumer surplus is the excess of a person's willingness to pay (her reservation price) over
the market price.  By using market prices as measures  of valuation,  the Code does  not tax consumer
surplus.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)  (as amended in 1995)  (setting forth the basic rule that where
services are paid for with property, the amount includable in an employee's  income as  compensation
is  the fair  market value of property).  See  generally  MICHAEL  J. GRAEMZ  & DEBORAH  H.  SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:  PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICIES  120 (3d ed.  1997)  (discussing nontaxation of
consumer surplus under Code and regulations).
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sources with the wife (assuming he gets a nonzero utility from sharing) by
relinquishing some of his financial control.
Other factors  in marital  well-being that  come under  the misleading
rubric of "economies of scale" include the gains from specialization within
the marriage.  True scale economies in home production have not been ad-
dressed much  in the literature,33  and for  good reason:  Home-production
output cannot be directly measured, and even information  on the allocation
of time  in household  production  is  very  minimal.3 4  More  attention  has
been paid to the closely related question of "economies in home consump-
tion" discussed earlier.
Instead  of focusing on true economies  of scale in  home  production,
economists have studied in more detail the gains to a married couple from
the division of labor within households.  For example, if one spouse  con-
centrates  on home  production and  the other  on market labor,  each spouse
can build up human  capital  specific to their tasks that  two  single people
would be unable  to do.35  Of course,  as a matter  of basic  values,  we can
certainly question whether the efficiency  gain here is important enough to
outweigh concerns  among  some  feminists  about  traditional  gender  roles
within the family.36  Even  from a purely  efficiency-based  point of view,
we must be careful not to allow the legal framework to exaggerate the in-
centive for secondary  earners  to work within  the home  beyond the  point
that would exist in a no-tax world.
On the burden  side, the primary earner  may  (or may  not) be  paying
for  support  of the  other spouse,  depending  on  what  the  other  spouse is
contributing to the marriage,  including "imputed income" from personally
performed  services.  More generally,  the primary earner  may  be  sharing
some cash  income  with  the other spouse partially  in return  for the  other
spouse's domestic labor.  The extent to which  this support or sharing is a
burden remains very difficult to measure.  As we will see, most economic
analyses  fail  to  distinguish  sharing  as gift-giving  and  sharing  as  part  of
marital exchange.  There is little reason, however, to suppose that this bur-
33.  For there  to be  true economies of scale in household production,  output  must expand pro-
portionately more quickly than amount of inputs.
34.  See, e.g., Gronau, supra note 30, at 288-89.
35.  See generally GARY  S.  BECKER,  A TREATISE  ON  THE FAMILY  30-53  (enlarged  ed.  1991)
(discussing the household division of labor between men and women).
36.  See McCAFFERY,  supra note 2, at 183-84,  287 n.183  (arguing  that, even if joint or house-
hold filing  were more efficient  because of efficiency  gains  from  specialized division of labor within
the family, feminist arguments for individual filing should be maintained on justice grounds),
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den or obligation  corresponds  to the amount of support a court would re-
quire on divorce.
37
Moreover, the secondary  earner often faces  the choice of whether  to
specialize  in market or domestic  labor.  Particularly  in the case of secon-
dary earners who specialize in work within the home, the secondary earner
has  foregone  the development  of job  skills relevant  for  the marketplace.
Again, there seems to be an inadequate relation of traditional support obli-
gations to the burdens assumed by such a secondary earner, and the lack of
compensation  for the specialization  of the wife has  been a recurring com-
plaint against traditional divorce law.38  At the most general level, the is-
sue is  how the gains from marriage  and the costs  in achieving  them  are
distributed  among the marriage partners both during the marriage  and  on
divorce.
2.  Control  and Consumption of the Benefits of Marriage
These  special benefits  and burdens  of marriage  are often  not evenly
distributed within the marriage.  Very recent economic studies point to less
than  complete  sharing  in  marriages.  While  married  couples  generally
seem to pool consumption to a great extent, men seem typically to enjoy a
greater degree  of control  over the economic  benefits of marriage than  do
women.
There  has been some doubt and much discussion  about  the extent to
which joint  consumption  occurs  in marriages  and  about  the  division  of
power and benefits between spouses.  There remains, however,  little hard
evidence as  to how much  sharing  actually  goes  on in marriages,  or how
"sharing"  should be  defined  in the tax  context.  It is important  to distin-
guish consumption and control: A primary earner might share consumption
with a secondary earner (such as shared heating, lighting, housing, and va-
cations)3 9 but not share control  (decisionmaking  over the consumption).
Thus, the spouses might vacation together (shared consumption) but if the
primary earner makes the decision of where to vacation,  he has retained a
degree of control greater than if he handed half of his extra cash earnings
to his wife and they bargained over where to vacation.  Further, the wife's
37.  See infra Part V.
38.  See, e.g.,  Katherine K. Baker, Comment, Contracting  for Security: Paying Married  Women
What They've Earned,  55 U.  CMI.  L. REv.  1193,  1206-13,  1220-27 (1988)  (documenting inadequacies
in current law).
39.  Shared  consumption need  not involve public  goods.  The primary  earner might share  in-
come  to fund  consumption  by the secondary earner, as  in  the case of vacations.  The likelihood  of
shared  consumption increases the more the primary earner's utility function is dependent on that of the
other spouse.  See  infra Parts II.B.3 and III.D.1.
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increase in utility from consuming the vacation  purchased with  the extra
income is less than it would be if she had chosen the vacation spot.  There
are two reasons for this conclusion.  First, if each spouse has distinct utility
functions  and  equal control,  the wife's preferences  would be given more
weight and she would gain greater utility from the final choice.40  Second,
having  control  as  opposed  to  mere ministerial  management4  may  yield
utility, in which case the husband has greater utility and the wife less util-
ity than if control as well as consumption were shared.
Many previous studies of "sharing" within marriages make consump-
tion  the object  of sharing.  In  attacking  the  old consensus  among joint-
filing proponents  that spouses do pool  income, Marjorie  Komhauser has
reviewed  the large  literature  on this  topic  and  notes  only  one  empirical
study other  than her  own  on the sharing  of income  among  married  cou-
ples.42  A study by Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz focused on atti-
tudes toward pooling,  where pooling seems to have meant at least pooled
consumption  (if not control).43  They found that a substantial  number  of
both men and  women favored  pooling and  that a positive  correlation  ex-
isted between the amount to which they favored pooling and the length  of
their present relationship.
44
40.  The resulting  extra weighting of the husband's  utility  in the  household's  decisionmaking
has  efficiency implications.  Under reasonable assumptions,  there is a welfare loss that will positively
correlate  with greater divergence  of the relative weighting from  equality.  See Patricia Apps &  Ray
Rees, Taxation and the Household, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 355, 362 (1988).
41.  Jan  Pahl makes  the distinction  between  control  that is  "concerned  with  decisions  such  as
which allocative system should be adopted within the household, which  spouse should have the final
say  on major  financial  decisions,"  and  the extent  to  which  spouses  have discretion  over  personal
spending money and access  to joint money.  JAN PAHL,  MONEY AND  MARRIAGE  57 (1989).  Manage-
ment,  on the other hand,  "is  concerned  with  putting into  operation  the  particular  allocation  system
which  the  couple  has  adopted."  Id.  For our  purposes,  control  means  decisionmaking  authority
whether exercised or not, as opposed to management,  which is the handling of money in order to carry
out those decisions (such as writing the checks for bills  and balancing the checkbook).
42.  See Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra  note 2, at 84-85.
43.  See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ,  supra  note 28, at 94-111.
44.  See id. at 95.  Among over 3,600 married couples, 69% of married women  favored pooling,
19%  were neutral, and 12%  were against pooling.  See id at 101.  Among husbands  the corresponding
numbers were 75%,  17%, and 8%.  See id.  Among unmarried  cohabiting heterosexual  couples, there
was  considerably  less support  for pooling,  with only  27%  of women  and  32%  of men  for pooling,
29% of women and 31%  of men  neutral on pooling, and 44% of women  and 37%  of men opposed  to
pooling.  See id.  Among  gay and  lesbian couples, there  was a strong positive correlation  of positive
attitudes  toward  pooling and  the length  of the relationship: For lesbians together  for  less  than  two
years,  31%  favored pooling;  for those together for 2 to 10 years,  40% favored pooling;  and for those
in relationships more than  10 years, 59% favored pooling.  See id. at 95.  Among gay men,  the corre-
sponding numbers  were 35%, 44%, and 68%.  See id.  The same positive correlation  held among  the
married couples as well but starting from a higher base, with 63% of wives married less than two years
favoring pooling and 67% of the husbands.  See id.HOUSEHOLD TAXATION
There  is also evidence  that people typically  overstate  the amount of
sharing that goes  on in their own  marriages.  As noted  earlier, if we  al-
lowed income-splitting to the extent of sharing, people would  have an in-
centive to "overreport"  the degree of sharing in their marriages.  However,
Kornhauser  argues  that  even  when  people  are  asked  about  sharing  and
where  (in our terms) there are no consequences  to the answer, people do
typically exaggerate the amount of sharing occurring  in their marriages. 45
Jan  Pahl conducted a study  in which  she interviewed  couples jointly and
then separately.46  Pahl found wide discrepancies  between the amount  of
pooling described by the couples in joint interviews  and in separate inter-
views.
47
The data show widespread  support for the idea of pooling, but there
has  been  some controversy  over  what  the significance  for  tax policy  of
Blumstein and Schwartz's results should be.  Kornhauser considers the fo-
cus on attitudes  to be beside the point:  If married couples do not share as
much as they  say they report, then they should not receive the tax advan-
tage of income-splitting.48  Lawrence  Zelenak  disagrees  on  the grounds
that the tax  system should reflect people's widely  shared  attitudes toward
aspects  of marriage  such  as  the degree  of sharing.49  Quite  possibly  he
adopts this view, because under current law there is no way  to test couples'
degree  of commitment to these  positive attitudes toward  sharing.  As we
will  see,  intermediate  filing solves  this dilemma:  Under  intermediate fil-
ing, people  are  allowed  a degree  of income-splitting  that corresponds  to
the  sharing  of control,  thus  satisfying  Kornhauser's  objections.50  Once
people  have the opportunity  to back up their professions  of sharing  with
actions, Zelenak's reliance on general attitudes is no longer necessary.
Measuring sharing is very difficult indeed.  As is widely  recognized,
difficulties  in  measuring  actual  pooling  include  privacy  concerns,  the
complexity of the phenomenon, and the multiplicity of interpretations with
which  the little data  available  are  consistent.51  Pahl  found that  women
married  to  high-income  men are  less  likely  to have control  over money
45.  See Kornhauser, Love, Money, and  the IRS, supra  note 2, at 86-87.
46.  See PAHL, supra note 41, at 83-84.
47.  See id.
48.  See Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra  note 2, at 86 n.64.
49.  See Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra  note 2, at 349-50.
50.  See infra Part IIl.
51.  See, e.g.,  Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra note 2, at 80-84.  See also Zelenak,
Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra  note 2, at 350.
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than  are women married to lower-income  men,52  and many  nonstatistical
studies conclude  that the husband often enjoys greater consumption within
the marriage than does the wife.53
For consumption  at least, census data can provide partial  answers  as
to the degree of sharing.  Zelenak notes that the high percentage of income
spent on consumption in basic areas like food and shelter indicates  a high
degree of shared consumption.54  However,  these data  are of limited use.
First, while acknowledging the possibility that a high-income husband may
spend far more on himself, Zelenak claims (without empirical support) that
this is "hardly the norm."55  Further, although it is true that the data indi-
cate that opportunities for saving (which could more easily be separate) are
limited,56  savings  should  also  include  human  capital.  If one  spouse  is
building up  human  capital  and  the other  is  not, pure joint consumption
during the marriage is a far cry from an assurance of long-term sharing.57
Finally, since control is not unrelated to rights on dissolution,  imbalances
in human capital may correlate  with  quite different degrees  of control  in
the spouses even where they jointly consume during the marriage.  Control
over joint consumption is crucial.
Measuring control is at least as difficult as measuring joint consump-
tion.  But very recent economic work points to less than  complete sharing
of  both  control  and  consumption  in  a  variety  of societies.  If couples
pooled their income and control, increases in the wife's income relative to
that of the husband should not alter the family's consumption  pattern,  as-
suming family income remains constant.  There  should be only an income
effect for  the family,  but no  substitution  effect based  on  whose  income
supplies the family.  But increases  in the wife's income relative to that of
the husband  are associated  with an increase  in  expenditures  on  restaurant
meals, child care, and women's  clothing,58 and with decreases  in expendi-
52.  See, e.g.,  Jan  Pahl, The Allocation of Money  Within  the Household, in TE STATE,  THIE
LAW,  AND THE FAMILY:  CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 36,43 (Michael D.A. Freeman ed.,  1934).
53.  See, e.g., BERGMANN,  supra note 28,  at 213-14; Christine Delphy  & Diana Leonard,  Class
Analysis,  Gender Analysis and the  Family,  in  GENDER  AND  STRATIFICATION  57-73  (Rosemary
Crompton  & Michael  Mann  eds.,  1986); Nancy  C. Staudt,  Taxing Housework, 84  GEO.  L.J.  1571,
1594-96  (1996).  For a  much  older study,  see  Michael  Young, Distribution of Income  Within  the
Family, 3 BRrr.  J. Soc. 305  (1952).
54.  See Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra  note 2, at 351-52.
55.  id. at 352.
56.  See id.
57.  See infra Part III.E.
58.  See,  e.g.,  Martin  Browning,  Frangois  Bourguignon,  Pierre-Andr6  Chiappori  &  Valerie
Lechene, Incomes and Outcomes:  A Structural  Model of  Intrahousehold  Allocation, 102 J. POL. ECON.
1067 (1994)  (women's  clothing).  See also Shelly  Lundberg & Robert Pollak, Bargaining  and Distri-
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tures on alcohol and tobacco.59  Nor can all of these patterns be explained
as increased  work-related  expenses  of the wife.  Strikingly,  these effects
extend to children:  Increases  in a mother's  control over family resources
are associated in some societies with increases in the health, nutrition, and
survival  chances  of the  children.6 0   The  most dramatic  of  these  recent
studies is based on a "natural experiment."  After the policy change in the
United Kingdom in the late  1970s that moved a substantial child subsidy
from the family to  the wife, there was  strong evidence  of a shift towards
women's and children's clothing and away from men's clothing.61  The in-
creased income was  in the form of the subsidy, meaning that the shifts to-
ward  women's  clothing  cannot  be  explained  by  requirements  of  work.
This  provides  evidence  that,  despite  everyday  professions  in  favor  of
sharing and despite the assumption of family unity in traditional economic
models,62 pooling is  far from complete,  and,  very  importantly  for  inter-
mediate filing, the legal right to income does indeed increase control.
These  results  should  strengthen  the  increasing  skepticism  about
pooling and marital  sharing  of control  among  tax commentators.  Korn-
hauser bases her doubts about sharing on a study that focuses  on whether
couples  deposit  earned  income  into joint  or  separate  bank  accounts.63
Komhauser  takes the depositing of earned income into  separate  bank ac-
counts as a proxy for nonpooling and in particular nonpooling for purposes
of control,  but concedes that separate bank accounts could  in some cases
be mere bookkeeping  devices.64  In a random  survey of married people,
Kornhauser  found  that 70%  of respondents  deposited  earned  income  in
separate accounts; in a survey of law students  at one law school, 55.6% of
married  and  cohabiting  respondents  answered  that they  use separate  ac-
counts  for depositing earned income.65  Kornhauser herself takes these as
bution in Marriage,  J. ECON.  PERSP.,  Fall 1996,  at 144 (collecting studies  on restaurant meals,  child
care, and women's clothing).
59.  See John Hoddinott & Lawrence Haddad, Does Female Income Share Influence Household
Expenditures?: Evidence from the Cbte d'Ivoire, 57 OXFoRD  BULL. ECON.  & STAT. 77  (1995).  See
also Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 58, at 144.
60.  See Lawrence  Haddad  & John Hoddinott, Women's Income and Boy-Girl Anthropometric
Status in the Cbte d'Ivoire, 22 WORLD DEv.  543  (1994); Duncan Thomas, Intra-Household  Resource
Allocation: An Inferential  Approach, 25 J. HUM. RES. 635  (1990);  Duncan Thomas, Like Father,  Like
Son; Like Mother,  Like Daughter:  Parental  Resources and Child Height,  29 J. HUM.  REs. 950 (1994).
61.  See  Shelly J.  Lundberg, Robert  A. Pollak  & Terence  J. Wales, Do Husbands and Wives
Pool Their  Resources? Evidence  from U.K.  Child  Benefit, 32J. HUM. REs.  463,472-79 (1997).
62.  See infra Part II.B.3.
63.  See Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra note 2, at 86.
64.  See id.  at 82-84; Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra  note 2, at 350.
65.  See Komhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra note 2, at 86.
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low numbers indicating widespread nonpooling.66  Zelenak finds the num-
bers to indicate a fairly high degree of pooling: Because a separate account
could  more  easily be considered  de  facto  a joint asset  by  couples  than
could  a joint account be considered de facto separate,  the numbers  repre-
sent a minimum.
67
Also, some couples use a combination  of joint and  separate accounts.
This could indicate more pooling,  as Zelenak believes, 6 8  or this could re-
flect partial  pooling.  Indeed,  in  Komhauser's  random survey,  fully  21%
of the respondents  did use a combination  of joint and  separate  accounts,
with only 9% using only separate accounts.69  Again, it is worth emphasiz-
ing that pooling may fall anywhere on the spectrum from none to full,  and
neither pure joint filing nor pure individual filing captures the reality of the
intermediate cases.
There  is  yet another reason to pay more  attention to control  than  to
consumption.  Utility for  the  individuals  in  the marriage  is  probably  a
function not just of amounts  consumed but also of control.  Indeed, this is
why  notions  of taxable  well-being,  upon  which  the income  tax  itself is
based, tend to look more toward control rather than consumption.  For our
purposes,  it  is  particularly  interesting  that  this  uneven  distribution  of
benefits within  many marriages  means that the assumption  of equal con-
sumption implied by income-splitting (and joint filing) is off the mark.
If the couple  were the  only relevant unit for measuring  utility  (as  is
often assumed for a variety of reasons), 70 this might not matter.  But com-
pare couples A-A'  and B-B', in which A  shares equally with A', but B and
B' consume or control resources very unequally.  First of all, these couples
are not similarly situated in a manner that will be relevant to the splitting
question.  The first couple approximates  more closely  the ideal of a shar-
ing couple that seems  to be implied by using married couples  as  the unit
for measuring utility.  We can even ask in what relevant sense the nonshar-
ing couple is a married couple.  At least, sharing is a defining feature in the
model of companionate  or equal-partners marriage7  that underlies the use
of the household  as the unit of taxation.  Second,  who actually  consumes
66.  See id.
67.  See Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra note 2, at 351.  Lawrence Zelenak  also
notes his  disagreement with McCaffery's  endorsement of Komhauser's  low-pooling interpretation of
these data.  See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, 70 S.  CAL. L. REV.  1021,  1029 n.42.
(1997)  [hereinafter Zelenak, Tax and  the Married  Woman] (reviewing MCCAFFERY,  supra  note 2).
68.  See Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra  note 2, at 350.
69.  See Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra note 2, at 86-87  nn.65-66.
70.  See infra Part 11.13.3.
71.  See infra Part II.B.1.
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or controls the benefits of marriage does matter unless we believe that in-
dividual utility within a couple did not matter, which would be reminiscent
of the common-law  theory of coverture under which women's legal  iden-
tities merged completely  into that of their husbands.72  This is neither ethi-
cally  nor economically  sensible.  Further,  if we wish  to promote  closely
integrated,  sharing marriages, it is quite appropriate that the tax burden  on
relatively nonsharing B-B' will be higher than on relatively sharing couple
A-A'.  Finally,  the degree  of sharing  that occurs may fall somewhere be-
tween the poles of full pooling  and nonpooling of income  and assets.  As
we will see,  the key is to make  sure that couples such as B-B'  can lower
their tax burden only to the extent that more sharing actually occurs.
B.  MODELS OF MARRIAGE
Models of marriage tend to stress those aspects of marriage character-
ized  by sharing  or they emphasize  how far actual  sharing falls from this
ideal.  In this  section,  I will  examine  various  normative  and  descriptive
models of marriage with an eye to how they justify either joint or individ-
ual filing.  Because  the literature  on this topic is extensive, I will focus  on
those aspects  of the debate that have  led to  an  acceptance  of individual
filing, particularly in the feminist tax literature.
As  I  will  argue,  the increasing  acceptance  of individual  filing  cor-
rectly  reflects  a  perceived  mismatch  between  the  rhetoric  surrounding
marriage  and  the reality of marriage.  As noted in  the previous  section,
people generally  profess  support for more sharing in marriages  than actu-
ally occurs.  This mismatch is then coupled with a belief that, although tax
laws can do little to promote equality,  we must ensure that they present as
few  obstacles  to  married  women's  economic  advancement  as  possible.
Thus,  the reality of unequal sharing in marriages justifies individual filing
as a least bad alternative, despite its own inaccuracies.
By contrast, in an earlier day, an unquestioned belief that full sharing
occurs in marriages  similarly  led to an  acceptance  of joint filing.73  Ulti-
72.  Under the common-law  doctrine of coverture, a wife's  legal  identity merged  on marriage
with that of her husband, placing her "in  the same legal  category  as wards, lunatics, idiots, and out-
laws."  Janelle Greenberg,  The Legal Status of  the English Woman in Early Eighteenth-Century Com-
mon Law and Equity, in 4 STUDIES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY  CULTURE  171-72  (Harold E.  Pagliaro
ed., 1975).  In equity, married women enjoyed somewhat greater legal rights.  See id. at 176.
73.  See, e.g.,  McIntyre, supra note 2, at 469-71; McIntyre  & Oldman,  supra note 2, at  1578
("we believe  that  married  couples  should  be assumed  to  share their income  equally");  id. at  1590
("[E]qual-income  couples should pay equal taxes, since each member of the couple will benefit more
or less equally  from the total available income without regard to the source distribution.").  But see,
e.g., Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses:  A  Comparison of Canadian,  American, British, French
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mately, however, this persistent but false assumption that we face a simple
choice of joint or individual filing has led to an exaggeration  of the abun-
dance or lack of sharing in marriage.  Because  tax  policy  commentators
generally seek to justify joint or individual filing, the models of marriage
chosen have tended to emphasize  the extremes  of sharing or the lack of it
in marriage.  However, many marriages exhibit some degree of less-than-
complete sharing.  Because not all marriages exhibit the extremes of shar-
ing-no sharing or total sharing-the models used to justify individual  or
joint filing  do violence  to the diverse  reality  of marriages.  In  later sec-
tions, I will  show that if tax  and  family  law  are  treated  as  an integrated
whole, we can begin  to solve the problems of the mismatch  between nor-
mative and positive models of marriage.
1.  Companionate  Marriage  and the Partnership  Model
The notion of equal sharing in marriage falls under a variety of labels
and has led to a surprisingly  wide variety  of normative  prescriptions  for
family law.  First, the idea of the equal-sharing model has a long pedigree,
despite the fact it has never been close to being fully practiced during most
of its history.  Michel Foucault has documented the rise in Western socie-
ties of the ideal marriage of equals based on mutual respect, affection,  and
support-what  Richard  Posner  terms  "companionate  marriage."74   More
recently, feminists have explored what that theory calls for and  how prac-
tice falls short of the ideal.75  Borrowing legal terminology, some have  ad-
vocated a "partnership"  model  of marriage.7 6  However,  this metaphor  is
sometimes taken  as implying a unity of interests in marriage  that does not
exist, especially  in light of less than full sharing in marriages.77  Interest-
ingly,  more  recent partnership  law  does not require  a complete  unity  of
and Swedish Law,  23  OSGOODE HALL  L.J.  67, 88  (1985)  (disagreeing with  this  assumption); Kom-
hauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra note 2, at 80-91  (disputing assumption of marital pooling  of
income).  Zelenak believes  that couples  pool  consumption  but  that income  should  be  taxed  to  the
earner.  See Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra note 2,  at 348-63.  For further discussion,
see supra Part II.A.2.
74.  See  MICHEL  FOUCAULT,  THE  CARE  OF THE  SELF  72-80,  228-32  (Robert  Hurley  trans.,
1986).  See also RICHARD A. POSNER,  SEX AND  REASON  45 (1992)  (discussing Foucault on the rise of
what Posner terms "companionate  marriage" and defining  this term as "marriage  between at least ap-
proximate equals, based on mutual respect and affection, and involving close and continuous associa-
tion in child rearing, household management,  and other activities").
75.  See PEPPER SCHWARTZ,  PEER MARRIAGES  (1994)  (documenting  the ideal  of a "peer mar-
riage" in which resources and responsibilities  are  shared  and deviation  of practice from such an ideal);
Marjorie E. Kornauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership  Model of Marriage  in Family and
Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV.  1413,  1425 (1996) [hereinafter  Kornhauser, Partnership  Model].
76.  See Kornhauser, Partnership  Model, supra  note 75, at 1414-24.
77.  See supra  Part II.A.2.
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interests  among partners.78  In general,  as noted above, we can say that in
marriage, as in partnerships, the extent to which the marital partners'  inter-
ests converge  or diverge will differ widely  in individual cases.  As I will
argue, a system tailored  to this full diversity  and  designed to force infor-
mation  disclosure will  not lead  to  the mismatches  between  rhetoric  and
reality about which feminists rightly complain.
Many  feminists  have  objected  to the  partnership  model  because  it
does not reflect reality.  Criticisms can be divided into two  groups.  Some
accept that the partnership ideal has some merit but that the empty rhetoric
of equality  winds up providing  women  and  children  too little protection
and  well-being  when  marriages  end.79  Others  find  that  the partnership
model  inappropriately  "commoditizes"  the  community  of the  family.80
Broadly  speaking, two approaches  have been taken  to remedy the defects
in the partnership model: Put teeth into it or discard it.  As we will see, the
intermediate-filing  approach dovetails  well with  an  approach  to property
division that meets many of these criticisms.
Many feminists seek a reform of marital property and divorce law that
would bring legal reality more  in line with the rhetoric of the partnership
model.  Thus, many divorce-reform proposals focus on a more equal divi-
sion of assets on divorce.  Under a more nuanced analogy of divorce law to
partnership  law, human capital in the spouses, for instance,  would be part
of the calculation  of division  on dissolution.8'  Because  equal sharing  in
marriages  is not the universal rule,81 the partnership model  as reflected  in
current  law  overstates  sharing  and  does  nothing  to  enforce  sharing  or
equality.
8 3
78.  See Kornhauser, Partnership  Model, supra note 75, at  1425 & n.28 (noting that under the
1914 Uniform Partnership  Act, partners are prohibited by strict fiduciary  duties from "acting in  their
own  self-interest in contrast to the partnership's  interest," but that section 404(e) of the Revised  Uni-
form Partnership Act recognizes  that the partners'  unity of interests  is not complete when it provides
that a "partner's  action in his own self-interest is not a violation of his fiduciary duty per se").
79.  See generally  Symposium, Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory, 82 GEO.  L.J. 2119  (1994).
See, e.g., Bea A. Smith, The Partnership  Theory of  Marriage:  A Borrowed Solution Fails,  68 TEx. L.
REV.  689  (1990);  Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced  Homemaker: A  Discourse on Playing
with Dolls, Partnership  Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault,  60 U. CHI.  L. REV.  67 (1993).  On
post-divorce  poverty  among  women  and  children,  see  LENORE  J.  WErrZMAN,  THE  DIVORCE
REVOLUTION 337-56 (1985).
80.  See, e.g.,  Milton C. Regan,  Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations  and Property
Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303 (1994).
81.  See, e.g.,  Smith, supra note 79; Starnes, supra note 79.  See also Kornhauser, Partnership
Model, supra note 75, at 1419-23.  For the author's discussion on this subject, see infra Part III.E.
82.  See supra Part II.A.2.
83.  I will show this overstatement  and lack of sharing or equality enforcement in detail below
with community property.  See infra Part V.A.
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Such proposals  for reforming the partnership  analogy in divorce law
are often justified on the basis that default rules should reflect what a ma-
jority of contracting  parties would have bargained for.  Although this may
well describe  a great number  of contractual  defaults,  particularly  in  off-
the-rack  legal  forms  like  partnerships,  this is  certainly  not  the  only  ap-
proach  to defaults.  Later,  I will describe  how the penalty  defaults  built
into  intermediate  filing  can  be used  to  improve  the  marital  contracting
process.
84
2.  The Contractarian  Approach to Family Law
The  other major group  of feminist commentators  would abandon  the
partnership model.  The major competitor of the companionate or partner-
ship model is the contractarian  model.  The contractarian  approach  differs
from the partnership model by seeking an implicit contract in the marriage
rather than looking to off-the-rack rules already set up by the law.  In other
words,  the  contractarian  approach,  rather  than  looking  mechanically  to
rules  about dissolution,  asks  instead what the parties  intended  to contract
for in the first place.  In particular, a partnership model  typically seeks  to
divide  up  conventional  forms  of property,  which  do not  include  human
capital.  The contractarian  approach,  however, might ask what a wife who
stays at home or puts a husband  through professional school was contract-
ing for.85  Such approaches lead very naturally to a broadening of property
division on divorce to include human  capital built up during the marriage.
If we find  that the wife  was  contracting  for a degree  of security  beyond
that implied by equitable distribution  of conventional property on divorce,
we have some reason to look  to human  capital  to supply the stream of in-
come after divorce that she implicitly contracted for all along.
Some feminists'  critiques  can  be  called  "contractarian"  in  only  the
loosest sense.  Some find that family patterns  are so unequal to begin with
that women  are entitled to more than  an equal  share. 6  Most importantly
for our purposes, such commentators  share  with the contractarians  a rejec-
tion  of the unity of interest  implied  by the partnership  model,  although
they would rest their conclusions less on an implicit bargain than  on more
general notions of entitlement. 8 7
84.  See infra Parts III.D.2 and III.E.
85.  See, e.g., Baker, supra note 38, at 1213-25.
86.  See, e.g.,  MARTHA  ALBERTSON FINEMAN,  THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY:  THE RHETORIC  AND
REALITY OF DIVORcE REFORM  2-6. 29 (1991).
87.  See Kornhauser, Partnership  Model, supra note 75, at 1424.
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As  we will see,  intermediate  filing has  implications  for family  law.
By providing for  "penalty defaults"  that the primary earner  will  have an
incentive to  contract  around,  we can  improve  the bargaining  position of
women. 88  That is, the inequality that this last-mentioned group of theorists
base their entitlements  on can be at least partially remedied  by changing
the rules under which bargaining takes place.
3.  Economic Models of  Marriage
In a manner roughly like the partnership and contractarian  models of
marriage, economic models  can be divided into those that take the couple
as a unity for purposes  of utility  and  welfare analysis,  and those  models
that are based  on individual  spouses  as the locus of utility.  Two further
distinctions important for us but not consistently made by economic mod-
els include:  labor in the home  versus leisure, and domestic  exchange  ver-
sus altruistic sharing.
One threshold problem with many economic  models is  that, in seek-
ing  a  simple  take  on  the  question  of how households  will  behave  as  a
whole,  they assume  away  the question  of the proper unit for measuring
utility and for analyzing  decisionmaking.  In traditional  analysis, families
are treated as firms or production functions for purposes of production, and
as individuals or utility functions  on the consumption side.  Theories about
individual-choice  behavior  are  then  based  on  a  single  household  utility
function.89  Under  the family-unity  approach,  the  family  is  then  often
treated as an extension of its head, with the head making the decisions  and
every one equally well off.90
However, when we  are concerned with  the distribution  of goods and
utilities within the marriage,  we must push the analysis below the family
level.  Economists  who  challenge  the unitary  model  theorize  the  intra-
family  decision  process  in  several  different  ways,91  but  these  "non-
88.  See infra  Parts III.D.2 and III.E.
89.  See, e.g.,  Gary  S.  Becker, A  Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL.  ECON.  1063,  1079
(1974).
90.  See, e.g.,  Apps & Rees,  supra note 40, at 355  (noting that "[w]here  policy  based studies
based  on [a  household utility function  that is that of the head  of the household]  require specific  as-
sumptions  about the intra-household  distribution of welfare, the common practice  is to assume  they
are all equally well off").
91.  See, e.g., id. at 357-61;  Pierre-Andr6 Chiappori,  Collective Labor Supply and Welfare, 100
J. POL. ECON.  437 (1992)  (extending collective model);  Pierre-Andrd Chiappori,  Rational Household
Labor Supply, 56 ECONOMETRICA  63  (1988)  (introducing  "collective"  model);  Shelly  Lundberg  &
Robert  A.  Pollak,  Separate Spheres Bargaining  and the Marriage  Market, 101  J. POL.  ECON.  988
(1993)  (using  "uncooperative"  marriage  model);  Marilyn Manser  &  Murray  Brown, Marriage and
Household Decision-Making:  A  Bargaining  Analysis, 21  INT'L ECON.  REV.  31  (1980)  (using  Nash
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unitary"  theories  all  allow  a  number  of predictions  that  would  be  more
difficult  to obtain  on the unitary  model.  In particular,  individual-utility
models  easily  predict  that cross-elasticities  of spouses'  labor  supplies-
that is, the sensitivity of the labor supply of one spouse  to the real wage of
the other spouse-need not be symmetric.92  Thus,  as empirical  work has
confirmed,  wives'  labor  supply  decisions  are  relatively  sensitive  to  the
wage rate of their husbands-the higher the husband's wage, the less labor
the wife will supply-whereas  husbands'  labor supply decisions  are rela-
tively unaffected  by their wives'  wage.93  Additionally,  the sensitivity  of
the labor supply of married women, particularly those not now working, to
the wage rate they  face  themselves  is  far higher  (though estimates  vary)
than  the  sensitivity  of married  men's  labor  supply  to  their  own  wage
rates.9 4  A lowering of the wage, which can result from a higher marginal
rate of income  tax,  will reduce  a married  woman's  labor supply propor-
tionately more than a lowering of the wage will tend to reduce a husband's
hours  of work  (who may even  work more if the  income effect dominates
the substitution effect).95  Although  more difficult  to study,  it seems par-
ticularly  likely  that the impact  of the own-wage  rate  on the  decision  of
cooperative  model assuming that household maximizes product of members'  utilities in excess of res-
ervation  utility  obtainable  through  divorce);  Maijorie  B.  McElroy  &  Mary  Jean  Homey,  Nash-
Bargained  Household Decisions:  Towards a Generalization  of the Theory of  Demand, 22 INT'L ECON.
REV.  333  (1981)  (using  Nash  cooperative  model);  Pierre-Andr6  Chiappori,  Bernard  Fortin  & Guy
Lacroix,  Household  Labor Supply,  Sharing Rule  and  the  Marriage Market  1  (Nov.  1997)
(unpublished  manuscript, Workshops in Applications of Economics) (deriving predictions  for sharing
and marriage market from collective model).
92.  See, e.g.,  MARK  R.  KILLINGSWORTH,  LABOR  SUPPLY  36 (1983).  In  the  individual-utility
models, cross-substitution effects arise as indirect income effects.  See id. at 36-37.
93.  See, e.g., id. at 109,  122-23  (collecting "first generation" studies and  noting that the results
support a cross-substitution  elasticity  for husbands  that is not  significantly different  from zero,  but
wives'  cross-substitution elasticity is usually significantly positive and in the range of 0.000 to 0.400).
94.  See id. at  106-09 (discussing compensated  own-substitution  labor supplies  of women  and
men),  192-206  (collecting "second-generation"  studies  and noting  that they  support an  even greater
difference between women's compensated own-wage labor-supply elasticities and married men's than
did first-generation studies).  See also MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 260-62 (collecting studies); Rich-
ard Blundell, Labor  Supply and Taxation, in  THE ECONOMICS OF TAX POLICY  107,  116-23  (Michael P.
Devereux ed.,  1996).  Because estimates of labor-supply elasticity vary  and  are subject to methodo-
logical qualifications,  it is hard to say how great the difference is between married  men  and married
women.  See Thomas  A. Mroz, The Sensitivity of  an Empirical  Model of Married Women's Hours of
Work to Economic and Statistical  Assumptions, 55 ECONOMETRICA  765, 795-96 (1987)  (noting wide
range of estimates  and problems  with some studies).  Even  those who  criticize some of the elasticity
studies do seem to agree that elasticities  for married  women not already  at work are particularly high.
See, e.g., Killingsworth  & Heckman, supra note 8,  at 185-97; Mroz, supra, at 795.  Cf. NADA  EISSA,
TAXATION  AND  LABOR SUPPLY OF MARRIED WOMEN:  THE TAX REFORM AcT OF  1986  AS A NATURAL
EXPERIMENT 31  (National  Bureau of Econ.  Research Working Paper No. 5023,  1995) (noting that for
high-income wives, the decision whether to work  outside the home is  only slightly  more elastic  than
the market-hours decision).
95.  See KILLINGSWORTH,  supra note 92.HOUSEHOLD  TAXATION
whether to  work  in  the marketplace  at  all  is  much  higher  for  married
women than for married men.96  Thus, when it comes to the behavioral  ef-
fects of taxation and their associated  welfare  losses, the effects of the tax
system on married women will be more important than those  on married
men.
97
Another simplifying assumption often made in models of the house-
hold  is  that households  or  their members  choose  between  market  labor
(used  to purchase  market  goods)  on  the  one  hand  and  "leisure"  on the
other.98  It is true  that this assumption  of a choice between  market labor
leading  to  purchases  of consumer  goods versus  enjoyment  of leisure  ap-
plies  to  all households  and  is not unique to the marital  context.  But this
assumption nonetheless does have a large impact on the model of marriage
and labor supply.  By treating  all nonmarket labor as consumption  of lei-
sure,  the secondary  earner  is treated as making  a decision between  these
two,  rather  than between  different forms of work, as  is  often  the case.
While it is true that we can redefine "leisure" to mean all nonmarket activ-
ity,  this  provides  little insight into  the trade-offs  between  different  non-
market  activities  and  between  those  different  nonmarket  activities  and
market-labor supply.
To  remedy  this  problem it is  necessary  to  disaggregate  nonmarket-
labor activities.  Thus, we must adopt something  along the lines of Gary
Becker's  time-allocation  model, in which  labor supply  and  consumption
decisions  are broken down such that the things to choose among and upon
which utility depends  directly  are  not market goods  and  services but ac-
tivities, or ways to spend time ("commodities" in Becker's original termi-
nology).99  Crucially,  individuals  choose  to  consume  or produce  these
"commodities."  To produce  them, the individual uses  as inputs her  own
time  and  market  goods  (or  services).  This  production  is  captured  by
household  production  functions,  the  key  innovation  of  Becker's  ap-
proach.' 0  The  time-allocation  approach  has  proven  more  useful  when
there is  a need  to analyze  nonmarket  production  (as  opposed  to  market
96.  See id.  at 442; sources cited supra note 94.  Studying the participation decision is somewhat
more difficult than  the decision  on how many  hours  to  work, because data  on the wage  rate facing
those who are not working is more difficult to obtain.
97.  See infra Part III.D.
98.  See, e.g.,  KILLINGSWORTH,  supra note  92, at 1-28;  WALTER NICHOLSON,  MICROECONOMIC
THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES  AND EXTENSIONS  737-59 (6th ed.  1995).
99.  See Gary S.  Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON. J. 493,495-500 (1965).
100.  See id. at 496.
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production).1 1  Because  nonmarket production  and  even  nonmarket  ex-
change  is crucial in what follows,  the time-allocation  approach  will be  a
natural place to start the efficiency analysis.
In  the  following  discussion,  it will  be  important  to  distinguish  not
only nonmarket production from "leisure,"  but also gift-giving or altruism
from marital  exchange.  Income-splitting  could  occur  for either  or both
reasons.  If the primary earner derives  utility from the secondary  earner's
enjoyment of resources,  then the primary earner can gain utility by sharing
with  the  secondary  earner  altruistically.  The  more  utility  the  primary
earner derives  from the sharing, the more  the utility-maximizing  primary
earner  will  share.  As  is  often  noted,  there  is  nothing  in  the  utility-
maximization  model that precludes  altruistic preferences. 1 02  On the  other
hand, even a primary earner not so altruistically inclined might engage in a
(nonmarket)  exchange  with  the secondary  earner.  For instance,  the  hus-
band will share  income in return for the domestic  labor of the wife.  As
mentioned  earlier, for  both  feminist  and  efficiency  reasons,  we  must  be
careful  not to let the tax system  increase  the attractiveness  of such  an  ar-
rangement relative to a no-tax world.  Both joint filing and even individual
filing allow nonmarket marital exchange to escape tax altogether.1 0 3
4. An Analysis of Income-Splitting as Gift and Exchange
Marital  sharing  can  be  regarded  as  gift-giving  and  exchange.  Al-
though gifts and exchanges  are treated quite differently under the Internal
Revenue Code, purely altruistic gift-giving  and completely hard-nosed ex-
change  are more realistically  regarded  as forming  two poles  of a contin-
uum.  Indeed,  to  French  sociologist  and  anthropologist  Marcel Mauss  in
his famous  1925 cross-cultural analysis of the institution of gift-giving, the
essence  of gift-giving  is  the  indefinitely  continuing  cycle  of gift,  return
gift,  and  counter-return  gift.1"4  Mauss  found that what  previous  anthro-
pologists had described  as voluntary,  spontaneous,  and  disinterested  gift-
giving  with  no  expectation  of  return  was  actually  quite  the  opposite.
Mauss believed that gift-giving could constitute a very special form of re-
101.  See KILLINGSWORTH,  supra  note 92, at 40; Reuben Gronau, Leisure, Home Production and
Work-The Theory of the Allocation of Time Revisited, 85 J. POL. EcON. 1099 (1977).
102.  See BECKER, supra note 35, at 277-306 (analyzing altruism within family); Gary S.  Becker,
A  Theory of  Marriage,  in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY:  MARRIAGE,  CHILDREN,  AND  HUMAN  CAPITAL
299, 327-32  (Theodore  W. Schultz ed.,  1974)  [hereinafter  ECONOMICS  OF THE FAMILY]  (introducing
"caring"  into the model of marriage).
103.  See infra  Part III.D.1
104.  See  MARCEL  MAUSS,  THE  GIFT:  THE  FORM  AND  REASON  FOR  EXCHANGE  IN  ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES  1-5  (W.D. Halls trans., Norton ed.  1990).
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lationship-building  exchange-a  "total  social  phenomenon"  in  Mauss'
terms-involving  three mutually  reinforcing  obligations of giving, receiv-
ing, and  repaying.1 0 5  In  any  event,  gift-giving can  range  from uncondi-
tional  to  quite  conditional  (Mauss'  systems),  to pure  exchange  with  no
"gift" element at all.'1 6
Although  such  a  spectrum  seems  quite  plausible,  both  the  Internal
Revenue  Code  and  the  law  generally  tend  to  classify  transfers  either  as
gifts or exchanges.  Importantly, the rules that apply to gifts and those that
govern  exchanges  are  very  different,  and  the  classification  thus  carries
with it often dramatic consequences.  Thus, in property law the criteria for
a valid gift are different from the requirements for  an enforceable agree-
ment in contract  law.  Contract law generally  excepts  donative promises
from legal enforcement under the doctrine of "consideration."
Sharing of income within a marriage can  be analogized to  gifts  and
exchanges.  In  a marriage,  the husband  and wife  exchange  a variety  of
services  and  property. 0 7  Many  of these  services  bear a  somewhat  mis-
leading resemblance to imputed income.  These services, when performed
for oneself, are imputed income.  However, if they are performed  for an-
other in exchange for income they are not imputed income.  If, on the other
hand, the services  are "donated" to the other spouse, they can be thought of
as  a gift of imputed  income.  As  is  well known,  imputed  income  is  not
taxed for various reasons, including administrative  difficulties and popular
perceptions.1 0 8  Maritally  exchanged  domestic services  are also not taxed
and this nontaxation contributes to a false similarity between such services
and true imputed income.
Taking the gift analogy first, if we focus  on "regular" income  and its
uses, we could treat the contribution  of income by one spouse to the other
like a gift.  I do not mean that such  a transfer really is a gift, and, as men-
tioned, the secondary  earner may well be providing services  to the house-
hold in return for financial  security. 10 9  This should come as no surprise,
105.  Id. at 1.
106.  For more recent treatments  of the shading of gifts into  exchanges and  its relevance  to the
law, see, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains,  and Form, 64 IND.  L.J. 155,  180-81,  189 (1989);  Melvin
Aron  Eisenberg, The  World of Contract and the  World of Gift, 85  CAL.  L.  REv.  821,  841  (1997);
Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and
(More Importantly)  Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295,302 (1992).
107.  Dependents change the situation as between the spouses only if one spouse is taking greater
financial responsibility for the child.  See infra Part V.
108.  See supra notes 7, 20, and accompanying text.
109.  See Baker, supra note 38, at 1206-13 (analyzing  marriage as involving  a bargain of services
for financial security).
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because  the notion  of gift-giving  itself is  not incompatible  with  mutual
transfer; indeed, cross-culturally,  many long-term gift-giving relationships
may best  be seen  as  protracted  exchange  relationships,  as  Mauss  would
recognize.  There  is little reason to think that analyzing  marital  sharing as
gift-giving implies a one-way street.
Instead, the analysis in terms of a gift will serve two purposes.  First,
granting that the view  of marital  sharing as a gift quite  often exaggerates
the contribution of the primary earner, we should be careful to prevent the
Code from treating the primary earner even better still. In other words, the
Code should not treat the primary earner as conferring an even  larger gift
than even the rosiest view of the sharing would justify.
Of equal importance is the fact that analyzing marital sharing as gift-
giving  furnishes  some insight  into  the  assumptions  lurking  behind  treat-
ments of the income-splitting problem that do not tax imputed  income (or
domestically traded  services).  That is, even granting that some mismeas-
urement will flow from the nontaxation of imputed income, we can use the
gift analysis to discover which approach to "taxable well-being"  motivates
the Code's approach  to family taxation and  the various  suggested alterna-
tives.
110
When  A  gives  value  gratuitously  to B,  there are  three possible  ap-
proaches to taxing the transfer.  First, the donor could receive a deduction
for the amount donated  and  the  donee would  pay  tax.  Second,  both  the
donor and the donee might be taxed  on the transferred  amount.  Or, third,
the donor but not the donee might be taxed on the amount.
The first possibility,  taxing the donee but not the donor, corresponds
to a "standard-of-living"  approach to measuring income.I "'  Consider two
parent-child  pairs A-A'  and B-B'.  A  and B start off with  the same wealth
but A  saves and makes a bequest to A'.  B consumes her wealth.  The chil-
dren consume everything they have.  On a  "standard-of-living"  measure,
the pairs  should pay roughly  the same  tax, because A'  is just consuming
what A  did  not  consume.1 1 2  A  should  pay  less  tax  and  A'  should  pay
higher tax.
The  "ability-to-pay,"  or what I  will term  the  "strong-control"  view,
would lead to taxing A  as well as A'  on the  amount A  transfers  to A', be-
110.  Later on,  we will  be in  a better  position  to understand what  approaches  to measuring  in-
come are implicit in the various splitting proposals.
S11.  See DAVID F. BRADFORD,  BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC  TAX  REFORM  33-35  (2d ed.  rev.  1984)
(reprint of UNITED STATES DEP'T OFTHE TREASURY,  BLUEPRINTS  FOR BASIC TAX REFORM  (1977)).
112.  See id. at 34.
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cause the gift itself is an exercise of the  ability to pay.113  A'  also has  an
ability to pay  greater than that of B'  corresponding to the value of the gift
A'  receives  from A.  On the ability-to-pay  approach, the pair A-A'  should
pay more tax than the pair B-B'.
The treatment of gifts under current tax law exemplifies  the third ap-
proach, taxing the donor but not the donee.114  As between the pairs A-A'
and  B-B',  this  corresponds  to  a  "rough"  reverse  standard-of-living  ap-
proach,  because  like the straight standard-of-living  measure,  it taxes  the
pairs A-A'  and B-B'  equally,  ignoring for the moment  the effects  of pro-
gressive rates.  But, unlike the straight standard-of-living  approach,  the re-
verse standard-of-living  treatment of the pairs mismeasures the standard  of
living of the members of each pair, because  the donor pays tax  on more
than she consumes  and the donee pays less."i5
Alternatively, this treatment  of the donor-donee  pairs under the Code
can be regarded as a "weak-control"  approach to the taxation of gifts.  Un-
der what I term the "weak-control"  approach, the donor is regarded as ex-
ercising an ability to pay, but the donee is not. 1 16  By contrast, under Henry
Simons'  view  (the  "strong"  view),  we would  find  control  (and  a corre-
sponding increase in ability to pay tax) in both the donor and the donee. 117
The strong- and weak-control theories diverge in the consequences  for the
donee:  Does the donee have "control"  over the resources after the gift and
a corresponding  ability to pay  tax?  Although it is true that we may have
more assurance  of control on the part  of the donor-after  all, the donor
chose to  make the gift-it seems  likely  that donees  have  "control"  in  a
good many cases.  Thus,  to the extent that the Code's provisions  on gifts
are motivated by policy, the Code either reflects a rough reverse standard-
of-living  approach  or a  "weak-control"  theory  of  ability  to  pay.  And,
given  the closeness  of the many  policy choices-two  versions  of control
versus consumption, ability to pay versus two versions  of standard  of liv-
ing-it may be that the relative administrative ease of taxing donors  over
taxing donees  is the decisive reason for the present system of only taxing
donors.  It would not be entirely surprising to find that the Code is an un-
easy compromise between a dominant ability-to-pay theory based on con-
113.  See id.
114.  Section  61  of the Internal  Revenue Code defines gross income  broadly and §  102 provides
that gross income does not include value of property acquired by gift, bequest,  devise, or inheritance.
See I.R.C. §§ 61,  102 (1994).
115.  See BRADFORD, supra note  111, at 34.
116.  Zelenak seems to subscribe to the weak approach in his discussion of control and consump-
tion within marriages.  See Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra note 2, at 357-58.
117.  See HENRY  C. SIMONS,  PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION  125-47 (1938).
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trol"8  and  some form  of standard-of-living  theory  based on consumption
lurking in the shadows.
On the analogy to gift-giving, income-splitting  can be viewed  as  the
transfer of one half of the increment of the primary  earner's income  over
that of the secondary  earner.119  Assume  for the moment only earned  in-
come  (ignoring for now income from property),  and  consider two  sets of
spouses.  A  earns  $100  and  A'  earns $50.  B  and B'  each earn  $75.  In-
come-splitting  is like a transfer of $25 (= ($100 - $50) / 2) from A  to A'.
On the three approaches  to taxing transfers,  one could tax A'  but not A  on
the $25  transferred, tax both, or tax A  but not A'.  The first is the income-
splitting result that conventional joint filing leads to, and, as we have just
seen, it corresponds  to the straight standard-of-living  measure  of income.
Thus,  conventional joint filing seems to rely implicitly  on the standard-of-
living approach.
This in itself is quite interesting, because the income tax is generally
thought to reflect an ability-to-pay  theory.  Thus,  we have  already  shown
that viewing the spouses  in a married  couple as individuals  reveals joint
filing as an exception to the Code's general approach.
The  treatment  that does  correspond  to  the  ability-to-pay  or  strong-
control view is the "double-taxation"  variant, under which A would pay tax
on $100  andA'  would pay tax on $75  (= $50 + $25).  In other words, both
would pay tax on  half the increment of the primary  earner's income over
that of the secondary  earner (here $25).  The primary earner is exercising
the ability to pay by transferring wealth to the secondary  earner, who, as a
result, has  an  increased  ability  to  pay.  This  "double"  method  of taxing
gifts was advocated  by Simons  outside the  marital context12  but has  not
found many adherents.
The last approach would tax the primary  earner on  his or her  full in-
come but not the secondary  earner on the amount transferred.  This  would
be in accord  with  current  law  preventing  assignments  of earned  income
from  affecting  choice  of taxpayer,121 and  it is  also  the  method  used  for
treating gifts under the current income tax, which corresponds  to the rough
reverse standard-of-living  measure  or, alternatively,  the weak-control  the-
118.  The  concept  of income  itself is  usually  regarded  as  incorporating  a view  that  taxation
should  follow  ability to  pay.  This theory  is implemented  by looking  to control  to find income  (and
hence  ability to pay).  See generally  GRAEIZ & SCHENK, supra note 32, at 31.
119.  Later I will consider the implications  of taking a more realistic view of the amount of shar-
ing that really takes place.  See infra Parts 1I.C and V.
120.  See SIMONS,  supra note 117,  at 125-47.
121.  See infraPartIV.
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ory.1 22  Such  double  taxation  (of both  donor  and  recipient)  might  be
viewed as protecting progressivity,  since an earner cannot shift income to
another individual in  a lower bracket.  But it only does  so at the price  of
some mismeasurement  of income on the standard-of-living  approach,  or it
requires us to adopt the less plausible weak, as opposed to strong, theory  of
control.  Individual filing thus reflects the rough reverse standard-of-living
or the weak-control measures of income.
With  a few  possible exceptions, 123 most commentators  do not advo-
cate  an  explicit  marriage  penalty.  For  present  purposes,  I  interpret
"marriage  penalty"  to mean any  increment in taxes for a married individ-
ual over what that person would owe as a single individual  with the same
income.  Whether  or not  this  is  really  a  penalty  certainly  depends  on
whether or not the benefits  of marriage  outweigh  the burdens.  As  a first
approximation,  I will assume that they do, since  some people do become
and stay  married, although the costs of getting  divorced are a factor once
people are married.
On a standard-of-living measure that takes into account all aspects  of
individual utility, we would expect a higher tax on married couples.  How-
ever, since the added benefit comes from nonmonetary transfers, consumer
surplus,  and  "economies  of  scale,"'124  measuring  standard  of living  in  a
marriage by household monetary  income will not lead  to this result.  On
the other hand, the ability-to-pay measure focuses on the monetary transfer
and suggests ability to pay in the primary earner corresponding to that of a
single individual with the same income, and an ability to pay in the secon-
dary  earner  corresponding  to  the sum of the transferred  amount  and  any
other income earned  by  the secondary  earner.  This  would  drive  the  in-
come for tax purposes  higher relative to the income of two corresponding
singles earning the same respective amounts.
Individual  filing corresponds  to  the rough  reverse standard-of-living
measure  or the  "weak-control"  version  of the  ability-to-pay  approach  in
the area of gifts.  Separate filing would tax the primary earner, but not the
secondary earner,  on any  extra income  shared with the secondary  earner.
If sharing is  occurring,  then the secondary  earner's  standard  of living  is
underestimated.  Separate  filing would not lead to  a marriage  (or singles)
122.  See BRADFORD, supra note  11I,  at 34-35.
123.  See infra Part III.D.1.
124.  As  discussed  above,  many  of these  so-called  "economies  of scale"  are best  analyzed  as
something  else, such as public goods within the marriage.  See supra notes  18-20 and accompanying
text.
1998]SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
penalty,  unless  intrafamily  gifts  additionally  were  taxed  to  the  donee
(which they are not).
Joint filing with full income-splitting  corresponds  to the standard-of-
living measure, as seen earlier.  If the couple is taken axiomatically as  the
unit for calculating utility, then this measure has  some initial  plausibility,
but the assumption that the family is the relevant unit for calculating utility
is itself problematic.
125
Furthermore, we should be concerned  about the distribution of utility
within the marriage and  the incentives  on the individual that taxing it  (or
not) creates.  If so, then the case for income-splitting  is far less clear.  In
addition to the well-known  disincentive for the secondary  earner  to work,
we may ask whether as much wealth-or more accurately,  as much wealth
as would  be a good index to well-being-is  really being transferred  as is
implied by income-splitting under joint filing.  If half the increment of the
primary earner's income over the secondary  earner's income were really  a
gift with nothing in return, full splitting would be consistent with viewing
the transfer as a gift.
But there  is  good reason  to  believe that half the increment  is not a
pure gift.  The  primary earner may enjoy  a degree  of control and  power
that makes the transfer less than complete. 126  Thus,  on full splitting, the
donee/secondary  earner's  income  comes  out  too  high  and  the  do-
nor/primary earner's income is treated as too low.  The secondary earner as
an individual thus faces a marriage penalty.  In sum, even on a very rough
scale, it is doubtful that either individual filing or full splitting necessarily
captures the standard of living or the ability to pay of the individuals in the
marriage.
Now consider the possibility  of an exchange  within the  marriage  of
services for income.  Many  commentators  have pointed  out that what oc-
curs in a marriage is better likened to a (nonmarket) exchange rather than
to a gift, and an entire "exchange  theory"  of marriage  and many other so-
cial relations  has  developed  within  sociology  and  only  more  recently  in
economics. 127  Keeping  in mind that gifts  and  exchanges  form  a contin-
125.  See Hurley, supra note 2, at 168-80.
126.  See supra Part II.A.2 and infra Part Iv.A.4.
127.  For a  discussion  of the "exchange  theory"  in  the sociology  context,  see,  e.g.,  PETER  M.
BLAU,  EXCHANGE AND POWER IN  SOCIAL LIFE 88 (1964);  LETHA SCANZONI & JOHN SCANZONI,  MEN,
WOMEN, AND  CHANGE: A SOCIOLOGY OF MARRIAGE  AND  FAMILY  10-11  (1976);  Note, supra note  23,
at 373-76  (surveying exchange  theory literature in relation  to marital  income pooling).  For a  study
that incorporates  marital exchange of spousal labor in Gary Becker's marriage market framework, see
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uum,  these  commentators  can  be  regarded  as  arguing  that  the  flow  of
services,  property,  and  money-income  within  marriages  falls  further  to-
wards the exchange end of the spectrum than is commonly thought.  Some
may object to the label "exchange"  in the context of marriage, but when it
comes to  analyzing the behavioral effects  of taxation  on the couple,  it is
worthwhile to consider the possibility of an exchange-like relation.
In an ordinary  exchange,  the Internal Revenue  Code taxes  both par-
ticipants.  If A  purchases  a haircut from B, A  pays B for the haircut out of
after-tax income because there is no deduction for the cost of the haircut;
even if it were  necessary to A's job to have short hair, the haircut would
invariably  be found  inherently  personal  and  thus  nondeductible. 128  The
provider  of the service  is taxed  on the income  (the gross  receipts  minus
costs)  derived  from the transaction.  Thus  in the haircut example,  B, the
barber or stylist, would be taxed  on what A  paid minus the costs of doing
business.  Marital exchange,  by contrast, is not taxed: The provider of the
services is not taxed.129  But it will be worthwhile to consider how marital
exchange would be taxed if it were treated like a market exchange.
In the marital context, if the primary earner can "share" income  with
the  secondary  earner  in return  for  domestic  services,  then  the  Internal
Revenue Code's treatment of exchanges  would, if it applied, dictate taxing
the primary earner on the income and taxing  the secondary  earner on the
receipt of the shared income.  This looks very much like Simon's  double-
taxation approach  to nonmarital gifts discussed earlier.'30  A natural  ques-
tion arises  about the costs of rendering the services.  Because the domestic
labor is done both as a self-rendered  service for the secondary  earner her-
self and as a service for the primary earner, the costs would be partly per-
sonal  and  partly  "business."  One might  object that  any  service  for  the
couple  is personal,  but the danger here is to fall into the assumption that
the couple (as a unity) is the only experiencer of utility.  In examining the
exchange  analogy it is far from clear that the unitary model is appropriate.
SHOSHANA  GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN,  ON THE ECONOMICS  OF MARRIAGE:  A THEORY  OF MARRIAGE,
LABOR,  AND DIVORCE 25-83 (1993).
128.  Section  262 disallows  any  deduction  for  "personal,  living,  or family  expenses."  I.R.C.
§ 262 (1994).  Clothing, personal grooming, and the like are deemed "inherently  personal" even when
the taxpayer can point to a business necessity  for the item.  See,  e.g.,  Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628
F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980)  (denying deduction for Yves Saint Laurent clothing for a taxpayer who was a
store  manager required  to wear the expensive clothing on the job but who  never wore it after-hours
because, according  to the taxpayer, it was too extravagant for her lifestyle).  See generally  GRAETZ &
SCHENK,  supra note 32, at 70-7 1.
129.  The recipient of the services-the transferor of the cash-gets  no deduction and so pays  out
of after-tax income, as in the market case.
130.  See supra text accompanying  note 120.
1998]SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, to the extent that some of the costs are public goods  or
give rise to a personal benefit  to both spouses individually,  any deduction
of items  by the secondary  spouse  would be an inappropriate deduction  of
personal expenses.  Furthermore, because many expenses of working in the
marketplace-grooming,  working clothes, commuting-are deemed inher-
ently personal under current law,13' deductions for "business expenses"  in
the home-labor context would lead to even more of a tax-favored status for
domestic  labor than under current law.  I return to  these questions in Part
III.E below.
Neither joint nor individual filing treats  marital sharing as it would a
market exchange.  Under joint filing, only the recipient spouse in effect is
taxed  on the shared income.  The sharing lowers the couple's  rates further
below what the primary earner  would face  as  an individual  and  raises  it
further above what the secondary earner would face as an individual.  With
individual filing, the primary earner is taxed on the shared income but the
recipient spouse  is not.  Thus, the domestic services  are paid for out of af-
ter-tax dollars  but the income earned (in the form of "shared"  income) in
return for the domestic services is not taxed to the wife.
Commentators  often  lump  this  under  the heading  of "imputed"  in-
come and invoke  the impossibility  of taxing imputed  income as  a justifi-
cation  for  not worrying  further  about  the incentive  effects.  Even  those
writing from a feminist point of view usually stop at advocating individual
filing (to solve the stacking problem) without worrying much whether we
are  still favoring  domestic  labor  over  market  labor of women  and  what
might be done about it.  Especially if the wife is exchanging  domestic la-
bor for shared income in a nonmarket transaction, it is likely that this way
of earning income will be  a close substitute for market labor.  If so, then
the unequal  tax treatment  of labor in  a market  exchange  and in  a marital
exchange, with the latter heavily favored, can be expected to induce a shift
towards domestic labor by women even under individual filing.
131.  Even commuting expenses that would not arise but for job requirements  have been held  to
be inherently  personal.  See, e.g.,  McCabe v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d  102 (2d  Cir. 1982)  (denying
deduction for extra gas and toll expenses to a New York City policeman who lived in New York State
and  was  required  to  carry his  gun at all times  but could  not  get a gun permit  in New Jersey  even
though he needed to drive around New Jersey  to commute  to work); Treas. Reg.  § 1.162-2(e) (1960)
(stipulating commuting expenses as nondeductible);  Rev. Rul.  75-380,  1975-2  C.B. 59,  60 (allowing
deduction  only  for additional  commuting  expenses  necessary  to get  work implements  to and  from
work,  and giving an example where only the cost of renting a  trailer to carry  tools but not extra gas
would be deductible).  See also Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946) (denying deduction  to
taxpayer who commuted  from Jackson, Mississippi, and worked  in Mobile,  Alabama).  But cf. Pollei
v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1989) (allowing deduction for commuting expenses for po-
lice officers who were engaged in their jobs while driving to and from the stationhouse).
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Thus, if marital sharing is  more like  a gift,  individual filing  accords
with the current tax treatment of gifts, but joint filing reflects a very plau-
sible approach to gifts, the standard-of-living  approach.  Indeed,  since the
reason for taxing  gift-givers  but not recipients  under the Code may  be a
practical rather than policy-based  one, joint filing cannot be said to be in-
consistent  with  marital  sharing  as  a  gift.  If, on the  other hand,  marital
sharing is regarded as part of an exchange, then neither individual nor joint
filing treats  sharing appropriately.  Even individual filing, heavily favored
by those  concerned  with  women's  incentives  to work  outside the home,
treats  marital  exchange  far  more  favorably  than  labor  by  a  secondary
earner in the marketplace.
C.  JOINT AND INDIVIDUAL FILING AND "MARRIAGE NEUTRALITY"
Because  rhetoric  does not always match  reality and  because people
tend to deceive themselves  and others about their true level  of support for
sharing, there is a gulf between normative  and descriptive models of mar-
riage.  It is generally believed that tax law can do little to move us toward
equal-sharing marriages  and  we therefore  must choose  a tax law  that re-
flects the nonsharing reality-namely, individual filing.  This conclusion is
too hasty.
Individual  filing  leads  to  couples  with  the  same  household  income
paying different tax.  As we will see, this may not be so problematic if the
different tax on those couples reflects genuine differences between them in
the degree  of sharing.  Because individual  filing does not calibrate tax to
the amount of sharing, for the most part it is unlikely that individual filing
makes sensible distinctions among couples.  Joint filing, on the other hand,
leads to a singles penalty if couples are in effect permitted to each pay half
the tax on total household income at singles rates  (by doubling the size of
the brackets).  I will call this  "pure" joint filing.132  A  different  "harsh"
form of joint filing applies the singles rates to total household income as if
only one spouse earned it all.  Such a system leads to steep  marriage pen-
alties.  The present system combines a bit of both pure and harsh joint fil-
ing, because it features  special  rates  that lead  to  a marriage  penalty  for
some and a marriage bonus for others.133  That is, some people pay more
tax than they would collectively  as two singles and  some couples pay  less
than they would outside marriage.
134
132.  Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "joint filing" to mean pure joint filing.
133.  See supra note 9.
134.  For data on the present system, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note  10, at 24.
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Both the stacking effect and  the marriage penalty under current joint
filing are generally thought to be significant at all income levels.  For those
who  face  the penalty  at the  lowest  income  levels,  the  marriage  penalty
stemming  from the phase-out  of the Earned  Income Tax  Credit  is likely
not to push women out of the labor force because women's  earned income
is so needed, but rather to exert a pressure in favor of not being married. 1 3 5
For  middle-income  women,  the  "stacking"  effect  from  the joint return
makes  working  outside  the home less  attractive,136 and  for those  upper-
income women who are secondary earners, the stacking effect is thought to
be significant.
137
Based on  the spectrum of marriages  from those involving little shar-
ing to those that are quite sharing, we should be skeptical  that either joint
or  individual  filing (or the present  system) takes  sharing  adequately  into
account.  If sharing is relevant to the proper tax treatment of couples,  then
neither one-size-fits-all  system is likely to be satisfactory:  Neither joint nor
individual  filing reflects  the degree  of sharing  in the full  range  of mar-
riages, and neither does anything to enforce the degree of sharing they pre-
suppose.
III.  A RATIO FOR MARITAL INCOME-SPLIT7ING
I turn now to a system for determining how much income-splitting to
allow  that  reflects  sharing.  Examining  how  such  a  system  would  work
serves  as an analytical  tool to see the role that sharing plays in the choice
of whom  to tax.  Any  ratio  based on  actual  sharing appears  to pose  tre-
mendous  problems  of measurement  and  significant  incentives  to  overre-
port sharing.  However, a self-assessment mechanism that ties the ratio  of
splitting for  income-tax  purposes  to  the ratio  used  for splitting  property
(broadly defined)  on divorce  can  solve these  and a variety  of other prob-
lems as well.
135.  See, e.g., MCCAFFERY,  supra note 2, at 83-84,  194; Zelenak,  Tax and the Married Woman,
supra note 67, at 1023, 1040-41.
136.  See, e.g.,  MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 150-54.  That these behavioral  effects  are substan-
tial  is not a  universally  held  view.  On  why intermediate  filing meets some of the skepticism  about
these behavioral  effects, see infra  Part III.D.4.
137.  See,  e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at  154-59.  Many upper-income  women  may not be
secondary  earners,  which  may explain why many of them have jobs in  the marketplace despite  the
severity  of the stacking effect.  See Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, supra note 67,  at 1023 &
nn.12-13.  Also,  some high-income  women may  work  in the marketplace for  nonmonetary  reasons.
See MCCAFFERY, supra  note 2, at 159.
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A.  FRACTIONAL  SPLITING
Ideally,  we might like  to allow splitting to the extent that the spouse
with fewer resources really has  control.  That is, we would measure  shar-
ing within a marriage and allow income-splitting on the basis of how much
actual sharing is occurring.  However, control and sharing are virtually im-
possible to measure,  and  legal  relations  may  not give  a good  picture  of
who really controls the resources in a family.  As we will see,  tax law has
long included a "control" test but one based on a very different and far less
adequate  notion  of legal control. 1 3 8  A  spouse  can  have  a legal  right  to
control  and not exercise it,  and,  more importantly,  legal  control  as  cur-
rently defined need not have long-term bite.  Even in community property,
there is no assurance  of longer-term  control by any given  spouse because
property  can  be  labeled  "community  property"  but  subsequently  trans-
muted back to separate property.
139
To allow splitting on the basis of the amount of sharing is  a form  of
fractional splitting, because the sharing may fall anywhere on the spectrum
from no sharing to full sharing.  We might ask whether to allow fractional
splitting  on  the  basis  of  legal  support  obligations:  The  lower-earning
spouse  would  be  taxed  an  amount  corresponding  to  what  the  higher-
earning spouse  could  be required  to  provide  as  support.140  The  problem
with  using  legal  support obligations  in this  manner is  that  more or  less
sharing may take place than is legally required. 14'  Furthermore, legal sup-
port  obligations  are  very  minimal  and  less  than  adequate  to protect  the
secondary  earner's  legitimate  expectations  of benefit  from  marriage.142
Support obligations therefore are quite inaccurate as a proxy for the degree
of sharing occurring in more-than-minimally  sharing marriages.  Also,  as
we will  see, a formula for  income-splitting based  on a view  of minimal
sharing does little to encourage  the level of sharing that remains the ideal
that motivates  income-splitting proposals in the first place.
138.  See infra  Part V.A.l.
139.  See infra  Part V.A.2.
140.  Boris Bittker notes  this possibility in passing.  See Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra
note 2, at 1422.  For further discussion of why this would not be as desirable as the intermediate-filing
system proposed here, see infra Part V.B.
141.  The purpose of alimony was to maintain the marital standard of living in two households to
the extent possible, but alimony was neither generous nor easy to collect.  See HOMER H. CLARK, JR.,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN  THE UNITED STATES §  16.4 (2d ed.  1987).
142.  See  Baker, supra note 38,  at  1206-13,  1220-27  (criticizing  current  law  as  inadequate  to
protect  women's bargained-for expectation of security from  marriage and proposing  alternative  con-
tract-based measures).
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Using  legal  support  obligations  as  a  basis  for  fractional  income-
splitting is a lot like using the category of community property itself.  Both
support  obligations  and  the community-property  classification  are  theo-
retically  about  how to divide  assets  and income  on divorce,  but both  are
not necessarily  a good guide to sharing and control in a marriage.  The le-
gal  title  and right  to control  in community-property  or common-law  re-
gimes do not necessarily reflect the real control or power and consumption
patterns within the marriage.
I argue that asking what existing family law or property law category
may  serve  as  the basis  for  income-splitting  is  backwards.  Rather  than
facing the inadequate menu of choices from family  law and  property law,
we may turn the inquiry around:  How do we ensure that a basis for the in-
come-split for tax purposes is respected for other purposes  such that split-
ting will reflect sharing?
B.  A SELF-ASSESSED RATIO
Instead of allowing splitting to the extent of legal support obligations,
we would do better to ensure that the amount used for income-splitting in
the tax area is really shared.  I propose a system of individual  filing with
the opportunity to opt into any degree of splitting, subject to possible lim-
its. 143  If couples  did nothing,  they  would be subject to individual  filing,
and I return  to exactly  what this would entail  in Part III.F below. 144  For
now, I will concentrate on couples who opt out of individual filing and into
some degree of income-splitting.
The  degree  of  splitting would  depend  on  a  ratio negotiated  by the
spouses that would govern not only income-splitting  for taxation but also
property division on divorce.  Thus, if the ratio negotiated were 50/50, then
half the total household income  would be taxed  to each  spouse, and  they
would enjoy  full splitting of both income from services  and income from
property.  On  divorce,  property,  including  the  fruits  of human  capital,
would also be divided 50/50145  If, on the other hand, the couple negoti-
ated a 60/40 ratio, then the primary earner would be taxed on 60%  of total
143.  On the possible limits, see infra notes  165-71  and accompanying  text.
144.  Along with most proponents  of individual  filing,  I am  assuming that  the individual-filing
default would use the same rates for married  couples as for singles.  No  attempt is made here to pro-
vide for taxation of marital  economies of scale.  Cohabiting  singles enjoy many  of the same econo-
mies of scale, making special treatment in the case of married couples less desirable than it might have
been in an earlier era.  Modifications  to the system proposed here could  be made to reflect economies
of scale if so desired.
145.  Intermediate filing solves some of the well-known  difficulties in handling human capital  in
the context of divorce.  See infra Part III.E.
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household income, and the secondary earner on 40%.  This couple,  and the
primary earner in particular, enjoys less splitting but on divorce, property
would be divided 60/40.
This self-assessed  ratio  system  can  be illustrated by  a return  to the
familiar cases.  In Cohen's Case  3,  C and C' are married  with  C earning
$20,000 and C' earning $0.146  Now let us break this case into two scenar-
ios.  In the first, C shares control and consumption  of $10,000,  and nego-
tiates a 50/50  ratio under intermediate  filing.  This means that one half of
the couple's total income is taxed  to each spouse,  and correspondingly,  a
50/50 ratio will be used for property division on divorce.  Now consider a
second  scenario  in which  C shares  only $8,000  with  C'  and negotiates  a
60/40  ratio.  With  this ratio,  intermediate  filing  will  lead  to taxation  of
$12,000  to C and $8,000 to C', and this same 60/40 ratio would be used on
divorce.  Under progressive rates then,  C in the scenario with a 60/40 ratio
of sharing and property division ratio faces a higher tax and a higher mar-
ginal rate than does the primary earner in the 50/50 scenario.  Likewise,
the 60/40 household pays more tax than the 50/50 household.  But what if
the less-sharing  C of the second  scenario  negotiated  a 50/50 ratio  under
intermediate  filing?  In that case,  C's taxes would be lower but on divorce
C' would  get 50%  of the property,  including  at least the fruits  of human
capital built up in either spouse  during the marriage. 147  Furthermore, un-
der a no-fault system, C' will always be free to walk away with the money.
In  effect, the  intermediate-filing  system  would  mandate  that  sharing  ac-
tually occur if the couple as a whole, and the primary earner in particular,
pays the lower tax associated with the ideal of greater sharing.
Notice  that this treatment of Cohen's Case  3 makes  sense  when the
unequally  earning couple in Case 3 is  compared with the equally earning
married couple in Case 4 (D-D', in which each earns  $10,000).  In Case 4,
D and D' can negotiate a 50/50 ratio.  This case can be broken down into
two scenarios  as well.  Assume first that D and D'  share.  Then they will
negotiate a 50/50 ratio to govern taxation and property division on divorce.
As far as  sharing is concerned,  they are  similarly situated to  C-C'  in  the
first  scenario  above.  The equal  treatment  of C-C'  and  D-D'  under  the
sharing  scenarios  makes  sense.  Now  consider  a  second  scenario  under
Case 4 in which D has  much more  separate  property than  D'  and  has no
intention of sharing it on divorce.  In that case, D may well have to nego-
tiate a less  equal ratio,  such  as 60/40,  and he will be taxed  on 60%  of all
household  income  (both  earned  and  property  income);  D'  will be  taxed
146.  See supra note I and accompanying  text.
147.  On human capital,  see infra notes 244-53 and accompanying  text.
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only on 40%.  D will face a higher marginal rate than he would have under
either joint or individual filing, and the system will give D an  incentive to
share with D' in order to lower his average and marginal rates.  Under joint
filing,  the split is  mandated  and  extra sharing  is  not  rewarded  by  lower
taxes-there is no marginal benefit in taxation from more sharing with D'.
Under individual  filing, there is  likewise  no extra  benefit of lower rates
from sharing earned income with D'. With respect to property income,  it
is notoriously  easy  to  make D'  appear to  be the  owner  of the asset  (and
hence taxed at lower rates) but let D retain actual  ownership even  on  di-
vorce.148  Thus, only intermediate filing rewards extra units of sharing with
extra lowering of taxes.
Some major advantages of intermediate filing are immediately  appar-
ent.  Not only does the system use a reasonable proxy for sharing and more
closely  fits the "sharing"  rationale for lower taxes in marriage,  but it also
gives  the economically better-off spouse  an incentive to  share.  Relations
in the marriage,  the distribution  of power, and  the  incentives  for invest-
ment all take place  in the shadow of the divorce  rules.  How  willing the
wealthier spouse  is to give up rights on divorce  may be a rough proxy  to
how much  power-sharing  is  going  on.1 49  Unlike  with  community  prop-
erty's  free  transmutation  rules,  the  spouse  with  more  bargaining  power
cannot make side-deals  to retain de facto control. 150  Such  side-deals  can
be regarded as the sale of a tax-shelter opportunity. 1 51  Little or no sharing
may be going on,  but in  order to lower his  taxes, the primary earner can
arrange-in  return  for  some  benefit  to  the  secondary  earner  up  to  the
amount of the tax advantage-for the fictitious  appearance  of ownership
by the secondary earner.152  This is not the type of marital  sharing that is
148.  See infra Part V.A.
149.  For  a  theoretical  model  from  which  one  can  derive  this  conclusion,  see  GROSSBARD-
SHECHTMAN,  supra note  127, at  54-83  (deriving the  conclusion  that factors  that  increase women's
"quasi-wage"  for  domestic labor are  likely  to  increase  women's consumption,  power,  and  control
within marriage).
150.  For example, the spouse with more bargaining cannot negotiate  to get the other spouse to
agree to transmute separate property  into community  property  for a time and transmute  it back at the
end of five years.  See infra Part V.A.
151.  Although  "abusive  tax  shelter"  is a value-loaded  term,  it is generally  appropriate  where
"any  investment or transaction ...  produces  a tax savings greater than that which would be appropri-
ate given its economic  income  or loss."  GRAETZ  & SCHENK,  supra note 32, at 392.  For famous ex-
amples  of deduction-selling  tax  shelters,  see, e.g.,  Frank Lyon  Co. v.  United States, 435  U.S.  561
(1978)  (use  of sale-leaseback  transaction  in  attempt  to  transfer  deductions);  Estate  of Franklin  v.
Commissioner, 544 F.2d  1045  (9th Cir. 1976) (real estate  tax shelter involving  inter alia shift of de-
preciation deductions).
152.  For example, if husband H faces a 40% marginal rate and his wife W faces a marginal rate
of 20%, then appearing to share $100  with  W would save H $20.  H could  pay  W anywhere  between
$0 and $20 for this opportunity with the understanding that the income or property  really remains  his
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supposed to happen in marriage, and the ostensible sharing is in such cases
far less than actual sharing.  Instead, such  an arrangement bears a great re-
semblance  to tax shelters  that involve  the sale of deductions.' 53  In  such
cases of false sharing, the most income-splitting  we should  recognize  for
tax purposes would be the sharing of what I call the "tax-shelter fee."'154
By using the ratio  across the board for both earned  and property in-
come  alike, intermediate  filing, like joint filing  and unlike  individual fil-
ing, also removes incentives to manipulate  the appearances  of ownership.
The  removal  of the  "tax-shelter"  opportunities  just noted would  lead  to
greater equity between  those with property income and  those with earned
income, with a corresponding efficiency advantage in removing the distor-
tionary practice of favoring property income  over earned income.  By re-
moving  the incentive  to  manipulate  the appearances  of ownership,  much
greater simplicity  can  be  achieved;  there  is  no longer  a  need to  protect
against unfairness and revenue loss by waging a futile war against couples'
efforts  to game the system.  By contrast,  individual-filing  systems gener-
ally tax the owner of an asset, and enormous problems of revenue loss and
unfairness  result from the gamesmanship  in the designation of asset own-
ership.
More generally, there is a sense in which the splitting ratio would de-
fine the rights of the spouses.  An important element of each spouse's in-
dividual ownership is what each spouse  could take on divorce.  The split-
ting  ratio  would  then  resemble  the part  of a partnership  agreement  that
determines each partner's share  on break-up  where, under the agreement,
each  partner  has  a  unilateral  right  to terminate. 155  Although  we  could
(under his control).  The more bargaining power H has, the greater the portion of the $20 gain he will
be able to capture.  Also, there is some risk that H and  W will divorce before the fake arrangement  can
be switched back.  This risk will  diminish the  amount H is willing  to pay, making W even worse off.
Moreover, if legal trappings such as title can be switched easily, this is not an insurmountable  problem
to such arrangements.  On the problem of "ingratitude"  and defection, see infra Part VI.
153.  Such  a  scenario  gains  further  plausibility  in light  of anecdotal  evidence  that some  two-
earner couples are asking their tax  preparers to calculate what each spouse would owe individually  in
order to divide refunds or to determine responsibility  for underpayments.  See Zelenak,  Marriage and
the Income Tax, supra note 2, at 350 n.54 (citing Ellen E. Schultz,  How to Split  the Tax Bill with  Your
Spouse, WALL ST. J.,  Mar. 31,  1993,  at Cl).  As Zelenak notes,  such couples "are  rejecting in the most
radical  way  possible,  the pooling assumption underlying  the joint-return system."  Id. at 351  n.54.
Couples who  can go to such lengths can easily  be imagined  engaging in the tax-shelter games envi-
sioned in the text.
154.  Thus, in the example given supra in note 152, suppose that H pays a "fee" of $7 to gain the
tax  advantage of $20.  We should count $7,  not $20, as  the amount shared.  Respecting  the outward
forms of ownership in this case overstates sharing by $13  or almost 200%.
155.  The old Uniform Partnership Act reflected a stronger notion of unity of interests  than does
the Revised  Uniform Partnership Act,  which  does  not make  all self-interested  actions  violations  of
fiduciary duty.  See  Kornhauser, Partnership Model, supra note 75, at 1420-21.  Much of the criticism
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imagine additional  rights to  enforce  a bargain  without  break-up,  and  al-
though some value will be lost in a break-up,  the right to take by calling
for dissolution does strengthen  the hand of the holder of that right. 156  A
recent study described below suggests that increasing women's  legal enti-
tlement  over  monetary  income  increases  their  control  and  consumption
within  the marriage. 1 5 7  The  proper comparison  then  is  sharing  of con-
sumption without the right to take  a corresponding  proportional  share of
assets (including human  capital)  on divorce  and the sharing  of marital re-
sources with such a right (as under intermediate filing).  Thus, to a certain
extent, each spouse's  ownership rights would be determined  by the agreed
splitting ratio.  Of course, because property law and family  law are mostly
matters of state law, some coordination between  the federal and  state lev-
els may be required.
158
Furthermore, if the fractional  income-splitting  applies  to  all  marital
income, both from services  and from property,  some troublesome  aspects
of current  law may  be avoided  as well. 15 9  Even  more  problematic  than
transmutations  in community-property  systems are assignments of income
from property that satisfy the formal requirements  as transfers  of property
but that furnish no guarantee of a corresponding  amount of actual sharing
as the formalities would imply.  We can solve this very thorny problem  on
the  present  proposal  by  aggregating  all  the  couple's  income  from  all
sources and, for tax purposes,  attributing it to the spouses according  to the
same prenegotiated  self-assessed ratio.  The holder of title  and other such
subtleties  would  make far less  difference.  As  noted  earlier,  this  would
carry  with it the major side benefit  of reducing  the incentive  to engage in
property-transfer  gymnastics  to  effect income-splitting:  The income  from
property  would be subject to the same splitting ratio regardless of the for-
malities of ownership during the marriage.  Again, the splitting ratio would
serve to define ownership.
Setting up the ratio is not an idle exercise.  The wealthier spouse is on
notice that the more favorable a ratio she chooses  for income-spitting,  the
more the other spouse could unilaterally  take by ending the marriage.  In
of  family  law  has  centered  on  the largely  immutable character  of  the  partnership-like  rules  in  the
marital  context.  On the default nature of intermediate filing, see infra Part III.F.
156.  For an analysis of why the tendency has been away from limiting  the remedy to dissolution
in some areas of the law but not in family law, see generally Saul Levmore, Love It or  Leave It: Prop-
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58  LAW  &
CONTEMP.  PROBS.  221 (1995).
157.  See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
158.  I return to this question in infra  Part III.E below.
159.  See infra Parts IV and V.
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the context of no-fault divorce, the choice of ratio is thus subject to coun-
tervailing pressures; the wealthier spouse has  an incentive not to make the
ratio  any  more  favorable  than  she  finds  comfortable  allowing  the other
spouse power to use on a unilateral  divorce.  Additionally,  since making
the ratio more equal between the spouses is giving up this power, it may be
a  fair proxy  for  sharing  in  the marriage. 160   In  any  case,  the  wealthier
spouse knows that she will pay if she gets it "wrong."
In this respect, the proposed  system  is  somewhat  like a  scheme for
self-assessment. 161  In self-assessment, a person is asked to put a value on
something and that value will be used for two purposes.  For one purpose,
a low  valuation  is  advantageous  to the self-assessor.  However,  with  re-
spect to a second purpose, a high valuation benefits this same person.  The
prospect of the second use  of the self-assessed  value  provides  a counter-
vailing incentive to the motivation to underreport.  For example, consider a
scheme  of property-value  assessment  in which  a homeowner can  set  the
valuation for taxes as long as he knows  that valuation  could be used  in a
government taking or in some other kind of forced sale.  In some such self-
assessment systems, nongovernmental "assessors"  could force the property
owner to sell at the self-assessed price.  If the taxpayer sets the value  too
low, the government will win by engaging in a cheap  taking or a forcing
buyer (one of the nongovernmental  assessors)  will buy the property at the
cheap self-assessed price.
The present  income-splitting proposal  would  act as just such a  self-
assessment device.  The parties would set the ratio for splitting, and for tax
purposes,  setting the ratio as close  to  50/50 would lower taxes  the most.
However,  each  spouse,  particularly  the  economically  stronger  spouse,
would know that the same ratio could be used if the marriage is terminated
at the  request  of either  party.  Thus,  as  with  the landowner  wishing  to
lessen taxes through a low valuation  of his property,  the better-off spouse
would have to consider not just the tax-lowering benefits of a ratio closer
to 50/50, but also the possibility that he would lose property  (including at
least the fruits of human  capital built up during the marriage)  on divorce.
The  economically  stronger spouse  would  like a relatively  equal ratio  for
160.  First, giving up power is a form of sharing.  Second, giving up power may correlate posi-
tively with sharing of other power and consumption.  Here, giving  up power is a true proxy for further
sharing.  Measuring how well it functions as a proxy  in this second sense would be quite  difficult to
investigate empirically.  It is fortunate,  then, that sharing of power seems to be a key  form of sharing
in its own right.
161.  See  Saul Levmore,  Self-Assessed  Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68  VA.  L.
REV.  771,  778-84 (1982)  [hereinafter  Levmore,  Self-Assessed Valuation Systems] (describing simple
self-assessment scheme for property taxation).
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income-splitting  but a less  equal  one for divorce,  with  divorce  being  the
analog to the forced sale or governmental  taking in the self-assessed prop-
erty  tax  system.  As  in  self-assessment  generally,  the  economically
stronger spouse faces countervailing incentives that are designed  to elicit a
valuation closer to the one he actually harbors.
The greatest objection to such self-assessment schemes in the taxation
area is that they force those with idiosyncratic  tastes into high valuations.
For example, the homeowner who especially loves his bookshelves or gar-
den will be forced into a high valuation to reduce the chance that a forcing
buyer  can  turn him  out.  To  protect  a  high  idiosyncratic  valuation,  the
homeowner will have to value the house for taxation purposes  at what the
next highest valuer would value it.1 62  Such a self-assessment scheme thus
has  a tendency  to tax consumer surplus,  the value that the current  owner
assigns to the property  over the market price.  One  can  argue  that con-
sumer surplus should be part of taxable well-being, but the current tax law
does not reflect this view and does not seem likely to do so soon.163  Self-
assessment schemes can be modified  to avoid much taxation of consumer
surplus,  but the simplest  schemes  do pose  the "problem"  of taxing  con-
sumer surplus.
164
The present scheme,  however, does not face  this problem of how to
treat consumer surplus, because a couple,  who chooses to opt into the sys-
tem of splitting is negotiating the ratio of splitting, not an absolute value.
More importantly, if the system consists  of default  separate filing, no one
is forced to negotiate a ratio at all:  The couple can only enjoy the benefits
of splitting by backing it up with a corresponding sharing ratio for divorce.
Unlike  typical  self-assessment  schemes,  negotiating  the  ratio  does  not
force  either  spouse  or  the  spouses  jointly  to  expose  themselves  to  full
taxation on the basis of individual tastes.
Finally,  we might want to  set limits  on  the self-assessment  scheme.
These  possible  limits  are of two  types: floors  and  recapture  rules.  As  a
floor, we might want to prevent  spouses  from negotiating  a ratio  for in-
come-splitting  that is less generous than legal support obligations.  For ex-
ample, if a ratio of 95/5 would leave the less wealthy spouse worse off on
divorce than current support obligations mandate,  such  a ratio should not
be available.  In this way, the prenegotiated ratio is no different from ante-
162.  See id.
163.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
164.  See  Levmore, Self-Assessed  Valuation Systems, supra note  161,  at  783-88  (describing  a
"competitive"  self-assessment  scheme for property  taxation  partially  as a  response  to the  objection
that self-assessment taxes consumer surplus).
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nuptial agreements,  which likewise  cannot be used to contract around  the
mandatory rules of legal support.165
Through  recapture  rules,  the  second  type  of  limit  on  the  self-
assessment scheme, intermediate filing can gain a great deal of flexibility.
The simplest  intermediate-filing  system would require those  couples who
wish  to opt into the system to  do so  once and for all.  After negotiating a
ratio to govern income-splitting for tax purposes,  the couple would  never
be able  to change it and would have  to abide by  it on divorce.  This in-
flexibility  may  be  undesirable  because  circumstances  in  the  interim
change.  Most importantly, couples  should not be prevented from moving
the ratio closer to 50/50, and  the empirical evidence  is consistent with an
increased commitment by many couples to sharing as time goes on. 166  On
the  other hand,  allowing  couples  to change  the  ratio  in either  direction
would  defeat the purpose of intermediate  filing.  If couples could  change
the ratio, then the primary earner could work a tax-shelter-style deal about
how to set the ratio.  Even though this would be riskier than playing analo-
gous games with legal title under current law, allowing free changes  of ra-
tio would probably make such deals too easy.  One solution to the problem
of changing circumstances  would be to require all assets up to the point of
the change (including human capital) to be governed under the original ne-
gotiated ratio and all subsequently acquired assets to be split under the new
ratio.  This would undoubtedly  be extremely  cumbersome  and  introduce
much of the contentiousness  about property  division that intermediate  fil-
ing shows promise of eliminating.
A somewhat better method of introducing flexibility into intermediate
filing would be to couple it with a "recapture" rule.  The Code uses recap-
ture rules in some situations where after-the-fact it appears that deductions
165.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM.  CODE § 1615(a) (West 1994) (providing  for unenforceability of uncon-
scionable premarital agreements);  N.Y. GEN.  OBLIG.  LAW  § 5-311  (McKinney  1989)  (providing  that
generally "a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve either of
his or her liability to support the other in such a manner that he or she will become incapable of self-
support and therefore is likely to become a public charge"); In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289
(Cal.  1973) (noting that an antenuptial agreement would not be valid if it sought to alter support obli-
gations imposed by law), overruled  on other  grounds by In re Marriage of Dawley, 551  P.2d 323  (Cal.
1976).  This  prohibition  is quite  minimal  since  legal  support  obligations  themselves  are  not  very
strong.  See infra  Part V.B.
166.  See supra note 28  and  accompanying  text.  The data  from  Philip  Blumstein and  Pepper
Schwartz's study show a correlation between length of relationship and verbal commitment to sharing,
but this  alone  does  not show  causation  running  from the  former  to  the latter.  See BLUMSTEIN  &
SCiHvARTZ,  supra note 28, at 144-46.  Thus, the data are consistent with either (i)  more sharing cou-
ples staying together  longer, or (ii)  couples increasing their commitment  to sharing  as  they  stay to-
gether longer.  Note too that the data is cross-sectional rather than time-series data.
1998]SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
allowed previously were too generous. 167  Under a recapture rule, some or
all of the now inappropriate  tax benefit is  "recaptured"  by  subjecting the
taxpayer  to  correspondingly  higher  tax  after  the  inappropriateness
emerges.  One method would be to institute a scheme  whereby if the cou-
ple decided to change the ratio,  they would be subject to  a recapture  rule
that would recoup from the wealthier spouse-the one with  the larger leg
of the  negotiated  ratio-the  incremental  tax  advantage  of past  income-
splitting plus interest.  The "interest" could be defined  to track any rate of
return  deemed  appropriate.' 68   Some penalty  to  cover  administrative  ex-
penses could be added.  Penalties could be punitive to any degree up to the
point at which living with the prenegotiated  ratio would be just as advan-
tageous.169  That  is, the recapture  rule could fall anywhere  on the  contin-
uum from liability rule to property rule. 1 70  The recapture rule would allow
changes in the ratio for changed circumstances but would protect the pres-
sure not to overreport sharing and would prevent manipulation by the more
economically  powerful  spouse.  A  cooling-off  period  could  provide  an
additional deterrent from overreaching by such spouses: Any change in the
ratio would not be honored on divorce for two years.  On the other hand, if
a recapture  rule that recaptured  all the benefit  seemed too  harsh  and  too
difficult  to apply,  the recapture  rule  could  be  limited  to  recouping  tax
benefit from the last ten years only, possibly  in conjunction  with a penalty
to  cover  administrative costs.  Through  such  modifications,  we could en-
167.  For example, the Code uses an array of recapture  provisions to limit the conversion of ordi-
nary  income into capital  gains  through use of deductions  (against current  income)  and capital  gain
treatment  (at a lower rate) upon disposition.  See I.R.C. § 467 (1994)  (providing  for taxation as  ordi-
nary  income of portion of gain from previously  leased property); id. §  1245(a)(3)  (West Supp.  1998)
(providing for  recapture of previous  depreciation  deduction  as  ordinary  income  rather than  capital
gain); id. § 1245(a)(4) (providing  for recapture of depreciation and loss deductions in connection with
player  contracts when a sports franchise  is sold); id. §  1250 (providing  for recapture of depreciation
deductions  in real  estate  context);  id. §  1252  (1994)  (providing  for  recapture  of portion  of soil  and
water conservation deductions  on farmland held for less than  10 years);  id. §  1254 (providing for re-
capture  of currently  deducted  intangible  drilling  costs  and  mineral  exploration  and  development
costs); id. § 1255  (providing for recapture of amounts received  as  tax-free grants  under § 126 where
improved property is sold less than 20 years later).  See also infra note 262 and accompanying  text on
the recapture rule known as the "tax-benefit rule."
168.  The "rate of return" may also have to be  inflated if the marginal  utility of money decreases
over the lifecycle.  As mentioned  in  the text, a recapture  rule  might  aim at approximately  the right
level of deterrent.  Alternatively, we have to face the complexities  of treating a shift of ratio  as a rec-
ognition event.
169.  Alternatively, spouses could  be allowed to change the ratio during the  marriage but only in
the direction  of 50/50.  This would allow  for the  ratio to reflect changes  in circumstances but prevent
overreaching by primary earners,  especially those unilaterally contemplating divorce.
170.  On  the continuum  of liability rules,  see,  e.g.,  Louis Kaplow  & Steven  Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability  Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713,  756-57 (1996).
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sure that the incentives for high and low self-assessed ratios balanced each
other out.  171
C.  EQUITY
Considerations  of equity  support  individual filing.  Debate  between
proponents  of joint and  individual  filing  have engaged  in  what  Edward
McCaffery  calls a "battle of the 'neutralities."' 172  Joint filing proponents
complain that individual filing under a progressive rate schedule  will lead
to different couples with the same total household income paying different
tax.  According to this view, we must have joint filing in order to prevent
the inequity of violating "couples  neutrality."  Against this, those who fa-
vor  individual  filing  cite  the lack of neutrality  between  a member  of a
married couple and a corresponding  single.  Under joint filing, they com-
plain, the same person will pay different tax depending on whether the per-
son is married.  As noted, this problem becomes especially  acute for sec-
ondary  earners,  who  in  effect  face  a higher  rate  in  marriage  than  as  a
single.  The question then becomes  which of these inequities-or  equiva-
lently which of couples or marriage neutrality-is more important.
Intermediate filing allows a way out of this dilemma.  The proponents
of joint filing believe in sharing, as do many of those in favor of individual
filing.  More importantly, the public seems to support sharing in marriages.
Thus,  a  system  like  intermediate  filing  that  is  narrowly  tailored  to  the
amount of sharing may help us to decide which individuals and couples are
similarly  situated.  As illustrated above with  couples  C-C' and D-D', the
extent  to which marital  sharing  goes  on  is  arguably  the most  important
factor in whether two people are deemed to be similarly situated or not.  173
Asking whether  two  married couples  with  the same  total  income  should
pay  the  same  tax  is  the  wrong  question.  Similarly,  whether  marriage
should affect someone's tax is the wrong question if asked without regard
to whether one is sharing marital income as a transferor or recipient.  The
intermediate  solution thus reduces the battle of the neutralities to our basic
171.  It might be  asked why  we  do not just use individual  filing  with liberal  property  shifting
possibilities  and with a recapture  rule on divorce if the split on divorce is less generous  than the tax
split during the marriage would indicate.  First, this does nothing to address earned income and human
capital.  Second, such a system does nothing to ensure that people are aware of the tax consequences
of their actions  in shifting property.  Because of this  likely lack of awareness,  individual  filing with
recapture  only will  offer  few of the beneficial  incentives  of intermediate  filing discussed  later.  For
further discussion, see infra Part III.F.
172.  McCaffery,  Fresh Look, supra note 2, at 986.  See also Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income
Tax, supra note 2,  at 358-63.
173.  See supra notes  146-48 and accompanying text.
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commitment  to  sharing.  Value  judgments  are  still  unavoidable:  The
commitment to sharing itself is just such a value judgment.  But given that
sharing should  matter most-and, as we  have seen,  this is  a surprisingly
uncontroversial  view  in the area of household taxation-intermediate  fil-
ing serves such a commitment best.
Other questions  that raise equity  concerns  are  also  handled  well  by
intermediate  filing.  Couples  with  more  earned income  than  property  in-
come  and  those  with  the  reverse  are  equally  well-off  economically.
Whether  a dollar of income  comes from services  or property  should  not
matter.  If we tax them differently,  we are failing to  treat taxpayers  who
have a similar ability to pay in a similar manner-a violation  of horizontal
equity.  As noted earlier, under individual filing, we are still faced with the
problem  of whom  to tax  on income  from property.  The two  traditional
solutions  are to tax property  income in proportion to the  spouses'  earned
income  or to tax property  income  to  the owner  of the underlying  asset.
The  former may be  unfairly generous  to low-earning  spouses with  more
property  income  and  in  any  case  may not reflect  the long-term  benefits
from or present control over the property.  If one spouse will get the prop-
erty on divorce, and especially  if the spouses  think of the property  as be-
longing  to  that  spouse  all  along,  there  is  little  reason  to  tax  the  other
spouse on the property  income just because that other spouse  might earn
more from employment.
Because taxing  in proportion to earned income presents equity  prob-
lems of its own, most proponents of individual filing favor taxing property
income to the owner. 174  But this leads to large opportunities for couples to
avoid tax by shifting the indicia of ownership  to allow property income to
be taxed to the spouse facing the lower marginal rate.  Due to the ability to
move property around, a tax-shelter opportunity  then arises. 1 75  More gen-
erally, if couples with property income are able to do this, they are unfairly
advantaged  when  compared to  couples  with  the  same amount  of income
from employment.
In a further equity advantage of intermediate  filing, allowing income-
splitting only under the prenegotiated  ratio gives wealthier spouses  an in-
centive to be generous in setting up the ratio.  It promotes sharing  in the
marriage, which  will tend to benefit women  on the whole.  While it is an
open  question how  much better  off women  would be  under intermediate
filing, if even some primary earners respond  to the tax incentive  to share,
174.  See, e.g., Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra note 2, at 384-91.
175.  See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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some women  will be better off.  As discussed above, a recent study based
on a "natural  experiment" in the United Kingdom in which a child allow-
ance was transferred from husbands to wives in the late 1970s supports the
proposition that having the legal entitlement to income increases women's
share of consumption and control.1 7 6
Finally,  unlike  either joint  or individual  filing,  intermediate  filing
treats  the income  of secondary  earners  from market labor  and from  do-
mestic labor equally in terms of marginal tax rate.  I return to this issue in
the next section, but for now it is sufficient  to note that those who choose
market labor and those who opt for working in the home will both face the
same tax  on their "compensation."'177  This is  a major improvement  over
the present system and both  the traditional polar systems  (joint and indi-
vidual), which  allow compensation  through marital  sharing to escape tax
altogether.  This aspect,  however,  must be considered  in the  context  of
other likely  consequences  of a move  to intermediate  filing,  which I will
address below.
D.  EFFICIENCY
Intermediate filing presents  efficiency  advantages.  Economic  analy-
sis in this area is characterized  by  a series  of partial  equilibrium models.
The  most comprehensive  of  these  is  traditional  "optimal  tax"  analysis.
Under the traditional optimal-tax approach,  welfare analysis of household
taxation  has  been  primarily  a  matter  of  identifying  and  measuring  the
deadweight  loss  associated  with  the  secondary  earner's  discouragement
under joint filing from working in the marketplace.  Other economists have
pointed out that individual filing may cause distortions in the use of inputs
in home production.  In this section I will show that, in view of the trade-
off  between  these  two  distortions-distortions  of  labor  and  home-
production-factor decisions-intermediate  filing probably fares better than
both individual and joint filing under such a traditional analysis of overall
deadweight  loss. I will  also show that the self-assessed  ratio  offers  addi-
tional efficiency benefits that stem from its nature as a rule of marital con-
tracting.  These  benefits  include  the  reduction  of  strategic  behavior
176.  See Lundberg et al., supra note  61,  at 472-79.  This natural experiment  should go  a long
way towards allaying Ann Alstott's concern that those supporting individual filing and child subsidies
to  secondary earners  far too easily  assume  that this  will  increase women's  control  over  marital  re-
sources.  See Alstott, supra note 28,  at 2041-42.  In addition  to the Lundberg-Pollack-Wales  study,
earlier work supports the proposition that the more money women have, the greater their control  (even
if they  do not control 100%  of the extra money).  See Kornhauser, Partnership  Model, supra note 75,
at 1427-28 nn.35-38,  1445 n.68 (citing studies).
177.  See supra note 154 and accompanying text.  See also infra  Part III.D.I.
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through the self-assessed  ratio's function  as a penalty default  and  the  in-
ducement  of  efficient  precaution  in  marriage  formation  with  the  self-
assessed ratio affording an expectation measure of damages upon divorce.
1. Deadweight  Loss  from Labor- and Home-Production-Factor  Decisions
As discussed  earlier,  marital  income  sharing can  be  regarded  as  an
exchange and/or a gift-giving, depending on the circumstances  of the mar-
riage. 7'  Although these two aspects  of marital sharing are intertwined in
practice, for purposes of our initial efficiency  analysis they may be treated
separately before being considered together.  I will show that with respect
to both  aspects  of marital  income-splitting,  intermediate  filing  overall  is
likely  to be more  efficient  than  both joint and  individual  filing under  a
traditional optimal-taxation  analysis.  Turning first to the exchange aspect,
I  will  demonstrate that intermediate  filing  should  lead  to  a lower  dead-
weight  loss,  considering  both  secondary-earner  labor-supply  and  factor-
input decisions in home production.  I will conclude with some remarks on
the efficiency advantages  of intermediate filing with respect to marital in-
come sharing as gift-giving.
Consider first marital income-splitting as an exchange of domestic la-
bor for shared money  income.  The literature has  devoted  a great deal  of
attention  to  one  distortion,  that  of the  secondary  earner's  decision  on
whether  and how much to work in  the market.  Commentators,  however,
have largely treated the use of time in the household as a black  box under
the misleading term  "leisure."  But this ignores the source  of the high  la-
bor-supply  elasticity  of  secondary  earners:  the  high  substitutability  of
home labor, rather than true leisure, for market work. 179  Moreover, by ig-
noring  home  production,  such  models  overlook  the distortion-from  an
efficiency point of view-of home production when the marginal rates on
the spouses differ.  I take up these two distortions  in turn.
The  treatment of spouses'  labor  supplies  is  the first distortion  to  be
examined.  Analysis  of the deadweight loss from a tax usually begins  with
178.  See supra  Part II.B.4.
179.  A few  economists  have focused  on  this aspect  of the labor supply  of women.  See, e.g.,
Janet C. Hunt, Charles D. DeLome & R. Carter Hill,  Taxation and the Wife's Use of Time, 34 INDUS.
& LAB.  REL.  REV. 426  (1981);  Jane H. Leuthold, Home Production  and the Tax System,  3 J. ECON.
PSYCH.  145  (1983);  Jane H. Leuthold, Income Splitting and Women's Labor-Force Participation,  38
INDUS.  & LAB.  REL.  REv.  98,  98-105 (1984).  McCaffery  takes this  point  as support  for individual
over joint filing.  See MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at  181.  While it is true that individual  filing is less
skewed against married  women's market labor than  is joint filing, even individual  filing leaves  eco-
nomic well-being from domestic labor untaxed  and thus excessively  favors domestic over market la-
bor.
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the following basic insight from optimal-tax theory: A necessary condition
for  minimizing  the deadweight  loss  from  a tax  is  to tax  items,  such  as
commodities  or labor supply, in inverse  proportion to the responsiveness
of the demand or supply of the item to a price change.  This rule  can be
traced  back to Frank Ramsey's  pioneering  work on commodity  taxes  in
which he  first  proposed  the  optimal-tax  rule.18 0  According  to  optimal
taxation, we should tax in inverse proportion  to the elasticity (price sensi-
tivity) of the demand for the commodity, 181 because where the demand for
a commodity  is  very  elastic, people  will readily  substitute  away  from it
when the price increases.  A tax increase can be regarded (more or less) as
a price increase.182  The substitution away from the commodity  is a distor-
tion in behavior relative to  a no-tax  world.  The deadweight  loss in wel-
fare-the "excess  burden"  of the tax  or the reduction  in overall  welfare
from the tax-will be proportional  to the size of this distortion.  Thus,  to
minimize  the deadweight  loss,  taxes  should be imposed  on commodities
that are associated with low elasticities because the consequent distortions
of behavior will be the smallest.
These insights  have been carried  over  into the field  of market labor
supply.'83  Taxing income  can be thought of as taxing labor supply.  Al-
though  both  income  from property  and  earned income  are  taxed,  the tax
will be  a function of how much  someone works.  It conceptually  will in-
crease  the price  of work.  Under  optimal-tax  theory,  those  whose  labor
supply is most elastic will have the most distorted  and welfare-decreasing
response to a tax on wages (or the wage-tax part of an income tax).  There-
fore, in theory, workers should be taxed in inverse proportion to their elas-
ticity of labor supply in order to minimize deadweight loss.  In light of the
fairly robust empirical results  that married women's  labor-supply elastici-
ties are significantly higher than married men's, 184 optimal-tax theory sug-
180.  See  Frank P. Ramsey,  A  Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON.  J. 47  (1927)
(proposing the inverse-elasticities rule).
181.  The elasticity of X with respect to Y is the ratio of a percentage change in X in response to a
percentage change in Y, or (8XII')(YIx), where the units of X and Y drop out. For example, the price-
elasticity of demand of  A  is the ratio of the percentage change in demand in response to a percentage
change in the price of A (PA).  Or we can write (8AISPA)(P  IA).
182.  Potential complications  arise in a general equilibrium context, making it impossible to say
that the price increase is equal to the tax.  See infra  notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
183.  The literature  is vast.  See, e.g.,  Feldstein  & Feenberg, supra note 4,  at 40-41.  See also
McCAFFERY, supra  note 2, at 168-84.
184.  See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.  As we will see, the wide range and remain-
ing uncertainty  in studies  of labor-supply elasticities  are troublesome  to those  who  count on an  in-
crease  in female  labor supply due to a lowering  of tax.  See, e.g.,  Mroz, supra note 94,  at 795-96
(noting the wide range of estimates).
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gests that men should be taxed more than women. 185  Whether this would
be regarded  as fair or not is another question, but as  long as we  focus  on
the labor-supply  decision, optimal-tax  theory  suggests  that efficiency  re-
quires  lower  taxes  on  married  women  than  on  married  men.  Because
women still typically earn less than men, individual filing would go some
way to effecting  this result.  For this reason, optimal-tax  theory provides
some support for individual filing in the joint-versus-individual-filing  de-
bate.
This  support,  however,  is  far  from  complete.  First,  notice  that  al-
though optimal tax suggests lower taxes for married women, this does not
mean that individual filing provides  exactly the correct level of differential
between  taxes  on secondary  earners  and  taxes on primary earners  (or be-
tween  women  and  men).  Indeed,  optimal-tax  theory  probably would  re-
quire  an  even greater  differential  between  women's and  men's tax  rates
than  provided for by  individual  filing.'86  The  elasticity  studies  do  vary
considerably,  but as we will  see, the case for intermediate  filing does not
depend  on labor supply effects being large or small.187  If our choices  are
limited to individual filing or joint filing, the general  consensus holds that
optimal-tax theory provides support for individual over joint filing.
Labor-supply decisions  are not the only ones distorted by taxes.  The
familiar  optimal-tax  result  does  not  take  account  of home  production,
which presents room  for a different type of distortion.  John Piggott and
John Whalley  have recently  argued  that efficiency  considerations  do  not
unambiguously point in the direction  of individual  filing.  Rather, the ef-
fects  of the  inverse-elasticity  rule  must be balanced  against factor-input
distortions. 188  The lower taxes on the secondary  earner's wages can make
the secondary earner's market labor more attractive relative to the primary
earner's  than it would  be  in  a no-tax  world.  Piggott  and Whalley  claim
that individual filing may cause  a large  enough distortion  in factor-input
decisions that the efficiency gained by reducing these distortions with joint
filing  may in  some cases  outweigh  the efficiency  gained  from lowering
185.  See, e.g.,  Feldstein & Feenberg, supra note 4,  at 40-41;  KILLINGSWORTH,  supra note 92, at
348-52;  MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 168-84.  Consistently with this result, other studies have dem-
onstrated that women's perceptions of the marginal tax rate they face are fairly accurate, but men's are
not.  See Harvey S.  Rosen, Taxes in a Labor  Supply Model with Joint Wage-Hours Determination,  44
ECONOMETRICA 485, 487-503 (1976).  See also KiLLINGSWORTH, supra note 92, at 356-58 (discussing
the Rosen study).
186.  See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
187.  See infra Part  L.D.4.
188.  See John Piggott & John  Whalley, The Tax  Unit and Household Production, 104 J. POL.
ECON. 398, 411-17 (1996).
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relative  taxes  on  secondary  earners.  Thus,  when  the  factor-input  effect
dominates, 189 efficiency  is in tension with a policy  of promoting women's
labor participation. 190  Piggott  and  Whalley  also  present  Australian  data
that they claim to be consistent with the model's predictions. 191
In a recent working paper, Patricia Apps and Ray Rees point out that
Piggott and Whalley's result only holds under rather extreme assumptions
about how low marginal rates on married women  would be under individ-
ual filing.192  More importantly,  Apps  and  Rees argue  that joint filing  is
unlikely  to be  superior to  all levels  of "separate  taxation." 193  Apps  and
Rees  define  "separate  taxation"  as  any system that provides  for different
marginal  rates for spouses.  Separate  taxation  under some rate or other
will  be  a better  second-best  solution  than joint  taxation.  Thus,  from  a
starting  point of joint taxation,  small movements  away  from equal mar-
ginal  rates  on the spouses  will be welfare-improving  overall-as long as
we focus  on  the two  distortions  in question.  The  problem  is  one  of a
trade-off  between two distortions: Movements toward much lower rates for
secondary earners will reduce the labor-supply distortion but will increase
the home-production  distortion;  conversely,  a  move  towards  more  equal
rates will reduce the home-production  distortion but at the expense of in-
creasing  the labor-supply  distortion.  In  a nonideal  world,  efficiency  is
generally better served by reducing some of each distortion in such a trade-
off rather than by eliminating either distortion  completely.  Thus, Piggott
and Whalley's advocacy of  joint taxation is misplaced, but their exposition
of the trade-off is well taken.
Joint filing therefore is likely to be inferior to both a realistic individ-
ual filing system194 and the system of intermediate  filing proposed in this
Article.  Notice  first that  intermediate  filing  would  count  as  a  form  of
"separate  taxation"  in  the model Apps  and  Rees  present.  Unless  every
single  couple  bargained  into  a  50/50  ratio,  intermediate  filing  will  tax
some spouses at different rates.  The optimal point in light of the trade-off
189.  See  PATRICIA F. APPS & RAY  REES,  INDIVIDUAL  VS.  JOINT TAXATION  IN MODELS  WITH
HOUSEHOLD  PRODUCTION  (Australian National  University Working Papers in Economics and Econo-
metrics No. 330, 1997).
190.  On  the disagreement among feminists about this policy and the occasional tension between
efficiency analysis and some feminists'  concerns, see infra Part III.D.4.
191.  See Piggott & Whalley, supra  note 188, at 403-11.
192.  See AP'S & RYE,  supra  note 189, at 3,  9.
193.  See id.  at 7-10.
194.  By "realistic individual filing system,"  I mean individual  filing with rates dependent solely
on income, rather than on secondary-earner  status or wealth.  Accordingly, a "realistic" system would
not have negative rates for secondary earners in general but might have negative rates for low earners,
as under a program like the Earned Income Tax Credit.
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between the two distortions in labor-supply and factor-input  decisions lies
somewhere between  very different rates for spouses-perhaps  with  nega-
tive rates  on the secondary  earner-and joint taxation.  Individual  filing
based on rates determined  by income  level195 and  intermediate  filing will
lie in this middle ground.  One or both of them likely will be closer to the
optimal  point than  either  extreme  of separate  taxation  or joint  taxation.
However, the rate of trade-off between the two distortions-how  much in-
crease of the labor distortion we get for a reduction in the home-production
distortion-is unknown.  Also, at what point the marginal changes in these
two distortions equal each other, reaching the optimal point, is unknown  as
well.
In light of this  trade-off, intermediate  filing may present advantages
beyond  those of even realistic individual filing.  Couples  who would face
the factor-input distortion could opt into the intermediate-filing  system and
choose  a  relatively  equal  ratio.  As  with  all  default  rules,  we  must  ask
whether parties for whom the default is inefficient will contract into an ef-
ficient arrangement.  Two factors point toward optimism in the case of in-
termediate  filing  with  default  individual  filing.  First,  those  couples  for
whom the factor-input distortion looms  largest  also have the most incen-
tive  to negotiate  a  relatively  sharing  ratio.1 96   The  gains  from  moving
closer to joint filing are fully internalized  to the married individuals,  who
will split the gains from the bargain.  Further, even despite the transaction
costs incurred  in negotiating  a nondefault ratio,  the stakes  may  be quite
high-spread out over the life of the marriage and beyond-compared to a
one-time cost of negotiating.  Thus, more than in the case of most contrac-
tual defaults,  intermediate  filing  provides  some  assurance  that  a penalty
default can work.197  In any event, the nonmandatory  nature of the individ-
ual-filing default of intermediate filing should go a long way towards miti-
gating the distortionary effects in factor-input decisions.  In contrast, under
individual  filing,  those  who  face  large  home-production  distortions  are
burdened with the same rate differential between  the spouses  as  is every-
195.  Consider this as opposed to individual filing based on rates determined by sex or status as a
primary or secondary  earner  as might be required  for separate  taxation aimed  at eliminating labor-
supply distortions.
196.  See GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN,  supra note 127, at 25-83 (1993)  (extending Becker's  theory
of marriage into unified theory of labor and marriage markets); Alan Freidan, The U.S. Marriage  Mar-
ket, in ECONOMICS OFTHE FAMILY,  supra  note  102, at 352,365-66 (presenting empirical evidence that
potential  gain from  marriage  and  proportion of women  married  is  positively  related  to  sex-specific
relative wage).  Cf. BECKER, supra note 35, at 330 (noting the correlation  between investment in hu-
man capital  and  delay in marriage);  Becker, A  Theory of Marriage,  supra note  102, 301-08  (noting
that an increase in wage rate of women relative to men would decrease incentive to marry).
197.  On the functioning of intermediate filing as a penalty default, see infra Part llI.D.2.
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one  else.  Unlike  individual  filing, intermediate  filing  shows  promise of
providing some targeted relief to the home-production distortion that is not
possible on any system that uses income alone as the determinant of mar-
ginal rates.
Finally,  precisely  because individual  filing  enforces  sharing, it may
present special advantages in the area of women's  labor supply.  A recent
study compared women's labor supply before  and after a move to unilat-
eral  divorce  in  states  with community  property  and  those with  equitable
distribution laws. 198  Where the shift led to increased bargaining power for
the  wife-that  is,  in  community-property  as  opposed  to  equitable-
distribution jurisdictions 199-wives  worked  more  and  spent  less  time in
home  production,  leaving  leisure  time  far less  affected.2 0  Where  the
change to unilateral divorce decreased married women's bargaining power,
such  as  in  equitable-distribution  states,  they  decreased  their  labor  sup-
ply.2 '  Interestingly, the same  study found no  significant increase  in di-
vorce  following  adoption  of unilateral-divorce  laws,  leading  to  the  hy-
pothesis that marital transfers  in  the form of work-pattern  shifts  occur to
prevent divorce.2°2  If intermediate filing strengthens  women's bargaining
position, as I have argued, then this hypothesis,  if true, may lead to an ex-
pected  increase  in  labor  supply  of women  under  an  intermediate  filing
system.  Although  much study remains to be done, these findings provide
further  indication  that intermediate  filing  may  be superior  to  any  filing
system that is not coupled with a change in marital property law.
Now  consider marital  income  sharing  as gift-giving.  To  the extent
that marital  income  is  given to  another spouse  with  no  strings  attached,
intermediate  filing also  leads to  efficiency  advantages.  The U.S.  income
tax  gives no deduction for  donors and does not tax gifts  to recipients.2 0 3
This  treatment  may  reflect  an  uneasy  compromise  between  our  views
about the fairness of taxing those who consume or control and administra-
tive  convenience.  From  a pure efficiency  standpoint,  however,  a strong
198.  See Jefferey S.  Gray, Divorce-Law Changes, Household  Bargaining,  and Married  Women's
Labor  Supply, 88 AM.  ECON. REV. 628 (1998).
199.  This is not to say that community property  protects women as  much as  it could or should.
See infra  Part V.A.
200.  See id. at 632-39.
201.  See id.
202.  See id. at 632-34.  But see Leom Friedberg, Did Unilateral  Divorce Raise Divorce Rates?
Evidence from Panel Data, 88 AM.  ECON. REv.  608  (1998)  (finding some increase  in divorce rates
attributable to adoption of unilateral  divorce).
203.  See supra note 114 and accompanying  text.
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argument  can be  made for lower taxes  on nonexchange  gifts.2°4  This is
because  the more altruistic  the giving, the more giving  will increase  the
utility of both donor and recipient.  As a result, because the amount of in-
come given enters the social  welfare function or overall utility twice, sub-
sidizing  gift-giving  will  increase  overall  welfare.  Because  intermediate
filing  allows  couples  to lower their taxes  through  a self-assessed  ratio  if
marital  income  giving  is taking  place,  the system would  encourage  wel-
fare-increasing behavior.  Individual filing does not allow for this because
earned  income  is  always  taxed  to  the  earner  and  property  income  is
shiftable with  little guarantee  that  a genuine  gift  has  been made.  Con-
versely, joint filing  may  both  overstate  gift-giving  by  allowing  income-
splitting regardless  of whether sharing is really  occurring  and  fail to  treat
those  who share better than those who do not.  Importantly, at the margin
there  is  no incentive  in  terms  of lower taxes  for interspousal  gift-giving
under joint filing.  For the primary earner and the couple as a whole, taxes
are at the same lower marital rate under joint filing regardless of whether
additional  sharing takes  place.  Thus,  from  an efficiency  standpoint,  the
more marital income sharing is like a gift and the more altruistic the giver,
the better intermediate filing works.2 0 5
204.  See Louis Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts, 88  AM.  ECON.  REV.  283,  284-87  (1998).  For a
parallel  argument about the welfare-increasing effects of bequests,  see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Effi-
cient and Optimal Taxation and the New  Welfare Economics,  in 2  HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
991  (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987).
205.  We might ask what the consequences  are of the increase in the secondary earner's  marginal
rate from the receipt of the gift of some of the primary earner's  income.  Under progressive rates,  the
gift will have the potential to raise the secondary earner into a higher bracket-a version  of the stack-
ing  effect on a smaller scale.  The implications  for efficiency  analysis and  for those seeking  to pro-
mote women's market labor, such as  McCaffery,  may diverge  here.  From a  welfare  standpoint, the
relevant effects are the increase in both spouses'  welfare  from the gift and the effect on both their la-
bor supplies.  To the extent that gifts  are taxed to someone,  that someone will  face higher marginal
rates on all  income, including  that from labor.  First, notice that under intermediate filing, taxing  the
gift  to the recipient  secondary earner will  not  distort the market-versus-domestic-labor  decision  be-
cause earnings  from both are in effect taxed under  the self-assessed  ratio of intermediate filing.  As
discussed  earlier, the big  substitution effect for  women  is between  market  and  domestic labor,  not
between  both  or either type of labor and leisure.  As  for the distortionary effect on leisure of taxing
gifts,  there is little reason to suppose that taxing them to the recipient secondary earner is worse than
taxing them to the transferor.  In addition to the double-utility effect noted in the text, any distortion  of
the secondary  earner's labor-leisure  decision  from higher taxes must  be offset  against  a decrease  in
such distortion of the primary  earner's labor-leisure decision.  Since the primary earner is at a higher
marginal  rate  and  since  there  is little  reason  to suppose  women's  substitution  effect  on  leisure  is
greater than men's in the presence of taxation of all labor, the marginal benefit from lowering the pri-
mary earner's leisure decision distortion is likely to be greater than the marginal increase in distortion
of the secondary earners'  corresponding decision.  Thus, even when cross-effects  are considered, the
taxation pattern under intermediate filing is unambiguously welfare-improving.
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As illustrated in this discussion of the efficiency consequences  of in-
termediate filing, regardless  of whether marital  income sharing  is treated
as an  exchange  or gift-giving, the attractiveness  of intermediate  filing is
clear.  Intermediate  filing is likely to represent a more efficient trade-off
between  labor supply  and home-production  distortions  than do  the polar
choices of joint and individual filing.
2. Eliminating Strategic Contractual  Inefficiencies
Traditional deadweight loss analysis  of the household taxation prob-
lem relies  on the underlying assumption that the marriage  already exists.
Because the marriage decision  itself-as opposed to time-allocation  deci-
sions within the marriage-may  or may not be sensitive to taxes, this tra-
ditional mode of analysis is not implausible.  However, intermediate filing
carries with it efficiency benefits from its ability to improve the process of
marriage contracting.  Intermediate  filing can  operate  as an  information-
forcing "penalty default" in marriage formation.206
Contractual  defaults  are  either mandatory  or default  rules.  Contrac-
tual parties are not allowed  to contract around  a mandatory  rule, but they
may elect to contract around a default rule.  "Immutable"  or "mandatory"
rules  reflect paternalism  or  an  effort  to prevent  negative  externalities.20 7
Examples  of immutable  rules  include  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code's
duty  to  act  in good  faith,  minimum  wage  laws  in employment,  implied
covenants of habitability in landlord-tenant law, and support obligations on
divorce.  Default rules can be classified as "majoritarian"  or "penalty"  de-
faults.  A majoritarian default rule is designed to mimic what most contact-
ing parties would contract for if they thoughtfully considered the matter.208
The goal  is to minimize  the transaction  costs involved in negotiating  the
particular provision in question for as many parties as possible.  A penalty
206.  On penalty default rules  in contract law,  see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,  Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An  Economic  Theory of Default Rules,  99  YALE  L.J.  87,  95-107  (1989)
[hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling  Gaps].  The literature on default rules in contracts is quite large.
See, e.g.,  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual  Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101  YALE L.J. 729  (1992);  Lucian A.  Bebchuk & Steven Shavell,  Information and the
Scope of Liabilityfor  Breach of Contract:  The Rule of  Hadley  v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON.  & ORG.  284
(1991);  Richard Craswell,  Contract  Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88  MICH.
L. REV. 489 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining  and the Economic Theory of  Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE  L.J. 615  (1990).  See  also Symposium on  Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 3 S.  CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993).
207.  See Ayres & Gertner, Filling  Gaps,  supra note 206, at 87-88.
208.  See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:  Toward a General The-
ory of Contractual  Obligation,  69 VA. L. REV. 967-971  (1983);  Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra
note 206, at 92.
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default, on the other hand, represents what a party with information would
not want and is designed to force that party to reveal the information  in the
process of contracting  around the penalty  default.2 09  Thus,  for  example,
Ian Ayres  and Robert Gertner  analyze the rule  of Hadley v. Baxendale
21 0
against  awarding  consequential damages  unless  the other  party knows  or
has reason to know of the probable damage as a penalty default.  The party
with the information about potential harm must either contract around the
Hadley rule, thereby  revealing information  that  is  useful to contract  for-
mation, or not receive damages for that harm.211
Intermediate  filing is designed  to  have the same beneficial  informa-
tion-forcing effect.  If the economically  advantaged  spouse wants to  seize
the carrot  of income-splitting,  she  must disclose  an  important  aspect  of
how equal she wants  the marriage  partnership  to be.  Intermediate  filing
thus  works  as  a  penalty  default,  forcing  the  economically-advantaged
spouse to share vital  information  with the  other spouse.  This  means that
less  wealthy  spouses  will have better  information  about  their  rights  and
about their partners'  intentions.  As  a result, inefficiency  in marriage  for-
mation from strategic behavior can be reduced.212  Thus, the information-
forcing  effect of the self-assessment approach  may lead  to more efficient
marriage formation.
The strong likelihood that this information-forcing  effect will be par-
ticularly important emerges from Komhauser's  data on deception and self-
deception.213  People may  say they favor more  splitting than they  are ac-
tually willing to do.  If so, intermediate filing has the advantage of forcing
this information onto the table.  Interestingly, the information-forcing  ef-
fect may arise whether or not the parties contract around default individual
filing and into a different ratio.  If the parties contract into a ratio,  the ratio
provides  the economically  more  precarious  spouse  vital  information  she
might not otherwise have about where she stands; there will be less chance
that she will detrimentally  rely on empty  rhetoric about partnership  from
her "partner."  If, on the other hand, there is  a large imbalance  in  the re-
sources  of the spouses,  then opting  into  a more  equal  ratio  would  save
209.  See Ayres & Gertner, Filling  Gaps, supra note 206, at 95-100.
210.  9 Ex. 341,  156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
211.  See Ayres & Gertner, Filling  Gaps, supra note 206, at 101-04.
212.  Becker  has  analyzed  how  divorce  is a  response to  imperfect  information  in  the  marriage
market.  See BECKER, supra note 35, at 324-41.
213.  See  Komhauser,  Partnership  Model, supra note 75,  at  1427  nn.31-32  ("[P]eople  lie  to
themselves  [about sharing]:  they lie to  others ....  People  may  say they share but  act inconsistently
with  that statement; they may  even make  inconsistent statements.");  Komhauser,  Love,  Money, and
the IRS, supra note 2, at 80-84 (setting forth data indicating deceptive answers about sharing).
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taxes.  If the economically  stronger spouse nevertheless  does not want to
contract  a more equal  ratio, then this too reveals  a lack of willingness to
engage in meaningful sharing.  Thus, unlike most penalty  defaults,  inter-
mediate filing, incorporating default individual  filing, is likely  to have an
information-forcing  effect in all the contexts in which it is most important.
The information-forcing  benefits  are closely tied to the overall value
of antenuptial  agreements.  Traditionally,  the law  has  been suspicious  of
antenuptial  agreements  as  likely  to  promote divorce.214   More  recently,
commentators  have  argued  that the  value  of antenuptial  agreements  in
terms  of optimal  sorting (who gets married),21 5 reducing incentives  to en-
gage in opportunistic behavior,216 lowering the costs (including third-party
effects)  of messy  divorces,217 and protecting the spouse  who invests more
in the marriage 2 1 8 outweigh the disadvantages of increased attention to the
possibilities of divorce.  Likewise, these benefits and respect for individual
choice  are  increasingly  seen  as  outweighing  a paternalistic  concern  for
people's  tendency  to make mistakes.219   Even with  respect  to  the tradi-
tional concern over the divorce rate, it is probable that giving the economi-
cally  weaker  spouse-the  one  who  has  more  marriage-specific  invest-
ments-more rights on divorce would lower the divorce rate.  The wife's
increased  incentive to divorce  is likely outweighed by the decrease in the
husband's incentive to seek divorce.220  Under a no-fault regime, which is
the norm  today, making  the spouses'  reservation  utilities  more equal  by
214.  See,  e.g., In re Marriage of Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr.  153 (Ct. App.  1985) (denying enforce-
ment of a wife's contractual claim to $500,000 on the grounds  that the prospect of such a claim gave
the wife an incentive to seek divorce).
215.  See,  e.g., Jeffrey Evans  Stake, Mandatory Planning  for Divorce, 45 VAND.  L.J. 397, 428
(1992)  (citing use of better  information about prospective  spouses in  the decision whether to marry
that person as support for a  system of mandatory  antenuptial  agreements).  See also BECKER,  supra
note 35, at 324-41 (discussing divorce as result of the imperfect information  in the marriage market).
216.  See,  e.g.,  Margaret  F.  Brinig &  Steven  M.  Crafton,  Marriage and Opportunism,  23  J.
LEGAL STUD. 869  (1994).
217.  See, e.g., Stake, supra  note 215, at 428 (noting external costs of divorce that can be lowered
through antenuptial  agreements  and  suggesting  that less-than-full internalization  of such benefits  is
one reason that antenuptial agreements  are not more widespread).
218.  See, e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 216, at 875-76, 887,  893; Stake, supra note 215, at
416.
219.  See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining:  The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM  1015,  1031  (1985);  Marjorie Maguire  Shultz, Contractual  Ordering  of  Marriage:  A New
Modelfor  State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv.  207,  241-42 (1982).
220.  See, e.g.,  Lloyd  Cohen, Marriage,  Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, "I  Gave Him the Best
Years of My Life,"  16 J. LEGAL STUD.  267, 293  (1987) ("It is this more rapid using up of the woman's
capital asset that creates  incentives for the husband to terminate the marriage and causes  difficulty for
women in replacing their husbands following divorce.").
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evenly  distributing the benefits  and  burdens  of divorce  may  well  lead to
fewer divorces.
221
Indeed,  many  of the problems blamed  on antenuptial  agreements-
based on the arguments that divorce becomes too easy, that a focus on di-
vorce  undermines  the marriage,  and  that people  cannot  choose  well  for
themselves-are  also largely a function of general divorce law itself.  For
example, the most obvious reason for divorce being too easy is no-fault di-
vorce, and proposals to introduce  fault into property division  would most
directly address that problem.2 22  The couple's negotiated ratio could serve
as  a  presumption:  If the primary  earner  were  abusive  or  the secondary
earner  shirked,  some  remedy  could  be  provided  for  in  the  antenuptial
agreement, or, if sufficient unfairness  resulted, by a judge  on divorce.  In
any case, I will assume in the following discussion  that any disadvantages
of the option of antenuptial agreements  and the self-assessed ratio are out-
weighed  by  the  advantages.  In  particular,  the benefits  of information-
forcing in this context  from better sorting  and  reduced incentives  for op-
portunistic behavior likely outweigh the costs, if any, of the greater infor-
mation.
3.  Expectation Damages
The information-forcing  effect  of intermediate  filing is  not  its  only
contract-like advantage.  Opting into the self-assessed ratio of intermediate
filing also works  like expectation  damages  and, in  particular, like  an  op-
portunity to set up liquidation damages.  Although current law  sometimes
looks unfavorably  on  liquidated  damages  provisions,  intermediate  filing
partakes of the benefits of liquidated damages and not the drawbacks.
From  an  efficiency  standpoint,  the presumption  should  favor  liqui-
dated damages provisions. 223  Often the parties will be in a better position
to estimate damages  than  a court will be  able  to measure  them  ex  post.
One party may be trying to signal extra commitment to the deal or may be
trying to protect  against special  harm  he  would suffer  on  breach.  If so,
liquidated damages  can be  expected  to  induce efficient  precaution  in  the
parties.  Liquidated damages provisions are suspect, however, when either
221.  Also,  as Robert Scott argues in  the commercial  context, transferring risk to  the party  best
able to control the production process or who places a lower subjective cost on the risk, or distributing
the risk will lower the likelihood of opportunism.  See Robert E. Scott,  Conflict and Cooperation  in
Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL.  L. REV. 2005,  2021  (1987).  See also Brinig & Crafton, supra note
216, at 873-75 (recognizing Scott's analysis to marital contract).
222.  See, e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 216, at 892-94.
223.  For a summary  of the arguments for and  against liquidated damages  and  references  to the
literature, see THOMAS J. MIcELI, ECONOMICS  OFTHE LAW 83-87 (1997).
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there  is some procedural  defect in  their  formation  or they  impose exter-
nalities.  The  former  do  not  distinguish  liquidated  damages  provisions
from  other  contractual  provisions.  However,  under  externalities,  Tai-
Yeong Chung has argued that in sales where there is uncertainty over what
another buyer might offer for the goods, a high liquidated damages provi-
sion might inefficiently reduce the probability of efficient breach.224
The  intermediate-filing  option  is  worth considering  in light  of this
discussion  of liquidated  damages.  Couples  opting  into  the intermediate
system by negotiating  a ratio to govern  income-splitting and  property  di-
vision on divorce  are in effect setting  up a liquidated damages  provision
for divorce.  This ratio should exhibit the benefits of liquidated damages  in
two respects.  First, although the parties may or may not be aware of the
probability that they might divorce, the bargain they strike before marriage
is likely to be a better and less-expensive  measure of sharing than the de-
cision of a divorce judge  listening to the self-serving  evidence  of antago-
nistic parties.225  Second,  one spouse may signal in negotiations  of the ra-
tio  the  extra  commitment  necessary  to  maximize  the  gains  from  the
marriage, or for the marriage to happen at all.
226
Nor does  intermediate  filing suffer from the disadvantages  of liqui-
dated  damages provisions.  In this respect, the externalities  argument cuts
the other way:  In marriage,  we generally do not want to promote efficient
breach.  We  are not worried  that a divorce  settlement will interfere  with
the chances  for a homebreaker  and  one of the spouses  getting together.
We can cast this argument in moral or economic terms.  From the perspec-
tive of society's shared  values, marriage  should not be indissolvable,  but
224.  See Tai-Yeong  Chung, On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 8 J.L. ECON.  & ORG.  280 (1992).
225.  See, e.g., Stake, supra  note 215, at 416-20.
226.  The benefits and costs here are somewhat  similar to those that arise from giving couples a
choice of divorce regimes at the time they marry.  However, because intermediate filing does not pro-
vide for the complete elimination of either spouse's exit option, both benefits and especially the costs
are probably lower.  See, e.g.,  Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake,  Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing  the Marriage  Contract,  73 IND. L.J. 453  (1998)  (proposing to allow couples to contract
for a wide range of divorce regimes).  But see Kathryn Abrams,  Choice, Dependence, and the Rein-
vigoration  of the Traditional  Family, 73  IND. L.J. 517 (1998) (arguing that choice in marital contract-
ing provides inadequate protection and false security to those specializing in home production); Greg-
ory S. Alexander,  The New Marriage  Contract  and the Limits of Private Ordering,  73  IND.  L.J. 503,
505-10 (1998)  (objecting to the Rasmusen-Stake scheme  based, inter alia, on information costs, cog-
nitive errors, and public ordering concerns,  but acknowledging that allowing contracting over property
division presents these problems to a far lesser degree).  The gains  from being able  to choose  a ratio
must also  be offset against the losses from being shown not to have this level of commitment, which
returns us to the information-forcing issues of the previous section.  Similar information-forcing issues
are raised by proposals for "covenant marriage" and the Rasmusen-Stake proposal.
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dissolution is not as desirable as would be the selling of a house to a higher
bidder.  From an economic  perspective,  the externality  of weakening  the
marriage  institution  is far more serious  with  effects  on  many  more  third
parties  (especially children) than the arguable weakening effect of efficient
breaches  on the institution of promising and third-party implications.227
Thus, as a measure of damages,  the  self-assessed ratio,  possibly lim-
ited by  a  recapture  rule,  will  function  like  a system  of liquidated  dam-
ages.228  Intermediate filing  is likely  to exhibit the beneficial  aspects  of
liquidated  damages.  Externality  arguments  used  against  liquidated dam-
ages actually favor individual filing as well.
4. Efficiency Analysis in Perspective
I  have  argued  that,  in  considering  various  partial  equilibrium  eco-
nomic models,  intermediate  filing likely  does better from  a  welfare  per-
spective than joint or individual filing.  Intermediate filing may lead to the
smallest deadweight loss from labor and factor-input  distortions, will force
information  from the parties that  is  relevant to  efficient  marriage  forma-
tion, and will act as a system of efficiency-enhancing liquidated damages.
Although these advantages  are substantial, there are good reasons  not
to base too much  of our overall  evaluation  of intermediate  filing on effi-
ciency considerations.  First, research in the area of labor supply and taxa-
tion  is  still based  on partial  equilibrium  models.  A general  equilibrium
model  taking into account the effect  of changes  in labor supply  on gross
wage  rates  and  feedback  effects  on labor  supply  is  still  in  the  future.229
From today's partial equilibrium models, we cannot draw firm conclusions
about the overall efficiency effects of a change in tax law.230  The hypothe-
ses  possible  under  partial  equilibrium  models,  however,  do  support  the
desirability of intermediate filing.
227.  For a  moral or property-rights-based  argument against the notion  of efficient  breach,  see
generally  Daniel Friedmann,  The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J.  LEGAL STUD.  1 (1989)  (likening  to
theft the deliberate breach of a contract in favor of a better offer).
228.  The recapture  rule may have the effect of limiting  the liquidated damages.  How limiting it
should  be will depend on the balance between  the need for flexibility and the deviation  from optimal
damages.  Note,  however,  that as  compared  to present  law,  the  liquidated  damages  in  divorce  are
likely  to be less.  Therefore, if the recapture  rule approach results in damages  that are smaller than the
optimal level, current law is likely to be even more deficient in this regard.  On the family law  impli-
cations of intermediate filing, see infra Part III.E.
229.  For a discussion of the difficulties involved, see KILLINGSWORTH,  supra note 92, at 340.
230.  Cf. Alstott, supra note 28,  at 2009-33 (noting that rough  economic  knowledge of compen-
sated elasticities  provides only weak support at best for individual filing).
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The  information costs of implementing a proposal cannot be left out
of the efficiency  analysis.  Ignoring  the information  costs,  the efficient
solution  would  be to  inquire  at the  individual  level  about  labor-supply
elasticity  and home-production-factor  distortions,  and to pick the individ-
ual tax rate that minimizes the sum of the two distortions.  Needless to say,
the information  costs would be prohibitive.  This is especially  important in
light of the range  of elasticity  estimates  in the literature.231   Some  have
even questioned  whether  the effect  of marginal  rates  on  women's  labor
supply is all that great,232 but nothing in the present proposal  depends  on
its being large or small.  Narrowly  tailored to the problem of sharing, in-
termediate filing may require less knowledge  about the exact effects of tax
levels  on labor supply than does  individual  filing.233  Intermediate  filing
shows  promise of harnessing  some private  information  and  reducing  the
informational burden on lawmakers.  This advantage has long-term impor-
tance  across  time: Making  secondary  earners',  or, alternatively  women's
tax  rates  depend  on elasticity  (and  other) studies  means  that new  meas-
urements  must  be  taken  and  rates  must  change  if  underlying  supply
schedules change over time.  Nor does intermediate filing call for negative
rates  on secondary  earners or women,  something that would be politically
impossible.
234
The  intermediate  filing  system  subjects  the secondary  earner  to the
same marginal rate on domestic and market labor.  If the secondary  earner,
such  as C' in the scenario  above,  will make the decision  of whether and
how much to work outside the home based in part on whether her domestic
labor is  "compensated"  by  shared income  from  the primary  earner,  then
intermediate  filing,  unlike  joint  or  even  individual  filing,  taxes  both
sources of income the secondary  earner is weighing.  That is, if C'  works
in the home and in exchange receives income from the primary earner, that
income is taxed to  C' just as earnings from a job outside the home would
231.  See KILLINGSWORTH, supra note 92.
232.  See Alstott, supra note 28, at 2017-22.
233.  This is subject to the usual provisos relating to what the rest of the tax system does, particu-
larly  with respect to taxation of commodities  that are complements  of the activities that the analysis
concerns.  For a general discussion, see Stiglitz, supra  note 204, at 1023-27.
234.  For example, McCaffery  has argued  from an optimal-tax  perspective that "[a]  strong theo-
retical  case exists  for altering  the  basic rate structure to  provide  significantly lower,  even negative,
rates for  secondary earners,  financed by  higher rates on primary  earners."  McCaffery,  Fresh Look,
supra note 2, at 1060.  McCaffery  has grown to recognize the political difficulties involved and advo-
cates  no  rate  differential beyond  that implied  by  the separate  filing  system he  now  supports.  See
MCCAFFERY,  supra note 2, at 278-80.  See also Zelenak, Tax and  the Married Woman, supra note 67,
at 1047 (noting this evolution in McCaffery's approach).
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be.  Under intermediate filing, domestic and market labor are subject to the
same marginal rates.
This equality of marginal rates may be particularly important because
the secondary  earner is most sensitive to marginal tax rates.  Furthermore,
domestic labor would for the first time enter into the Social  Security Tax
system, which has been argued for on feminist grounds. 235  This Social Se-
curity tax on domestic labor is attainable without the politically  unaccept-
able  and  inevitably  too  coarse-grained  imputation  of values  to  taxpay-
ers.236  On the other hand, the lower taxes on a primary earner in a couple
opting into an even ratio may lead to a shift outward in demand for spousal
labor.  Whether or not this constitutes  a distortion  in efficiency  terms  de-
pends  on the baseline  for comparison.  As I  argued  above, intermediate
filing will likely provide some targeted reduction in home-production  dis-
tortions.
237
The question  remains, however,  what the overall effect on  the  labor
supply  of women bargaining into  a relatively  even  ratio will be.  On the
one hand, demand for domestic labor may increase as may  the quasi-wage
that some secondary earners  can earn,  as well  as those secondary  earners'
reservation  wage-the  wage  below  which  they will  choose not to work.
Both of these factors may push married women's  market labor down, but
also increase women's welfare.  On the other hand, the taxation of marital
"compensation"  may reduce some tax-favored status of domestic labor un-
der the other systems.  Moreover, the increased bargaining power of mar-
ried  women  resulting  from  a  move  to  individual  filing  might  increase
married women's labor supply.  As noted earlier, there is at least indirect
empirical support for this proposition.238
Thus,  interestingly,  the present proposal  can help isolate  where shar-
ing fits into an overall concern with women's  welfare.  For those who be-
lieve that breaking down the gendered division of labor is the most impor-
tant goal,239  the fact that women have more "choice,"  with a higher quasi-
wage for domestic labor, will not be decisive.240  On such  a view, sharing
should  be  regarded  as  a  mixed  blessing  because  it  may  raise  married
women's  reservation  wages  and  leads  them  to work  less  in  the  market.
235.  See Staudt, supra note 53, at 1642-43.
236.  See, e.g., Richard Posner, Conservative  Feminism, 1989 U.  CHI. LEGAL F. 191,  193; Staudt,
supra note 53, at 1571-75,  1620-27.
237.  See infra Part III.D.1.
238.  See supra text accompanying notes  198-202.
239.  See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 184;  Komhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS, supra
note 2, at 105-11; Note, supra note 23, at 382.
240.  See MCCAFFERY, supra  note 2, at 287 n.183.
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Other  feminists,  however,  have  stressed  the  importance  of  choice  for
women and have not regarded domestic labor as inherently problematic.241
For them, sharing is mostly positive: It directly increases women's welfare
and  increases  their choice.  Thus,  the general acceptance  of sharing 42  is
put to the test  through individual  filing:  One's  attitude  to  sharing  itself
should depend on one's view of women's long-term interests.
This discussion of efficiency is meant mainly to answer the supposed
efficiency benefits touted by proponents of the polar systems.  None of this
should obscure the main point of this Article, however, which is that if we
pay attention to the role of sharing, progressive rates do not inevitably lead
to  unacceptable  normative  choices  and can  bring  out  the relationship  of
sharing  to  other normative  commitments.  Adopting  a  system  based  on
self-assessed  ratios  supports  the ideal  of  a sharing  marriage  and  makes
women better off in many respects.  Either filing separately by default  or
opting into increased security  of marital property rights would benefit the
secondary  earner.  Removing  the current marriage  penalty  would benefit
two-earner couples,  among whom the marriage penalty  is quite  common,
and would help low-income couples for whom the penalty is disruptive of
family formation in the first place. 243
E.  IMPLICATIONS  FOR FAMILY LAW
Intermediate  filing ties tax treatment  to the rule of property division
on divorce for those who  opt into the system.  As this section will demon-
strate, this  voluntary,  integrated  approach  to marital property  has  several
advantages  outside the boundaries  of tax policy.  Most importantly, it of-
fers a partial answer to the vexed question on divorce of whether and how
to divide  human  capital  developed  during  the marriage.  The  voluntary
nature  of the system at the  individual  level  and,  if so  desired,  the state
level, provides  an answer to objections  from federalism that family law is
traditionally  a matter for state law.  The voluntary  nature of intermediate
filing and its ability to define property rights for those who choose  a ratio
also point to a solution to the problems of joint and  several liability after
divorce for tax  arising  during the marriage.  Finally,  many  of the equity
and efficiency advantages  of intermediate filing in taxation carry  over into
family law as well.
241.  See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 28, at 2035; Staudt, supra note 53, at 1614-18.
242.  See supra Part II.
243.  On the incidence  of the marriage penalty, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note
10,  at  32.  On  the  effects  of the  marriage  penalty  on family  formation  among poor  women,  see
MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 178-84.
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Property division  on  divorce  is restricted  in many  states  to  conven-
tional property, such as real estate and personal property,  and does not di-
rectly include human  capital built up during the marriage.  The paradigm
of human capital is  a professional degree for which  the nondegree  spouse
sacrificed  to help the degree spouse attain.244  In equitable-distribution  re-
gimes,  conventional  property  is  divided,  and  this  process  is  the  main
mechanism  to achieve  "equity"  between  the spouses  apart  from possible
child support and alimony.  Alimony  is usually awarded, if at all, to allow
the spouse with fewer market skills to attain such skills.1 4 5  The latter, so-
called rehabilitative alimony is usually quite meager, typically lasting two
years, and  falls far short of an  equal interest  in the human  capital  devel-
oped in the marriage.246  There has been a move in divorce law to replace
support payments  with  property  division,247 but property  that  can  be  di-
vided has generally been construed rather narrowly.
The treatment of professional  degrees  in  divorce  is  still  very  unset-
tled.2 48  Most courts, except those in New York, give the nondegree spouse
a debt interest in the human  capital rather than  an equity  share.249  How-
ever, if the spouse  with  less human  capital  receives  less  than  half of the
human capital  on divorce,  then splitting the income  by halves means that
income but not the underlying income-producing property has been  trans-
ferred.  The question is whether,  on the various  approaches  to  measuring
income, half should be deemed transferred.
On an  ability-to-pay  approach, the fact that the spouse  with less  hu-
man capital is a donee does not negate the fact that the donor is exercising
a heightened  ability to pay  in  the form of control.  Unless  the nondegree
244.  See, e.g., Lowery v. Lowery, 413 S.E.2d 731 (Ga.  1992)  (holding medical school education
and business licenses to be  an intangible asset personal  to the holder and, because such  asset is diffi-
cult to value  and nonphysical,  not subject to division on divorce);  Mocnik  v. Mocnik,  838 P.2d  500
(Okla.  1992)  (holding that  a husband's interest in goodwill of his medical  practice  is not  a divisible
asset on divorce).
245.  See generally  Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative  Alimony:  Uses and Abuses of  Limited Du-
ration  Alimony, 21  FAM. L.Q. 573, 573-75 (1988).
246.  See,  e.g.,  WErrZMAN,  supra note 79, at 70-142;  Suzanne  Reynolds,  The Relationship of
Property  Division and  Alimony: The Division of  Property  to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.  827,
866 & n.168 (1988).
247.  See, e.g., WErrMAN, supra  note 79, at 64-67.
248.  See, e.g.,  Daniel D.  Polsby & Martin  Zelder, Risk-Adjusted Valuation of Professional De-
grees in Divorce, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (1994).  For references  to the large literature  on the  subject,
see id. at 273 n.2.
249.  See id. at 273-75.  For example, the California Family Code provides that the community is
to  be reimbursed  for  community  contributions  with  interest.  See  CAL.  FAM.  CODE  § 2641  (West
1994).  Thus, contributions by either spouse are split down the middle without regard for a net imbal-
ance.
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spouse  has  sufficient  rights  after  divorce  to  ensure  a  continued  benefit
from the human capital-a kind  of continued  expectation  approximating
beneficial  ownership-the transfer is an exercise of the donor's  ability to
pay.
Under a standard-of-living  measure, it might be thought that as long
as both spouses enjoy the income during the marriage, the spouse with less
human capital is enjoying taxable consumption.  Also, under what I called
the "weak"  theory of control,  the spouse who  makes the transfer,  but not
the recipient, has  the kind of "control"  relevant for taxation.25 0  Further-
more,  marriage partners bargain for control in the shadow  of legal  rules,
including  those  of property  division  on divorce.251  Thus, if divorce law
gives the spouse with  more human  capital more leverage during the mar-
riage, that spouse may have a higher standard of living, or at least greater
ability to pay, during the marriage.
If the nondegree  spouse  does not have this measure  of control, then
equal taxation of the spouses  (as under joint filing) would then overtax the
nondegree  spouse  with less human  capital,  and the spouse  with  the extra
human capital would be undertaxed.  Alternatively, the unequal bargaining
power  means that the  situation of individuals  in  an unequal  marriage  is
characterized by far less  sharing than the assumption  of sharing in  a tax-
paying family unit.  Such an unsharing married couple may even engage in
little more  sharing  than  two  unmarried  individuals.  In  such  cases,  the
spouse with  more human capital  has  given up  less  freedom  and  control,
and the spouse with  less human  capital has gained less freedom and  con-
trol.  Less consumption or well-being has been transferred within the mar-
riage than the splitting approach implies.
Many problems on divorce stem from the search for a one-size-fits-all
solution, just as the problems with joint and individual filing do.  If we do
not mandate sharing of the fruits of human  capital on divorce, then, as we
have just seen,  less  sharing  may occur  in  the marriage than joint filing
would  imply.  If, on  the  other  hand,  we force  couples  to  share  human
capital on divorce, we face two problems.  First, we preclude people from
entering into less-sharing marriages  if they so choose.  It is not at all clear
that restricting the range of choices  in this way is desirable.  Second,  we
face  difficulties  in how  to levy the nondegree  spouse's  share.  If it is  a
lump sum, we do not have to worry about the degree spouse's  incentive to
250.  See supra  Part II.A.2.
251.  See  Polsby & Zelder, supra note 248,  at 276 & n.13; Robert H. Mnookin  & Lewis  Kom-
hauser, Bargaining  in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of  Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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work: The degree  spouse  owes the same amount  whether  or not, or even
how much, that spouse works.  But such lump-sum taxes are very difficult
to convince  the public  to accept.  If instead we force the  spouse  with the
greater human  capital  to pay  some portion  of future  wages  to  the  other
spouse after divorce, we run the risk of diminishing the spouse's incentive
to work.  In effect, we are raising  the degree-spouse's  marginal  tax rate.
However,  if this  spouse's  labor-supply  elasticity  is  relatively  inelastic,
taxing that spouse  more heavily  may not induce  less work  and  could  in-
duce more, if the income effect predominates.
252
Instead, I posit that the main objection to the forced sharing of human
capital on divorce is that people take pity on the spouse with human capital
having to pay  after the marriage  has  gone bad.  Such  sympathy  may  be
misguided  and  stem  from  a  blatant  disregard  of the  less-well-off  post-
divorce spouse.  In any event, sympathizers with the degree spouse  should
have little quarrel with intermediate filing, because the system is voluntary
even beyond the point that marriage is voluntary.  Many people marry for
a variety of reasons,  including religious and  cultural, as well as economic
ones.  It is not surprising that there is no consensus  that merely  because
someone did not have to get married, she has no reason to complain  about
the rules for divorce,  whatever they are.  Instead, there is an unsurprising
tendency to regard marriage as fundamental  and to take burdens  on it very
seriously.
Intermediate filing is open to none of these objections, however.  For
most people, the decision to lower one's taxes does not have the religious
and cultural overtones that the decision to marry does.  Rather, intermedi-
ate filing  presents individuals  contemplating  marriage  with  the choice  to
lower taxes in return for rules that mandate sharing, even of human capital,
on divorce.  That decision, if taken  with  eyes open,  gives little  reason to
think that the consequences should be any less severe than those bargained
for by the parties.  Primary earners who do not want to share human capital
on divorce need not negotiate a more even ratio, and their prospective  sec-
ondary-eamer  spouses need not marry them.  Consider again  the analogy
to liquidated damages:  Absent fraud, duress, or other formation difficulties
that courts  already police, the presumption  should be to enforce the dam-
ages for which a party bargained.  In the case of intermediate  filing, the ar-
252.  This result is because the higher effective tax rate makes the degree-spouse poorer and may
therefore prompt more work.  Because taxes  lead to both  an income  effect and  a substitution  effect
that work in opposite directions, nothing can be said a priori about the behavioral  response to a higher
tax rate.  Rather we must know something about the labor supplier's elasticity.  The spouse with more
market skills is often the husband, with a lower elasticity.  Thus, the income effect may well dominate
here.
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guments  for liquidated  damages,  as well  as  the arguments  against  them,
point in favor of letting intermediate filing take its course on divorce.
Intermediate filing, however, does not solve the most difficult prob-
lems of human  capital  on divorce.  Under intermediate  filing, one  would
total the human capital built up during the marriage and divide the fruits of
it according to the prenegotiated  ratio, which  acts as a liquidated damages
clause.2 53  The system would require  a method of valuing human  capital
and a method of distinguishing human capital built up before and after the
marriage ends.
254
Lastly,  intermediate  filing  can  be  generalized  to  offer  solutions  to
several  other problems related to income-splitting  and  the marriage pen-
alty.  For  example,  the  current  system  of standard  deductions  and  the
Earned  Income  Tax  Credit  present  many  couples  with  a  marriage  pen-
alty.255  The benefits of these could  also be set up to track the prenegoti-
ated ratio for income-splitting  and property division.  Similarly, the pres-
ent proposal can handle the presence of children: The benefit of dependent
deductions  could  be  allocated  to the  secondary  earner  as  a  default  and
shifted fractionally  to the primary  earner;  the proportion  of the deduction
going to the primary earner would rise towards fifty percent as the negoti-
ated sharing ratio approaches 50/50.  I return to the question of children in
Part VI.
One  further  problem  on  divorce  is  the  spouse's  liability  for  taxes
arising  during  the  marriage.  Under  the  present  joint-filing  system,  a
spouse who signed a joint return is jointly and severally liable for the taxes
owed that year.256  Women  especially have sometimes  found after divorce
that  their  husbands  did  not  pay  their  share  of the tax,  and the  Internal
Revenue Service has pursued the wife on the basis of joint and several li-
ability.  As has become clear, the "innocent  spouse" provisions  are insuf-
ficient to protect against  many such problematic  cases  and  time will tell
whether newly enacted relief will prove effective.257  Although intermedi-
253.  See supra Part III.D.3.
254.  As  for human  capital  built up before  the marriage begins,  similar questions  arise, or we
could just leave it to the spouses  to take into account the extent they wish to share this human capital
in setting the ratio, or by not opting into the system at all.
255.  See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET  OFFICE, supra note 10, at 7-8,  15-25.
256.  See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West 1998) (providing for joint returns).
257.  See id. § 6015 (relieving spouse of liability  in certain  cases).  See, e.g.,  Crowley v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C.M.  (CCH)  1180 (T.C. 1993)  (denying innocent spouse relief), aff'd by Cockrell v.
Commissioner, 116 F.3d 1472 (2d Cir. 1997)  (table), cert. denied, 118 S.  Ct. 1163  (1998).  See gen-
erally, e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem:  Joint and  Several Liability  for Income
Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND.  L. REV.  317, 348-69  (1990);  Jerome Borison, Alice Through a
1998]SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
ate filing is not the  only way to solve the problem of joint and several li-
ability, it does present a particularly  natural solution.  If we use a default
individual-filing  system, property income could  be taxed  in proportion  to
earned  income, or, with  more difficulty,  to  the "owner."  Spouses  would
then be responsible for that portion of the tax  that is  "theirs."  Under the
self-assessed ratio, matters are even  simpler.  Spouses  are responsible for
the tax liability on their respective percentages of the household income.
The  voluntary  nature  of the  self-assessed  ratio  under  intermediate
filing  also  provides  an answer  to the possible  objection  that family  law,
and divorce  law in  particular, are  traditionally  matters  for the  states,  not
for the federal government.  To gain maximum advantage out of interme-
diate filing, it could be imposed across the country despite objections  from
the  states.  Somewhat  less  intrusively,  individuals  opting  in  the  system
might be required  to negotiate the ratio in such  a manner that it would be
respected  as a valid antenuptial agreement  with an  enforceable  liquidated
damages provision.  If we accept the proposition that family  law has been
traditionally  left  to  the  states,258  the  intermediate-filing  system  can  be
made voluntary  in a second sense:  Individual states can be  allowed to de-
cide  whether  they will pass enabling legislation  to give the self-assessed
ratio from intermediate-filing  effect in their divorce  law.  This  is a minor
step, because the self-assessed ratios would function much like antenuptial
agreements,  which  already  are  typically  given  substantial  deference.  In
any event, a state could choose not to opt into the system and thereby force
its residents  to use default individual filing.259  Indeed,  we could use any
default system we wished for the states that did not opt into the intermedi-
ate-filing system.  But if we wanted to have an incentive for the citizens to
opt  in,  it should  lead  to higher  taxes  for  many  couples  than  they could
achieve with  a self-assessed ratio under individual filing.2 60  Thus, the de-
Very Dark and Confusing Looking  Glass:  Getting  Equity from the Tax  Court in  Innocent  Spouse
Cases,  30 FAM.  L.Q.  123 (1996).
258.  As  Jill Hasday points  out,  the historical  evidence  for  this "tradition"  is surprisingly  slim.
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism  and the Family  Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV.  1297  (1998).
259.  The system  thus  presents  the  states  with incentives  to  adapt  their  marital  property  laws
without forcing a one-size-fits-all  solution.  Pamela  Gann has noted  that, if we combined  individual
filing with  income-splitting  for  those  in states  adopting  a  system  like  community  property,  states
would have  an incentive  to adopt such reforms.  See Gann, supra note 2, at 49-52.  However, com-
munity property does  surprisingly little to guarantee sharing.  See infra Part V.  Further, even if com-
munity property did enforce equal sharing, a choice of individual filing or a community-property  sys-
tem would provide an all-or-nothing choice without assurances  that people would opt into community
property.  Intermediate sharing would be mismeasured.
260.  For example, using pure joint filing (leading to the lowest taxes for any couple) would sap
any  incentive  for a state to opt  into the intermediate-filing  system:  Couples, and  primary earners  in
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fault for states not opting in must be some form of individual filing, but the
choice between that and intermediate filing can be left up to them.
In addition to the advantages of making the treatment of human capi-
tal on divorce more straightforward  because it is more voluntary, interme-
diate filing has further potential benefits for family law  and the institution
of marriage.  These benefits  are closely tied to some of the equity and ef-
ficiency considerations discussed earlier.
Intermediate filing will strengthen women's  bargaining position both
before and  during marriage.  The penalty  default will favor the economi-
cally less-secure prospective or actual spouse-typically  the woman-and
will  strengthen  that  party's  hand.  To  get  the  advantages  of  income-
splitting, the husband,  for example,  will have to  offer  more  genuine  and
greater  sharing than he would otherwise.  Furthermore,  if he negotiates  a
more even, tax-lowering ratio, then the wife will be entitled to more on di-
vorce.  This will mean that during the marriage,  she can demand  more: If
not satisfied, she can leave and will be better off than  she typically would
be if she left under today's law.  In economic terms, her "reservation util-
ity" and hence her bargaining power will have increased.  Furthermore, by
making division  on  divorce simpler, this reservation  utility will  be  even
higher because the cost of divorce will be less, and the lower the cost of
divorce, the more the wife will receive from the divorce.
A final question  about this system  and its relation  to family law and
marriage is whether it unduly  "commodifies"  domestic labor and marriage
itself.26'  Here, we can point to both the voluntariness  of intermediate  fil-
ing and, more importantly,  to the fact that couples would be negotiating  a
ratio rather than a dollar value.  The system does not tell spouses to work
out a wage  for domestic  service,  although  marital  sharing  often  has  that
behavioral  effect.  Instead,  it asks  them if they  would like a single  ratio
that is favorable for overall  household taxes that would also apply on di-
vorce.  In effect, the couple  is being asked whether they  would like their
sharing legally  recognized and enforced beyond the minimum level man-
dated by marriage  law.  The  spouses  (and others) are free  to think of the
particular, could not lower their taxes more under intermediate filing than  they already  could if their
state opted for default joint filing.
261.  See,  e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson,  Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19  PHIL. & PUB.  AFF.
71,  80-87 (1990)  (arguing  for incommensurability  of women's labor); Staudt, supra note 53,  at 1631
(noting critique for "commodification"  of valuation of housework for taxation).  See also  MARGARET
JANE  RADIN,  CONTESTED  COMMODITIES  (1996);  Margaret  Jane  Radin,  Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV.  L. REV.  1849,  1885  (1987).  But see Katherine  Silbaugh,  Commodification and Women's
Household Labor,  9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM  81,  120-21  (1997)  (arguing that commodification critique
has less force in nonmarket situations in which economic analysis can often benefit women).
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sharing  as exchange  or gift or something  else.  What is important  is that
the amount  of sharing  of control is  not murky  and  that the resulting tax
regime has desirable behavioral effects, because of the way it taxes marital
exchange and gifts to the extent either  occurs.
F.  (RELATIVE)  SIMPLICITY
Intermediate filing can go a long  way towards reducing  the incentive
to engage in property transfers in order to lower taxes.  One of the advan-
tages of joint filing over individual filing is that apparent  ownership of as-
sets by the wife, the husband, or both does not matter as far as income tax
rates are concerned.  Individual filing has the potential of emulating joint
filing in this positive respect.
Consider  first  the  case  of a  couple  who  has  opted  into  the  self-
assessed intermediate  system.  Whatever  ratio they negotiate applies  to all
household income.  If they negotiate a 60/40 ratio, then sixty percent of the
household income is taxed to the one spouse and forty percent to the other.
Who  has  title to property  is  not relevant for divorce  or for tax purposes.
There is no tax-effect of manipulating  legal title because tax-ownership,  as
well as true ownership, in an important  sense is determined by the negoti-
ated ratio.
Now consider a couple that stays with the default.  Assuming that this
default is  individual  filing, then  we  have the familiar problem of how  to
tax this couple on property income.  This problem is not as important  as it
seems,  however, because there is  usually a lot less  property  income in  a
marriage  than earned income  from human  capital.  For the default filers,
however, we might wish to tax property income in proportion  to earned  in-
come or to the higher earning spouse.  Either would give the penalty  de-
fault more  bite and  avoid the tax  incentive  to manipulate  the  indicia  of
ownership.  As noted earlier, the nature of the default is not as important as
that it be less  attractive from a tax  point of view than  a negotiated,  more
even ratio.
Alternatively,  for the default  we might use the mirror image  of the
self-assessed ratio.  That is, we might say that for tax purposes, ownership
counts in default individual filing but use a recapture rule for tax purposes
on divorce.  Consider the situation in which there is a divorce that makes  it
clear that true ownership is not tracking  prior tax  ownership.  The better-
off spouse  is doing better out of the divorce than  it appeared  on paper for
tax purposes during the marriage.  The recapture rule would recoup  from
that spouse for the Treasury  the benefits of the tax  savings from the false
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appearance  of greater  equality  in the  marriage.  Thus,  if the  indicia  of
ownership during the marriage  causes the couple to be treated as a 60/40
couple under default individual  filing, but on divorce  the division reflects
an 80/20 ratio in favor of the better-off spouse (the sixty percent spouse for
tax purposes  during the marriage),  the better-off spouse is responsible for
returning  the tax savings  (plus interest) that resulted from the 60/40 ratio
as opposed to an 80/20 treatment.
Admittedly,  such a system of recapture  rules would be more compli-
cated  than  taxing property  in  proportion  to earned  income.  Arguably  it
would  be fairer, however,  and like taxation  by the earnings ratio, it does
preserve the penalty-default nature of the individual-filing part  of the sys-
tem.  It also does not interfere with divorce law, because the recapture rule
does  not mandate  any  division  on divorce.  It  only  attaches  tax  conse-
quences  to such divisions  where  such divisions  call into  question the va-
lidity of previous tax treatment.
In  this  way,  the  default  would  function  very  much  like  a  well-
established judicial recapture  rule:  the "Tax  Benefit" Rule.262  The inclu-
sionary  side of the Tax Benefit Rule subjects  amounts  previously  but in-
correctly  deducted to later tax at the point when the incorrectness  becomes
apparent.  Like the Tax Benefit Rule, the recapture rule would recoup tax
where a previous lower tax turns out later to have been based on a false as-
sumption.
Finally, like  the self-assessed ratio  that  such a default-using  couple
has  chosen not to use, this tax-benefit-type  recapture  rule would  help  en-
sure that tax treatment tracks the amount of sharing occurring in  the mar-
riage.  This is not surprising because the recapture-rule approach to default
individual  filing is,  in some sense,  the mirror image of the self-assessed
ratio that the couple could have negotiated.  In default individual filing, the
recapture rule ensures that the couple is paying enough tax by recouping it
later with  interest,  if necessary,  whereas  with the self-assessed  ratio,  the
ratio negotiated  for tax purposes is used on divorce.263  What separates the
262.  See Hillsboro  Nat'l  Bank v. Commissioner,  460 U.S.  370  (1983)  (holding that an  earlier
deduction or credit is subject to recovery if a "later event  [occurs  that is]  fundamentally  inconsistent
with the premise on which the deduction was initially based").  See also, e.g., Matthew J. Barrett, De-
termining an Individual's Federal  Income Tax Liability When the Tax Benefit Rule Applies: A  Fifty-
Year Checkup Brings a New  Prescription  for Calculating Gains, Adjusted Gross, and Taxable In-
comes, 1994 B.Y.U.  L. REV.  1; Win. D. Elliott, The Tax Benefit Rule: A  Common Law of  Recapture,
39  Sw.  L.J.  845  (1985);  Patricia  D.  White,  An  Essay on  the  Conceptual Foundations of the  Tax
Benefit Rule, 82 MICH.  L. REv.  486 (1983).
263.  The recapture rule previously discussed as a method for introducing  flexibility  into the self-
assessed ratio of intermediate filing raises entirely different issues.  See supra Part III.B.
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two is that the self-assessed ratio would be much easier to administer: The
recapture  rule in connection  with  default  individual  filing would  require
very complicated  audits.  Further, it is much easier to be strict with those
who have negotiated  a ratio  than those  who  could  plausibly  plead  igno-
rance  at the time they  owe tax  on divorce.  Thus,  the case for  the self-
assessed ratio itself is far stronger than for the use of tax-benefit-type  re-
capture rules on divorce.  In light of this, for purposes of default individual
filing, taxing property income in proportion to the spouses'  earned income
or taxing it to the primary earner might be better on balance than  the tax-
benefit-type of recapture rule.
IV.  CONTROL AND INCOME SHIFTING IN THE HISTORY
OF HOUSEHOLD TAXATION
Recognizing  intermediate  filing  as an  option  allows  a better  under-
standing  of the history of tax law's  treatment  of married  couples.  Con-
versely, this history confirms the central role played by the assumption  that
the  polar  alternatives  of joint  or individual  filing  are  the  only  possible
ways to tax the income of married couples.  Further narrowing  the alterna-
tives along the way, Congress,  the courts, and commentators  often assume
that whatever approach tax law took to income-splitting  would be based on
existing property-  and  family-law categories.  In the process,  the tax law
has  lurched from one extreme  to another.  However, the  changeability  of
those categories  in response to tax law and the limits of that changeability
both demonstrate  on a legislative  level the countervailing  incentives upon
which this Article's proposed system of intermediate filing is built.264
A.  INCOME-SPLITTING,  STATE PROPERTY LAW,
AND "PENALTY"  AVOIDANCE
In  1913,  Congress  introduced the  solution  advocated  by  most  com-
mentators today: individual filing.265  Because married taxpayers  wished to
lower their taxes  through income-splitting,  they tried a number  of devices
and  legal theories that if accepted  by the courts  would have achieved  the
264.  For previous  discussions of the history of marital  taxation  from perspectives  other than  the
possibility  of intermediate  filing  and  the source  of  ownership  notions  for  the  tax  law,  see,  e.g.,
GRAETZ,  supra note 2, at 30-34;  MCCAFEERY, supra  note 2, at 29-85; Bittker, Taxation and the Fan-
ily, supra note 2, at 1399-1416; Gann, supra  note 2, at 10-24.
265.  See Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch.  16,  § II(A)(l), 38 Stat.  114,  166.  Joint filing was
first recognized in 1918, but because the same rates were applied to individual and joint returns,  it was
almost invariably disadvantageous  to file jointly.  See Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra note  2.
at 1400 & n.20.
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desired effect.  In the period between the beginning of the Depression  and
the end  of World War II, the Supreme Court decided  a number of cases
that raised issues  of income-splitting  and the definition  of ownership  but
did so in a seemingly arbitrary  or even contradictory  way.  Under the con-
ventional view, the Court in Lucas v. Earl66 appeared  to endorse the pro-
tection of progressivity, but Poe v. Seaborn 2 67 allowed  progressivity to be
eroded through income-splitting in community-property  states.  The Court
in Seaborn seemed  to have embarked  on  a program  of deference to state
property  law  and only  later,  in the  1940s,  to  have pulled back  towards
protecting progressivity again in the marital income-splitting area.
In this section, I will argue that the Seaborn decision is not best seen
as a serious  answer to  the question  of ownership for purposes  of income
taxation,  as  is often expected.  Instead, I will argue that Seaborn is better
explained as arising from the interaction of the Court's reluctance to define
tax ownership on the one hand and the Court's use of existing state prop-
erty-  and  family-law  categories  as  crude  devices  to  avoid  a  marriage
"penalty."  I will ague that what appears to be deference  to state property
law concepts  results  from the Court's  wish to avoid  defining  ownership
and  its  desire  to  prevent  any  situation in which  a taxpayer,  especially  a
man, would wind up paying more tax than the taxpayer would  as  an indi-
vidual.
1. Income-Splitting Arrangements: Lucas v. Earl
The Supreme Court rendered its first major pronouncement on volun-
tary income-splitting in Lucas v. Earl. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Earl had
arranged  by contract  that every  acquisition  of property  by either  spouse
and  all proceeds  of any  property of either spouse would be taken  as joint
tenants with  the right of survivorship.2 68  The Court assumed  that this as-
signment was valid under the  law of California, where  the Earls resided.
The effect of the arrangement  was to allow the Earls to engage in income-
splitting (of the pure kind later allowed  between  1948  and 1969).  In par-
ticular, Mr. Earl's earned income would not be subject to as high a rate as
before  the  assignment  but  instead  would,  along  with  other  income,  be
taxed half to  his wife.  Each would  pay  the tax  on half of the aggregate
household  income.  Not surprisingly,  the Commissioner  objected  to  this
result.
266.  281U.S.  111  (1930).
267.  282U.S. 101  (1930).
268.  See Earl, 281  U.S. at 114.
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In a brief opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court sidestepped the ques-
tion of whether Mr. Earl ever owned the assigned portion of the earned in-
come.269   Rather,  the Court focused exclusively  on the policy  of the  in-
come tax:
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned
them  and provide that the tax could  not be  escaped  by  anticipatory  ar-
rangements  and contacts  however skilfully  [sic]  devised  to  prevent  the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second  in the man who earned
it.  That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that
no  distinction  can be taken  according  to the motives leading  to the  ar-
rangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree  from that
on which they grew.270
Since  the  Earl case,  the  fruit-and-tree  metaphor  unfortunately  has
been taken to mean that a complete transfer of property means no taxation
of the transferor but a transfer of a "carved  out" interest does lead to taxa-
tion of the transferor. 27 1  Nevertheless,  Holmes was using the metaphor in
advocating  an  interpretation  of the Internal  Revenue  Code as  taxing the
source of income.  In  particular,  the Court  took  the  Code to  mean  that
earners  are  taxed  regardless  of what happens  to the  earned  income later,
especially if the income ends up with a lower-bracket taxpayer.
Earl  can be regarded as a method of preventing tax avoidance through
income-shifting  on  the  assumption  that  married  individuals  should  be
treated  as individuals.272  If  so, the problem is  its  narrowness.  Shifting
earned  income  is  prevented but  shifting of income  from property  is  al-
lowed.  As noted in Part II, one of the major drawbacks to individual filing
is the ability to shift around property income to  give the false appearance
of sharing in order to lower the primary earner's  and the couple's  overall
269.  That is, the Court avoided addressing the issue of whether under the assignment the  income
flowed though  Mr. Earl's hands or whether the assignment had  the effect of creating  for Mrs.  Earl
one-half ownership in the income the instant it was earned by Mr. Earl.
270.  Earl,  281  U.S. at 114-15.  The statutes in question were the Revenue Act of 1918,  see Pub.
L. No.  65-254,  §§ 210-211,  212(a),  213(a),  40 Stat.  1057,  1062-64,  1065  (1919),  and similar  provi-
sions  in the Revenue Act of 1921,  see Revenue Act of 1921,  ch.  136,  §§ 210-211,  212(a),  213(a), 42
Stat. 227,  233-38.  In particular, section 213(a) of the 1918 Act provided for taxation of net income of
every individual including "income derived from salaries,  wages, or compensation for personal  serv-
ice.., of whatever kind and in whatever form paid."  Revenue Act of 1918  § 213(a).
271.  Compare Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937)  (holding that assignment of the right to
receive income  from trust was transfer of property,  the income of which would not be  taxable to  the
donor) with Helvering v. Horst, 311  U.S.  112 (1940)  (holding that a gift of coupon on  a bond is trans-
fer of income that remains taxable to the donor).
272.  See Bittker, Taxation and  the Family,  supra note 2, at 1401-04 (pointing out that Earl only
"guards"  progressivity if one assumes that married  people should  not be subject  to a lower  rate  be-
cause of marriage).
[Vol. 72:145HOUSEHOLD TAXATION
taxes.  If preventing  income-shifting  is correct for  earned  income,  some
effort  should be made to prevent  shifting  of income  from property.  As
discussed  earlier,  intermediate  filing,  unlike  individual  filing,  accom-
plishes this by using a single ratio for splitting all earned and property in-
come for both tax and divorce purposes.
2.  Income-Splitting Under Community Property:  Poe v. Seaborn
Community-property  systems  presented  the Court  in the  term  after
Earl with  an income-splitting  situation  very  similar to the  one  the Earls
sought to achieve by means of their individual arrangement.  In ruling  on
the income-splitting  effected  by  Washington's  community-property  sys-
tem, the Court took an entirely different approach to splitting than it had in
Earl.  The  Court  made the  availability  of splitting  rest  on  state  marital
property law.  I suggest that this anomalous result derived from the Court's
desire to avoid a marriage "penalty."
In  Poe v. Seaborn, the Seaboms  were  residents  of Washington  and
tried each to pay half of the tax on their aggregate income.  The situation
was artificially  simple, because  "[w]hile  the real estate stood in  [the hus-
band's]  name alone, it is undisputed that all of the property real  and per-
sonal constituted community property and that neither owned any separate
property or had any separate  income."2 73  Since separate property is prop-
erty  held  by  either  member of the entire  community  rather  than by  the
community  and is kept by the separate  owner on divorce, 274  the fact that
there  was  no  separate  property  made  the  issue  in  Seaborn deceptively
simple.  The choice was between allowing complete splitting of all income
or taxing it on the basis of some other notion of "ownership."
The notion  of ownership  advanced by  the Commissioner was based
on the  so-called  "control  test":  Who  had such  control  over the property
that the individual  in effect owned it?  The Commissioner relied on three
cases,  United States v.  Robbins,2 75  Corliss v.  Bowers,276  and  Lucas v.
Earl. 277  In  each  of these  cases,  a  high-bracket  taxpayer  was  prevented
from lowering the rate applied to his income by means of a transfer of in-
come  to a  lower-bracket  individual.  Further,  the  Robbins case  seemed
quite close to the Seaborn situation because it involved community prop-
erty.  Justice  Holmes'  opinion  for the Court in Robbins emphasized  the
273.  Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S.  101,  109 (1930).
274.  See infra Part V.A.1.
275.  269 U.S. 315 (1926).
276.  281  U.S. 376 (1930).
277.  281 U.S.  111 (1930).
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extensive  powers of management  and control of the husband as indicating
ownership  and hence taxability.2 78  The Seaborn Court nevertheless distin-
guished  Robbins on the ground that California itself, the state of the tax-
payers'  residence, regarded the wife's interest in community property  as a
"mere expectancy."  Under California law, she did not own the property  or
the income and would not be taxed.  Instead, her husband would be taxed.
But Holmes'  opinion in Robbins had explicitly  stated that the law of Cali-
fornia did not matter but rather that the tax act taxed those with control. 2 79
The  Court's complete reinterpretation  of Robbins in Seaborn, which  was
unanimous  with Holmes'  vote, was  also curious  in light  of Earl. There,
Justice  Holmes  had  explicitly  denied  that the  subtleties  of property-law
vesting should determine the availability of splitting.  Thus, the method of
distinguishing Robbins was at odds with the reasoning of both Robbins and
Earl.
The Seaborn Court ignored  the reasoning  in Robbins and Earl, and
reinterpreted  it as based  on  the  very  subtleties  of state-law  vesting  that
Justice  Holmes  had  consistently  downplayed.  In  Seaborn, the  Court
claimed that the issue in Earl  was precisely whether there was any vesting
because:
[t]he  very  assignment  in  that  case  was  bottomed  on  the  fact  that  the
earnings  would  be the husband's  property, else there  would have  been
nothing on  which it could operate.  That case presents quite  a different
question  from  this,  because  here,  by  law,  the  earnings  are  never  the
property of the husband, but that of the community.28 0
The Earl Court, however, had  indicated that  even if an  arrangement
prevented the "salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man
who earned  it," '281 the arrangement  would not prevent the earner from  be-
ing taxed, because that seemed  to the Court the "import of the statute."282
In other words, Earl directs  attention to  who the  earner is  as a matter  of
interpretation of the federal statute regardless of the state-law technicalities
of vesting and ownership.  Implicit in earning income is a degree of con-
trol over it, which Mr. Earl had exercised in assigning half of it to his wife.
The Seaborn Court, however, made the result in Earl turn on those newly-
resurrected technicalities.
278.  See Robbins, 269 U.S. at 327.
279.  See id.
280.  Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 117.
281.  Earl,  281 U.S. at 115.
282.  Id.
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The Court in Seaborn also needed to distinguish the case of Corliss v.
Bowers.283  In  that case,  the donor of a gift in trust was nonetheless  re-
garded  as the owner  for income  tax purposes because  he exercised  suffi-
cient control over the trust.  Again,  a case that directed attention  to Con-
gress'  purposes  in order to determine ownership for taxation was confined
to  its result.2 84  The  Court in  Seaborn merely  asserted  that the Court  in
Corliss had found that Congress declared the donor was still the owner for
tax purposes, but that in the Seaborn case the husband "never ha[d] owner-
ship."2 85  This  begged the question of how tax ownership is to be deter-
mined.  In Corliss,  Earl,  and arguably Robbins, the Court attributed an in-
tent to Congress to tax those who  exercise control over income, including,
but not limited to, those who earn (and hence control) it.
One  reason  the control  test may  have  appeared  unattractive  to  the
Court in Seaborn is that the Commissioner  was not just claiming that the
husband should  pay  tax  on all of the income  arising from his labor  and
over which  he retained control.  The Commissioner did not use a source-
based theory at all.  Instead, the Commissioner took the position that, since
the husband  had the power to  manage  all the community  assets  and in-
come,286 he should be taxed on the whole of the community's income.
In other words, the Commissioner was  advancing  a theory whose ef-
fects would have closely tracked those of a 1941  House proposal.287  Un-
der that proposal,  each married couple would aggregate  their income  and
pay as much as a single person would on the same amount.  The proposal
was  not very  popular.  Opponents  branded it a "tax  on morality. 288  The
Commissioner's position in Seaborn would have had the same result: The
community would pay as much tax on its aggregate income as the husband
would if all the income were his as an individual.
The Court, therefore,  faced a three-way  choice.  It had to  accept the
income-splitting in community-property  states that the taxpayers'  desired,
insist on  income  aggregation  on  single  rates  (the  Commissioner's  posi-
tion), or the Court had to come up with a third theory not advanced by ei-
283.  281 U.S.  376 (1930).
284.  Congress  has  since  introduced rules  for  the treatment of trusts  into  the Internal  Revenue
Code as reflected  in § 641  to § 683.  See I.R.C. §§ 641,  644-645, 663-665, 672, 674, 679 (West Supp.
1998); id. §§ 642-643, 668 (1994 & Supp. 111996); id. §§ 651-652,  661-662, 666-667, 670-678,  681-
683  (1994).
285.  Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 117.
286.  This  includes  even  the income  from his  wife's  assets,  and,  if present,  income  from  the
wife's labor.
287.  See H.R.  REP. No.  77-1040, at 420-21  (1941), reprinted  in 1941-42 C.B. 413.
288.  See Bittker, Taxation and the Family,  supra note 2, at 1409.
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ther party.  For example,  it could  have developed  the "source"  aspect  of
Earl,  such that sources of income would be taxed; this would treat those in
community-property  states for tax purposes  as if they  were in a common-
law property  state.2 89  The source treatment would have required develop-
ing a federal concept of ownership for the Internal Revenue  Code.290  De-
veloping  such a concept of ownership would only have highlighted the ar-
tificial  distinction  from  Earl between  earned  income  and  income  from
property.
Of these choices, the Commissioner's position of income aggregation
on single rates likely seemed extreme for the reasons that the 1941  House
proposal  was  viewed  unfavorably.  The  Commissioner's  position  makes
sense today: If the community property statute does not give the wife con-
trol,  why not tax the husband?291  In the  early  1930s,  though,  the  Court
probably  sympathized  with  the  husband  facing  a  marriage  "penalty."
Since the Depression  was a time  when employers  routinely reserved jobs
for  male  "breadwinners," 292  the  Court  probably  believed  that  such  a
"penalty" was unfair.
Developing  a  source-based  theory  would  have  required  a  federal
definition  of ownership  for  income taxation,  which  would  have  necessi-
tated some motivation  in terms of the purposes  of the income tax statute.
These  requirements would have been difficult to meet in light  of the  arti-
ficiality  of the Court's own distinction between income from services  and
income from property.  The new definition of ownership  for taxation  that
the Court  developed  would raise the question  why  one  can shift income
from property but not income from personal labor.
The easy way  out was  to defer  to state  ownership  rules.  The Court
accepted income-splitting  for community-property  states  only;  for others,
Earl would still govern.  This choice was dictated not by  an acceptance  of
289.  The source aspect of Earl is probably most popular  today, in part because it supports indi-
vidual filing.  See, e.g., Zelenak, Marriage  and the Income Tax, supra  note 2, at 357.
290.  Alternatively, the Court could have compromised  between the Commissioner's  pure control
theory and  taxed personal-service income  to the spouse  who earned  it and investment  income to  the
spouse to whom state law gave the right to manage and control it.  This was the approach of the  later
1941  Senate Proposal.  See S.  REP.  No. 77-673,  at 466, 474-76, 494-95  (1941),  reprinted  in  1941-42
C.B. 470.
291.  These days,  such a statute giving  the husband  control  would not be  acceptable;  but given
such control,  most would favor taxing the husband  with that control.  Cf. Zelenak,  Marriage  and the
Income Tax, supra note 2, at 354-58  (arguing  that tax  should follow  control  and that therefore  indi-
vidual filing is appropriate).
292.  See, e.g.,  Nancy  E. Dowd,  Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32  ARIZ.  L.
REV. 431,  436 & n.27 (1990);  Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional  Women, 40 STAN.  L.
REV.  1163, 1172 &  n.49 (1988).
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the proposition  that  the policies  behind  state  marital  property  law  were
congruent with  those  of the Code on  the income-splitting  question.  In-
stead,  allowing  income-splitting  in  community  property  was  the  only
choice as long as the Court did not want to define ownership  for tax pur-
poses itself and wished to avoid steep marriage  "penalties" in community-
property states.  As we will now see, in striking confirmation  of this view,
when  the  threat  of such  a  marriage  penalty  had  passed,  so  would  the
Court's use of community property law in the income-splitting area.
3.  Deference to State Property  Law
The  Court's  deference  to  state  property  law  seems  to  foreshadow
other cases  in the line starting with Blair v. Commissioner. 2 9 3  On closer
inspection, these cases pose apparent problems for regarding Seaborn as a
pure case of deference to state property law.  Developments after Seaborn
reinforce the view that the Seaborn Court's objective was to avoid a mar-
riage "penalty"  on husbands  and that "deference"  to state law  was only a
means to that end.
In Blair, a beneficiary  of a trust made a series  of assignments  of in-
come to his children  and claimed that not he but the assignees,  who were
presumably  subject to a lower marginal tax rate, should pay the tax on the
assigned income.  The  Court  relied  on Seaborn for  the proposition  that
"the tax is upon income as to which, in the general application of the reve-
nue acts, the tax liability attaches  to ownership." ' 294  The Court found that
the assignments  were  valid as a matter  of local  (Illinois)  law295  and that
"nothing  in  the  revenue  acts ...  denies  [the  assignee]  [the]  status  [of
owner] .296
The  problem becomes  how to  distinguish property  and income.  In
Helvering v.  Horst, 297  the Court decided  that transferring  the unmatured
coupons  of a  bond  was  an  assignment  of income, not  "property."  The
Court asserted that "[t]he  holder of a coupon bond is the owner of two in-
dependent and  separable kinds of rights, 298  the right to receive the princi-
pal back and the right to  receive periodic  interest payments  according  to
the terms of the coupons.  The Court used the Earl  control test to find the
donor to be the owner and hence taxable:
293.  300 U.S. 5 (1937).
294.  Id. at 12.
295.  See id. at 10.
296.  Id. at 12.
297.  311U.S.  112 (1940).
298.  Id. at 115.
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Underlying the reasoning in  [previous] cases  is the thought that income
is  "realized"  by  the  assignor  because  he,  who  owns  or  controls  the
source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could
have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others  as
the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants ....
Although  the donor here, by  the transfer of the coupons, has  precluded
any possibility of his collecting them himself, he has nevertheless, by his
act, procured payment of the interest  as a valuable gift to a member  of
his family.  Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income,
to procure a satisfaction which  can be obtained only by  the expenditure
of money  or property, would  seem to be the  enjoyment  of the income
whether  the satisfaction  is the purchase of goods at the  corner grocery,
the payment of his debt there,  or such non-material  satisfactions  as may
result from the payment of a campaign or community chest contribution,
or a gift to his favorite son.
299
The  Court  came  close  to  a  federal  definition  of ownership,  stating
flatly that "[t]he power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership
of it"3 0  and that "[t]he dominant purpose of the revenue laws  is the taxa-
tion of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it
and enjoy the benefit of it when paid."301  Blair  was distinguished as being
about donating  "property"  as opposed  to  "interest  or  wages,"302  but  the
Court did not explain why this distinction should matter.
In the marital context, the question remained  why a similar "gift"  or
transfer of earned income to a spouse under community property does not
constitute  an  enjoyment  of the  income,  particularly  where  the  primary
earner retains  a  high  degree  of control  and  where  the members  of the
marital  community retain  a  great degree  of freedom  to  convert  separate
property into community property and vice versa.3 03
4.  The Reemergence of a Modified Control Test
By the end of World War  I,  however, the Court's approach to marital
income had begun to move away from deference to state property law.  By
that time, however, a marriage  penalty of the sort avoided by the Seaborn
decision  had been rejected  by Congress  in the  early  stages  of Congress'
move from one polar extreme of individual filing to the other extreme  of
joint filing.
299.  Id. at 116-17.
300.  Id. at 118.
301.  Id. at 119.
302.  Id. at 118-19.
303.  See infra Part V.A.
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After the  Seaborn decision,  many  states  sought  to  secure  for  their
citizens  the  advantages  of  income-splitting  by  adopting  a  community-
property  system.  Oklahoma  gave  its  citizens  a choice  of opting  into  a
community-property  scheme,  and  the  tax effect on those  who  chose  this
option was  the issue presented in Commissioner v. Harmon.3 4  This time
the Commissioner  took the position  that the husband  was  taxable  on his
income from separate  property and  on all his earnings,  but not taxable on
income from his wife's separate property.  Mr. Harmon and both the lower
courts  viewed the case as falling under Seaborn: Income-splitting  effected
by  a  community-property  system  was  to  be respected  for  tax  purposes.
The  Supreme  Court,  however,  claimed  that  the  "community  system  of
Oklahoma  [was]  not a system, dictated by  State policy, as  an incident to
matrimony."305  The  Court  emphasized that  the  system was  not  an
"inveterate  policy"  in  Oklahoma  unlike  in  other  community-property
states.3 06 The Court was  willing to assume that Oklahoma state law made
the property one-half Mrs. Harmon's 0 7 but was unwilling to  defer to that
division for tax purposes.
Thus, after Harmon, the Court was  advocating two theories of income
tax liability, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent.3 0 8  Contemporar-
ies too recognized  that there was nothing "consensual" or "voluntary"  that
separated the Oklahoma  scheme from community property  in other states.
Marriage itself was  a consensual  act,309 and in many community-property
states,  husband  and  wife  could  use  antenuptial  agreements  to avoid  the
community-property  scheme  or could  contract around it  once in the mar-
riage.  Furthermore,  separate  property  was  preserved  as  separate  unless
converted by contract into community property.310  Thus, as contemporary
commentators  were  quick  to  point  out,  the  only  difference  between
Seaborn and Harmon was an act-omission distinction.  Taxpayers like the
Seaboms  could  split  income  because  they  could  allow  the  community-
property  system to give them the result they wanted, although they could
achieve a different result by contract.
304.  323  U.S. 44 (1944).
305.  Id. at 48.
306.  Id. at 46.
307.  Id. at 47.
308.  See id. at 56 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
309.  See id.  at 53 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
310.  See, e.g., Willard S. Pedersen, Application of  Federal  Income, Estate and Gift Tax Laws to
Community Property, 45 MiCH.  L. REV.  409, 414, 423  (1947).  Further  contemporary  commentary
regarding this line of case  law also  focused  on the resulting disparity in  tax  liability between  those
states with mandatory community-property  systems and those states without such a system.  See id. at
412 n.4.
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The choice of whether to invoke Earl and Harmon, on the one hand,
or Seaborn and Blair  on the other, was to be made on arbitrary and shifting
grounds.  In Earl,  as long as  there was an act stemming from control, the
interaction  of the act,  such  as  an agreement  to assign the income, with  a
state's property law  was irrelevant.  Even if the income did not rest for a
moment with the husband, the assignment did not affect the husband's  li-
ability for tax.  In Seaborn, the operation  of a state scheme with much the
same effect  did allow  income-spitting,  even  though  the  members  of the
community retained  a good deal of power to contract  around it.311  Thus,
what seems  to separate  the application  of two  very  different rules  is  the
act-omission distinction.  Regardless  of how much control the parties pos-
sess, if the unimpeded operation of an off-the-rack  state-law  device led to
a particular result, the Court would take that as the result for taxation fol-
lowing Seaborn, but if the parties have to do something beyond the histori-
cal minimum, the control test was to be used in accord  with Earl  and Har-
mon.
Thus, the Harmon Court seemed to reestablish the control test while
employing a different and  far less satisfactory  definition of "control."  In-
stead  of asking-as  did  the Court  in  Robbins and  Corliss and,  in  part,
Earl-which  spouse  had  control  through  management  and  disposition
powers  and the like, the Court looked to whether the couple as a whole had
to exercise control by performing an overt act to gain the advantages of in-
come-splitting.  While the first sense of "control"  might correspond  to a
sensible notion of ownership and taxable well-being,  the second Harmon-
type control does not correlate with any notion of ownership or any  other
proxy for taxable well-being.
312
Harmon, however,  can  be explained  in  light  of events  intervening
between  it and the earlier  Seaborn decision.  In Seaborn, the Court was
faced with  a choice of (i) leaving the door open  to  a marriage  "penalty,"
(ii)  "deferring"  to a state property  law  concept,  or (iii)  developing  a  tax
concept  of ownership.  In the  meantime,  the Commissioner's  position  in
Seaborn, summing both  spouses'  incomes  and  applying  to that sum  the
same rate as would apply to individuals, lost its force with the repudiation
of the  1941 House Proposal.  The failure of that proposal  could be viewed
as  a clear  expression  on the part  of Congress  not to  allow the  marriage
"penalty"  that would result from stacking marital incomes  and subjecting
them to the same rates that an individual with the same income would face.
311.  See infra  Part V.A.
312.  Presently,  talk of "control"  is invariably  in the  sense of power of the spouse  over  ie  re-
source, not in the sense of Harmon. See supra Part II.A.2.
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When that danger passed, there was  no longer  a need to avert it through
deference  to  state property law.  The Harmon decision,  although bizarre,
indicated an end to deference to state property law in the marital area once
the threat of a marriage "penalty" had receded.313
Thus, the Harmon  decision confirms  a view of Seaborn as a marriage-
penalty avoidance case rather than as a property-concept case.  The volun-
tary scheme in Harmon was no less a property system than state trust law
and  no  more voluntary.  But  once the danger  of a marriage  penalty  had
passed, the marriage and property cases began to diverge.  Of the compet-
ing theories of income taxation, the one that avoids a marriage penalty was
no longer so necessary and was therefore relegated to the backseat.
Thus, the Court's use of state property law was less a matter of prin-
ciple than one of convenience in the face of what it viewed  as extreme al-
ternatives.  As this Article argues, the historical focus on joint and individ-
ual  filing,  which  is  itself  sustained  by  a  lack  of  tax  definitions  of
ownership, pushed the Court to "defer" to state law in a highly inconsistent
way.  Nor did the matter rest there.  After Harmon, the Court's job of pre-
venting a harsh version of joint filing was complete, but Congress contin-
ued to work towards "reform,"  which led to the pure joint-filing system of
1948  to  1969.314  Singles'  protests  against  the resulting  singles'  penalty
gave us the system of joint filing with somewhat unfavorable rates that we
have today.
315
That the tax  law  has  instantiated  at  one  time  or another just about
every  variant  of individual  and joint filing  suggests  that we  may  never
achieve  equilibrium  at  either  pole.  In  light  of  the  tortuous  path  that
brought the tax law to  where it is now, it is worth reconsidering  the tacit
commitment  to polar systems that inevitably fails to reflect  the degree  of
sharing in marriages.
313.  Harmon slowed but did not halt  the stampede  of states  to adopt community-property  sys-
tems in order to take advantage  of the Seaborn decision.  See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46,
48 (2d Cir. 1982).
314.  See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat.  110, 114-16.  See also Bittker,  Taxation and the
Family, supra note 2, at  1412-14 (discussing the effects of the portion  of the Revenue Act of 1948
dealing with joint returns);  Stanley S.  Surrey, Federal  Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of
1948, 61  HARV. L. REV.  1097,  1103-06 (1948)  (discussing circumstances  that led Congress  to adopt
the Revenue Act of 1948).
315.  See Tax Reform  Act of 1969,  Pub. L. No.  91-172,  § 803,  83  Stat.  487, 678  (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1 (Vest  Supp. 1998)).  See also S.  REP. No. 91-552,  at 260 (1969), reprinted in
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2299; GRAEz, supra note 2, at 31-35 (describing singles'  protest to the singles'
penalty  and the resulting marriage penalty);  McCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 62-64 (describing the sin-
gles'  penalty and the resulting modem rates schedules).
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B.  SOURCES OF OWNERSHIP CONCEPTS  FOR THE CODE
This discussion  thus far suggests that Seaborn is best seen not as  an
endorsement of using community-property  categories for income taxation
or even as the true beginning of the Blair-type  property-versus-income  line
of cases but rather as an attempt to forestall a marriage penalty.  Neverthe-
less, using community property  as a basis for taxing the income of married
couples is one of the alternative methods of allowing income-splitting,  in
the  continued  discussion  below,  I  argue  that community  property,  like
other existing property- and family-law categories,  does not furnish an ap-
propriate proxy for sharing that is readily translated  into a system  for in-
come-splitting  in the income tax.  Before turning to a closer analysis of in-
come-splitting  based  on the category  of community property,  it is  worth
noting the serious  problems that the Seabom decision generated  and how
those problems would also be addressed by intermediate filing.
First, as the Seaborn Court recognized,  the decision  caused  a radical
geographical  diversity in the level of income tax paid by similarly situated
couples  in community  and  non-community  property  states.316  The Court
brushed  off this  concern  as  irrelevant to its  decision,31 7  but  the decision
provoked a stampede of states to the community-property  system3 1 s before
Congress in  1948  adopted  the joint return  provision  across  the board.319
After  1948, people in all states would be taxed in accordance  with income-
splitting of a  type that previously  had only  been  available  to  couples  in
community-property  states.  Interestingly,  many  of  the  new  converts
among community-property  states  reverted  to  common-law  property  re-
gimes after there was no more tax advantage to community property.3 2 0
Second, there is no guarantee that the policy, if any, behind a state's
community property law will relate to that state's income tax policy.  More
precisely,  there  is  no  necessary  relationship  between  the  community-
versus-separate-property  distinction  and  the  extent  to  which  we  would
want to allow  income-splitting.  Seaborn presents  an instance  of a  much
larger problem: the lack of a single concept of ownership for the Code.321
As Noel Cunningham and Deborah Schenk have pointed out, Congress has
316.  See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S.  101,  117  (1930).
317.  See id. at 117-18.
318.  See Bittker, Taxation  and the Family, supra note 2, at 1411-12.
319.  See Revenue Act of 1948.  See also Surrey, supra  note 314, at 1103-06.
320.  See Note, Epilogue to the Community Property Scramble: Problems of Repeal, 50 COLUM.
L. REV.  332, 332-33  (1950).  See also, e.g.,  Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra note 2, at  1414
(describing the repeal of community property statutes in the wake of the Revenue Act of 1948).
321.  See generally  Cunningham & Schenk, supra note  14, at 727.
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indicated that many tax consequences  should flow from "ownership,"  but,
aside from the rules for bonds with attached coupons,322 Congress has not
defined ownership.3 23  Thus, while it is not necessary for community prop-
erty  to be congruent with  the appropriate  scope of income-splitting,  it is
conceivable that it could.  I return to this question in Part V.
Finally, whatever  the policy  that motivates  the  chosen  scope  of in-
come-splitting may be, that policy must be clarified  because it potentially
competes with an important policy of the income tax: progressivity.  If we
view a higher-income  spouse as in fact sharing less than half the increment
of her  income  over that of the lower-income  spouse,  then the Earl case
protected progressivity by preventing  a lowering of rates that did not cor-
respond to a true shift of income.  Mr. Earl assigned half his income to his
wife  by  contract,  but there  is  little  assurance  that  this  reflects  genuine
sharing.
Interestingly,  the Earls'  arrangement  has  received  some  measure  of
approval  from recent commentators  who  seem  to take the assignment  at
face value.324  Because  there is no mechanism to enforce  true sharing that
would  deserve  a  splitting-induced  lowering  of the  spouses'  rates,  this
judgment is too hasty.  Not much prevents couples from making an Earl-
like assignment subject to a side-deal that whatever amount of the income
is saved will be transferred  back to the earning  spouse  as a "gift" after  a
year or two.  There  is, of course,  the risk that a divorce will occur in the
meantime, but the problem here is  that there will  be what I have  called
"tax-shelter"  opportunities.  For example, the earning spouse may make an
"assignment"  in which the other spouse agrees to transfer back a substan-
tial amount of this "shared"  amount.  Actually, sharing is only occurring to
the extent of the tax-shelter fee  or kickback, but if we take Earl-style  ar-
rangements  at face value,  then such opportunities  immediately  arise.  Po-
322.  See I.R.C. § 1286 (1994).
323.  See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 14, at 727.  Noel Cunningham and Deborah  Schenk
go on to  advocate extending the  § 1286  approach to  defining  ownership under  the Code generally.
See id.
324.  Bittker expressed this opinion over 20 years ago:
Mr. and Mrs.  Earl were  prophets  without honor in another  respect.  By  establishing  for
themselves a  marital regime of equal ownership  and equal  control of their joint income  in
1901, they  foreshadowed an idea that contemporary  women's rights advocates often present
as novel,  and that many regard  as worthy of being imposed by law on all married  couples.
Moreover,  it was only by equalizing their financial  positions that they put themselves  in a
position to claim the tax advantage of equal-income  separate returns.
Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra note 2, at 1402.  See also, e.g., Zelenak, Marriage  and the
Income Tax, supra note 2, at 378 (favoring retaining the Earl approach of taxing earned income to the
eamer);  Gann,  supra note 2, at 60-61  (discussing  the effects of overriding  Earl and  extending the
possibility of income-splitting to states with common-law  systems of property distribution).
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licing these arrangements  may be difficult, as is recognized  in the nearly-
identical  area  of  interspousal  "transfers"  of property  that  are  designed
merely  to transfer tax  liability to a lower-bracket  spouse under individual
filing.3 2 5  Intermediate  filing  eliminates  this  incentive  altogether,  and  it
prevents  temporary  assignments.  The assignment under  intermediate  fil-
ing must be used on divorce, and changes in the ratio can be either prohib-
ited  or made  subject  to  the cooling-off  periods  and  recapture  rules  sug-
gested earlier.
326
Thus,  modem commentators'  sympathy  for  the  Earls  is  premature,
because an assignment like the one the Earls'  made still gives too little as-
surance  of actual sharing.  As I will argue at greater length in Part V, the
same criticism can be leveled  at the actual result in Seaborn: Community
property, despite popular myth to the contrary, does not enforce sharing in
marriages  or on divorce  to nearly the extent that it may  appear.  The his-
tory of marital  taxation  in the United States reflects  a failure to come  to
grips  with  the problem  of marital  ownership.  Neither Earl nor Seaborn
addressed the important and interrelated issues of how to define ownership
under the Code and how to make sure that such  a definition of ownership
really reflects-ideally by enforcing-marital  sharing.
V.  OTHER NONTRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO FILING
Both Earl  and Seaborn  failed in the end to define ownership or ensure
that income-splitting for tax purposes  would reflect  sharing.  Community
property, however,  sounds as if it mandates sharing:  Marital property that
belongs to the community is under the equal control of each spouse and is
shared equally on divorce.  However,  community property  is quite decep-
tive in this respect: Even community property does surprisingly little to en-
force the  degree of sharing that full income-splitting  would imply.  That
even community property falls short in this regard is a powerful argument
favoring intermediate filing.
A.  COMMUNITY PROPERTY  AS  A POSSIBLE INDEX FOR MARITAL SHARING
Because neither individual filing nor the full income-splitting of joint
filing  necessarily  captures  the standard-of-living  or the ability-to-pay  tax
of the individual  marriage  partners,  we  might  ask  whether  the Seaborn
Court stumbled on a good compromise: Should marital income-splitting be
allowed  but only  to the extent of community  property?  The question  of
325.  See supra  Part III.F.
326.  See supra  Part III.B.
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whether community property  is normatively a good basis for determining
who  to tax  is complicated  by the very  factor that motivated  the Court  in
Seaborn: Despite some consensus that marriage can and should affect util-
ity through sharing, not everyone  agrees which, if any, benefits from mar-
riage ought to  be taxed.  However, this section asks  whether  community
property corresponds with anyone's normative view.
Before turning to this question,  it is necessary  to ask what  we mean
by  "community  property,"  because  community-property  regimes  have
been and still are characterized  by a great deal of diversity.  California's
notable  system  retained  common-law  property  features  until  1973.327
More importantly, not all community-property states require equal division
of community  property  on  divorce;  California,  Louisiana,  New  Mexico,
and Puerto Rico maintain such  a requirement, but Arizona, Idaho, Nevada,
Texas,  and  Washington  allow courts  to  engage  in equitable  distribution
with  substantial  judicial discretion.328  On  the other hand,  modem  com-
munity property  statutes, unlike the  one in Seaborn, do not give the hus-
band  special  management  and  disposition  rights  but  rather  give  both
spouses those rights.329
The  Court in Seaborn did not face some  of these  complications  for
two reasons.  First, the case itself presented the system of only one state-
Washington.  More importantly, the Seaboms'  financial situation  was very
simple:  Neither  of the Seaboms  had separate  property.  Thus,  the  com-
munity-property  regime  had  a pure  income-splitting  effect  in  that  case.
But in holding  that state community property laws should be used  to de-
termine  taxable  ownership,  the Court  did  not limit  itself to  the  special
situation  of a  couple  with  no  separate  property.  In  Harmon, the  Court
simply dismissed without  explanation the impact of some crucial  compli-
cating features,  antenuptial  agreements,  transmutation,  and  separate  prop-
erty on  its  conclusion  in Seaborn. 330  However,  these  features  seriously
undermine  the value  of community  property  as  a possible  basis  for in-
come-splitting in taxation.  Again, we need more  assurance of actual shar-
ing than community property provides.
327.  See  Susan Westerberg  Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in Califor-
nia's  Community Property  System, 1849-1975,24 UCLA L. REV.  1 (1976).
328.  See  W.S.  McCLANAHAN,  COMMUNITY  PROPERTY  LAW  IN THE  UNITED  STATES  §§  12:5-
12:14, at 531-46 (1982).
329.  See, e.g.,  CAL. FAM.  CODE § 1100(a) (West 1994).
330.  See Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,48 (1944).
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1. Separate  Property
Income-splitting  does not extend  to  "separate  property."  In a com-
munity-property  system, not all property held by the spouses is community
property.  Rather, community property  is that property held by the spouses
with equal present interests, and all property acquired during the marriage
is community property unless some exception is made.331  Exceptions ren-
der property "separate" property,  and states vary in the extent of such sepa-
rate property.  For example, in California the major categories of separate
property  are  as  follows:  "(1)  [a]ll  property  owned  by  the  person  before
marriage[,]  (2) [a]ll property acquired by the person after marriage by gift,
bequest,  devise, or descent[, and]  (3)  [t]he rents, issues,  and profits  of the
property  described  in  this  section." 332  A  few  states  follow  the  original
Spanish system in making the third category,  the return on separate prop-
erty, count as community property.333
Even if separate and community property were immutable categories,
it is unlikely that these divisions correspond to the benefits and burdens of
marriage.  As far as the primary earner or the spouse with greater assets is
concerned,  community  property  may  overestimate  or  underestimate  the
"burden"  on the primary-contributor  spouse.  If the wealthier spouse  has
legal or even de facto control during the marriage,334 that spouse may  de-
rive  a greater ability to pay  or a higher  standard of living from  the com-
munity assets than the secondary spouse, who may derive less benefit than
he would on paper.  On the other hand, the wealthier spouse  may  choose
not to exercise  control and  may instead commingle the separate  property
such that it is separate in name alone and on divorce  would be counted as
community property because of this commingling.335  In terms of the ana-
lytical framework based  on donative transfers,  such  a spouse could  in ef-
fect make a transfer without a change in the legal label from "separate"  to
"community."  This problem  of underestimating  sharing and  overtaxing
the better-off  spouse is  less  serious  than  the overestimation  problem just
noted, however,  because the couple  can  change the status  of property  by
331.  See, e.g.,  CAL. FAM.  CODE § 760 (West 1994)  ("Except as otherwise  provided by  statute, all
property, real or personal,  wherever situated, acquired by a married person during  the marriage while
domiciled in this state is community property.").
332.  Id. § 770.
333.  See MCCLANAHAN, supra  note 328,  § 4:10.
334.  See supra  Parts II.A.2 and IV.A.
335.  In California,  if a spouse commingles separate with community  funds,  the presumption  is
that property  purchased  with commingled  funds is  community  property,  and  the spouse claiming  a
separate property interest has the burden of tracing, which  may be hard to meet.  See, e.g., See v.  See,
415 P.2d 776 (Cal.  1966).
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agreement. 33 6  The underestimation  problem exists for those not aware  or
sophisticated enough to make  such an arrangement.  Quite unfairly, those
who are not sophisticated enough to  take advantage  of the opportunity to
manipulate labels will be subject to higher tax.
Furthermore, after Blair, 337 income from property  (as  opposed to in-
come from services) is relatively easy to shift.  Thus, it is possible for one
spouse to keep separate property and  shift the income to the other spouse
by  using  trusts.331  Moreover,  side-deals  are  possible  as  long  as  one is
willing to undergo  the risk of property  loss  on divorce in the meantime.
This is not directly the fault of the community-property system, but as long
as  Blair allows  shifting  of  income  from  property,  calling  something
"separate property"  does not ensure it will be taxed that way.
Finally,  the  issue  in both  Seaborn and Earl was  whether  to  allow
splitting of the primary earner's earned income.  This income is a return on
human  capital,  and it is  not  obvious  that  allowing  splitting  really  does
measure  income  or well-being  accurately.  If, as  is  common  now, com-
munity property does not include the value of the primary  earner's human
capital, it becomes much more doubtful that the secondary  earner is enjoy-
ing that degree of control, even during the marriage, that would lead us to
conclude  that taxing  to  the secondary  earner  rather  than  to the  primary
earner is appropriate.
2.  Transmutation
The freedom to shift income from property  is not the only  freedom
allowed  under  community-property  regimes.  In  community-property
states,  spouses  can  "transmute"  property.  In  California,  spouses  can
transmute property from community property  to separate property of either
spouse, from separate property of either spouse to community property,  or
from  separate  property  of one  spouse  to  separate  property  of  the other
spouse.339  This means  that the spouses can move property around to gain
maximum  advantage  from  income-splitting  and  can  then  transmute  it
336.  See infra Parts V.A.2 and V.A.3.
337.  300 U.S. 5 (1937).  See supra  notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
338.  Because  current law generally  makes joint filing the only realistic choice for most couples
by applying  unfavorable rates  to those married  persons filing separately, see I.R.C. § l(a), (d) (West
Supp.  1998),  there is little reason to use trusts for income-splitting purposes.  See supra note 9.  Al-
though the Code does contain elaborate rules on the taxation of the grantor versus  the beneficiary, the
question remains whether a trust, for example,  that provided for a reversionary  interest in the grantor
spouse on a divorce initiated by the beneficiary  spouse would count as a grantor trust, taxable to the
grantor spouse under § 671 and § 673.  See I.R.C. §§  671,673 (1994).
339.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994).
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back.34°  If the  less  wealthy  spouse  can be influenced  or pressured  by  a
stronger  spouse,34 1 the opportunity  to  transmute property  in either direc-
tion  affords  an  income-splitting  device  at least  as,  if not  more,  flexible
than the arrangement  that the Earls attempted  to use.  The tax-shelter  op-
portunity  from the false appearance  of sharing is present even under com-
munity property.
3.  Antenuptial  Agreements
Similarly, a couple may alter their rights before marriage.  Recall  that
commentators  in the  1940s were well aware  that the main difference  be-
tween the optional  Oklahoma community-property  system in Harmon and
most previous  community-property  regimes  was  highly  superficial.  In-
come-splitting  through the designation "community property"  was  the de-
fault in the older systems with an opt-out, but in Oklahoma a common-law
system  was  the default  with  an  opt-in  for  community  property.  Under
Seaborn and Harmon, the tax consequences  turned  on the distinction  be-
tween opting out and opting in.
In California, the Family Code provides that "[t]he  property rights of
husband  and  wife prescribed  by  statute  may  be  altered  by  a premarital
agreement or other marital property agreement. '3 42  The only limit on this
freedom is that the parties may not alter any support  obligations mandated
by  law.343  The  California  Supreme  Court has  ruled  that  an  antenuptial
agreement  providing  that  earnings  and  other  property  acquired  during
marriage will remain separate property will bind the parties even if they do
not contemplate  lifelong marriage.344  Other states  also give considerable
force to antenuptial agreements.
345
B.  OTHER DIVORCE AND PROPERTY LAW
If community  property,  which  is  thought  to  be  among  the  stronger
protections for secondary earners, fails as an appropriate basis for income-
340.  After 1984, a California statutory provision  has required  both spouses to agree expressly  in
writing.  See id. § 852.  See also Estate of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911,  915-22 (Cal.  1990) (giving sub-
stance to "express declaration"  and writing requirements,  and noting problems with previous easy oral
transmutation provisions).
341.  Provisions  against undue influence are not a perfect guarantee  against this situation,  particu-
larly when one spouse is not aware of her rights at the time of the transmutation.
342.  CAL. FAM. CODE  § 1500.
343.  See Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 329  (Cal. 1976) (in bank); In re Higgason, 516 P.2d
289,  295 (Cal.  1973) (in bank).
344.  See Marriage  of  Dawley, 551 P.2d at 328-30.
345.  See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 328, §§ 8:1-8:11.
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splitting, it is not likely that other family-law and property-law  categories
will do better.  In this section, I tie together some observations  made ear-
lier that confirm this proposition.
The least  adequate  approach  would  be to allow  income-splitting  in
proportion  to  the  minimum  legal  support  obligation  that  the  better-off
spouse bears towards the less well-off spouse.3 46  Such an approach would
share  the inadequacy  of all  of the traditional  approaches  to  alimony.347
Furthermore, those who share more than the legal minimum do not get any
extra benefit.  Because there is no marginal decrease in tax for the primary
earner from sharing, such a system offers no additional incentive to share
beyond the legal minimum.
If we allowed  splitting to  the extent  of equitable distribution  on di-
vorce, we would face many problems, the solution to which would involve
a move towards  intermediate filing.  Using existing equitable-distribution
principles would face the usual criticisms of inadequate protection  of sec-
ondary  earners.  We  would have to solve the problems  of separate  prop-
erty,  antenuptial  agreements,  and  human  capital.  Furthermore,  because
equitable  distribution is inherently  discretionary  and ex post, it is  hard to
predict exactly how it would be done.3 48  For this reason, it would furnish
neither the clear answers nor the information-forcing  effect that,  I argue,
are among the principal advantages  of intermediate filing.  Also, if we re-
sponded  to  these  problems  in using  equitable-distribution  principles  by
asking couples to commit in advance to a ratio for division on divorce, we
are well on our way to the intermediate-filing  system advocated here.  In-
termediate filing would be the reverse of taxing according  to  a prediction
of the division on divorce-by  equitable  distribution  or otherwise:  Inter-
mediate filing settles  such questions  ex ante for both tax  and divorce law
purposes.
Finally, some  have proposed  that we  allow couples  to  choose  their
filing status.349  For example, couples  would be allowed a choice of using
346.  For an acknowledgment of this possibility, see Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra  note
2, at  1422.  See also Boris I. Bittker, A  "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARV.  L. REV. 925, 976 (1967).
347.  See Baker, supra note 38, at 1206-13 (criticizing the state of alimony law).
348.  This applies  equally to the "contractarian"  or hypothetical-bargain  approach to family  law
as well.  See supra Part II.B.2.  Notice that such an approach to family law and one based on interme-
diate filing are contractarian  in very different senses.
349.  At some times in the past, the Code has  contained a secondary-earner  deduction.  Most re-
cently,  a secondary-earner  deduction was abolished  in  1986.  See CONGRESSIONAL  BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note  10, at 51-53.  Such a deduction would lower rates for secondary earners and is compatible
with intermediate filing.
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current joint filing or individual filing.  Such  a solution would  be expen-
sive in terms of revenue loss in that all the marriage  "bonuses"  in the pres-
ent system would  be maintained by  tax-minimizing  couples.3 5 0  Couples
would have an incentive to overreport sharing; they would split income for
tax purposes without regard to how much sharing was occurring.  Without
the countervailing  incentive  of the self-assessed ratio  under  intermediate
filing,  couples  would  choose  the maximum  split  and  the primary  earner
and/or wealthier  spouse  would again  have no  incentive  to  share  in  fact.
Moreover,  such  a system would  do nothing  to prevent  tax  avoidance  on
property income.
VI.  A THEORY OF SHARING IN THE ATRIBUTION OF INCOME
In this section, I address how the system based on self-assessed ratios
could  be  generalized  to  other  groups  of taxpayers  who  share joint eco-
nomic  interests  and  who could  argue  for some consolidation  of their in-
come  for tax  purposes.  This problem  of choosing  among  taxpayers  for
purposes  of attributing  taxable  income  is  quite  general  and  one  of the
thorniest that  tax  policy  has  to  offer.  By  defining  the  group  members'
ownership  interests  in  important  respects,  the self-assessed  intermediate-
filing system can solve similar difficulties  in measuring  sharing  that stem
from a tax-driven  desire to overstate  the sharing within  the group.  With
this more general analysis in hand, we also can discern the limits of self-
assessment:  Because self-assessment crucially rests on a contractarian  no-
tion of consent, we may  see which contexts-most notably  with respect to
parents  and  minor children-in  which  we  might not  want  to  allow  self-
assessment.
Until  now, we have focused on  the  taxation of married couples,  but
the problem we have been addressing  and my proposed solution can both
be generalized.  At issue in the marital tax context is when it is appropriate
to regard one taxpayer as a "conduit"  of income to the other, such that the
second  recipient taxpayer  ought to  pay  the  tax rather  than  the  "conduit"
taxpayer.  In the case of spouses, there may be a net transfer of monetary
resources from one spouse to the other, and, as seen above, it makes  sense
both from  an  equity  and  efficiency  perspective  to  tax  the recipient-but
only so long as sharing by the conduit taxpayer can really be said to occur.
350.  See, e.g., Marriage Tax  Elimination Act,  H.R. 2456,  105th Cong.  (1997)  (proposing  legis-
lation that  would  implement  a  traditional  solution  of allowing  married  couples  a  choice  of filing
jointly or separately).  See also CONGRESSIONAL  BUDGET OFFICE, supra note  10, at 55-56  (noting the
large loss of revenue that would result from allowing couples to choose  between current joint filing
and individual filing).
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Under the self-assessed system, the amount declared as shared, transferred
by the conduit,  for income  tax purposes  is  then backed  up with  a corre-
sponding property-law and family-law rule of division.  Thus, a conduit for
tax  purposes  is  a true conduit  because  the property interest  of the other
spouse is defined in terms of the prenegotiated tax-conduit (sharing) ratio.
In these terms, the problem can be seen as one facet of a larger prob-
lem.  There are many social relations in which multiple taxpayers  seem to
have joint economic interests and some transfer of income from one to the
other occurs.  Examples of these include parent(s)  and  children, extended
families, cohabiting couples,  communes,  and  any other cooperative living
arrangement.  As  is  well known,  it would  be difficult  to  investigate  the
nature of each of these  varied arrangements  and allow income-splitting-
taxation of some income to the transferee rather than to the "conduit"-to
the extent that the arrangement  really does represent a joint economic  en-
terprise.351  Indeed, even the question of what is a "family" receives  a very
wide  range  of responses.352  If  we  simply  took  people's  word  on  such
matters, people would have an incentive to overreport the amount of shar-
ing in such groups in order to lower overall taxes.  Lower-bracket  taxpay-
ers could  sell their participation  for some fee up to the savings  in tax li-
ability.  This is the general version of the "tax-shelter"  opportunity in  the
marital context.353  There would be little to stop a group from declaring it-
self such  a joint economic  enterprise  to a  greater extent  than  resources
were really being transferred,  simply in order for high-bracket taxpayers  in
the group to lower their taxes.  If we simply  allowed joint filing for such
groups, we face both the question of where to stop, as well as the problem
that any such rule will be over- and underinclusive.  A search  among exist-
ing  legal  categories-such  as  parent-child,  niece-aunt,  and  grandchild-
grandparent-inevitably  faces  these  difficulties.  But  traditionally,  the
question  of when  to  allow  splitting  has  consisted  of just  such  a  search
among existing legal  categories  for determinants  of consolidation for tax
purposes.
354
Self-assessment here too provides  a possible approach  to  this seem-
ingly  insoluble problem.  Under self-assessment,  we  can  ensure that the
351.  See, e.g., Bittker, Taxation and the Family,  supra note 2, at 1398-99.
352.  See  Kornhauser, Love,  Money, and the IRS, supra note 2,  at 65-73.  See  also id. at 69
(noting that many researchers use the notion of commitment to define families).  Intermediate filing is
well-suited to putting commitment to the test.
353.  See supra notes  151-54 and accompanying text.
354.  See, e.g., Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra note 2, at 1399.  See also, e.g., McIntyre
& Oldman, supra note 2, at 1578 ("In  answering  [the question  of who  the taxpayer is], current  law
looks principally at property rules").
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extent of negotiated consolidation for tax  purposes  will dictate  important
aspects  of ownership.  We  can  set up a system  whereby  such  groups  of
taxpayers must, if they separate, divide  their property in accordance  with
the same ratio they declared for income-splitting  purposes  on their tax re-
turns.  As in the marital context, the group has countervailing incentives to
report a more even ratio for income tax and report a less even, less sharing
ratio  in light of the possible use of such a ratio on break-up  of the group.
We do not face the usual problem of the tax rule not reflecting true owner-
ship because, once again, the tax income-splitting  ratio defines ownership
to a large extent.
Nor  is  self-assessment  likely  to  lead  to  an  explosion  of  taxpayers
opting into such a system.  Tax theorists have been quite aware  that trans-
ferors of income face greater or lesser risk of "ingratitude"  on the part of
the transferee, which inhibits use of such transfers to effect tax avoidance.
There  is  always  a risk  that the tax-motivated  transfer  will  result  in  the
transferee taking the money  and running.355  Transfers range from those to
spouses  at the most secure end of the spectrum,  running through various
transfers to children and other close relatives, to those to other third parties
where  the risk  of ingratitude is  greatest.  This  realization  itself suggests
that few, besides  spouses and  some others with closely related dependents
would  opt  into  a  more  generalized,  self-assessed  income-splitting  ar-
rangement.  The risk of ingratitude is precisely what the conduit must be-
ware of when he attempts to lower his income tax bill through a prenego-
tiated income-splitting ratio.  Again, the incentive to lower taxes through a
move towards more even splitting of income is counterbalanced  by the in-
centive not to put one's assets at too great a risk of being lost on break-up.
The fear of ingratitude magnifies  the countervailing incentive that pushes
such taxpayers  away from income-splitting.  This view is supported  by re-
cent work  on  bequests  showing  that people  give  less in  gifts  than  tax-
avoidance would dictate.356  Again, under intermediate  filing, there should
be little incentive to overstate the amount of integration of economic inter-
ests and sharing actually occurring.
Because  self-assessed  intermediate  filing  rests  on  the  potential  to
contract around a default, it works  best where such  an expectation is real-
istic.  By the same  token, intermediate  filing cannot be easily extended  to
355.  See, e.g.,  Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra note 2,  at 1441  & n.141.  But see Feld-
stein & Feenberg supra note 4, at 69 (arguing that people would not shift property  around because of
the high chance of divorce).  Feldstein and  Feenberg  are overly optimistic  about this, as  I argue  in
Parts III.B-E and V supra.
356.  See  JAMES  POTERBA,  THE  ESTATE  TAX  AND  AFTER-TAX  INVESTMENT  RETURNS  24-25
(National  Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6337,  1997).
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minor children.  While we might, if we so chose,  allow adult relatives to
split income as long as they commit to it over the long term, this will not
work with minor children.  We cannot expect them to bargain or to give
their consent.
357
What intermediate filing might do is help with the question of how to
allocate  deductions  relating  to children.  Although  there is  disagreement
over how much the allocation of deductions to the mother versus the father
really  results  in behavioral  and welfare  effects  within  the family,35 8  we
may ask whether self-assessment might help here, too.  The most straight-
forward solution would be to allocate child-related deductions according to
the same  ratio  as the couple negotiates.  For default individual  filers,  we
might allocate all the deduction  to the secondary  earner or split the deduc-
tion in a number of other ways. 359  On the other hand, if we wish to treat
child responsibilities as a separate category, as suggested by current family
law, we could allocate child-related deductions to the secondary earner as
a default and make couples opting into intermediate filing negotiate a ratio
for the child-related  deductions.  This  ratio would  be used  as a floor for
child support payments after divorce.
As  should be clear by now, there are  no technocratic  "solutions"  in
this  area, but intermediate  filing both  allows us to build a strong  role for
sharing into the tax system and helps us to refine our intuitions about the
importance of sharing.  In this way,  intermediate filing can have an infor-
mation-forcing effect on the policy level as well.  If we would not accept
intermediate filing for a given group of taxpayers  who genuinely  do seem
to share income, this strongly  suggests that some other value trumps shar-
ing.  For example, if society  considers  some groups  to be  "cults,"  inter-
mediate filing would not be acceptable regardless  of the extent of sharing.
Further, where  society has  no such objection to the group  of taxpayers,  a
lack of acceptance  for intermediate  filing might suggest that we fear that
sharing is not going on.  Thus, in marriage,  if someone wishes  to promote
marriage  in general,  favors  sharing,  but opposes  intermediate  filing,  the
problem may well be a belief that intermediate  filing exposes as empty the
commonly expressed strong rhetoric in favor of sharing.  Just as interme-
357.  See generally  E. ALLAN  FARNSWORTH,  CONTRACTS  § 4.4 (2d ed.  1990).
358.  Compare Alstott, supra note 28, at 2049-50  (arguing  that allocating  allowances  may  not
increase women's after-tax income if husband controls  money) with Komhauser, Partnership  Model,
supra note 75, at 1445 n.68 (noting that studies that suggest that when women have their own money
they have more control).  See also Lundberg et al., supra note 58; supra notes 61,  176, and accompa-
nying text.
359.  See, e.g.,  Bittker, Taxation and the Family, supra note 2, at 1444-56 (discussing problems
involved with dependency exemptions).
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diate filing would force the primary earner to support professions  of will-
ingness to share with enforceable  guarantees,  so intermediate filing can put
our general confidence in marital and other sharing to the test.
Intermediate  filing should  not be thought  of as  an attempt  to  escape
the need to base the choice  of taxpayer  or attribution  of income  on soci-
ety's shared values.  Boris Bittker is correct that we cannot decide between
individual  and joint filing  from  some  neutral  standpoint  but  will  rather
have to consider "society's assumptions about the role of marriage  and the
family,"  and the decision "in  the end can rest on nothing more precise or
permanent  than collective  social preferences."3 6  But  intermediate  filing
does expand the range of choices and the amount of relevant information.
We  can  escape  the  "battle  of  the  neutralities"  of  the  joint-versus-
individual-filing  debate by providing  a system  more narrowly  tailored to
the values,  sharing in particular, that we want to promote.  In addition, in-
termediate  filing  has  efficiency  advantages  that  flow  directly  from  this
fine-grained nature.  As the question of how far to extend the option of in-
termediate  filing  to  other  groups  indicates,  we  still  must  ask  ourselves
what the consequences are in terms of the values  we wish to promote.  But
intermediate  filing allows us to make that question both more precise and
open to a wider range of answers.
VII.  CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the implications  of intermediate  filing.  As I
have shown, it is a sensible method of implementing  in the income tax our
commitment  to sharing in marriages.  By combining features  of individual
and joint filing, it presents  a range  of equity  and  efficiency  benefits  that
neither of these two polar systems has to offer.  Intermediate filing's vol-
untary nature  and contractarian  basis  lead to information-forcing  and  op-
timal  damages  on divorce,  which  should  induce more  efficient  behavior
and make women better off.  More generally,  moving the analysis beyond
the traditional polar "solutions"  to the trilemma of choosing between pro-
gressive rates, marriage neutrality,  and couples neutrality allows us a win-
dow on the role that sharing plays in our intuitions about marital taxation.
This thought experiment based on intermediate filing extends naturally  to
other  groups  of taxpayers.  By  considering  the  possibility  and  likely
(un)acceptability  of intermediate  filing in the context of other social rela-
tions,  we can isolate the role that sharing is or is  not playing  in our atti-
360.  Id. at  1392,  1463.  See also GRAETZ,  supra note 2, at 39-40; Zelenak, Marriage  and the
Income Tax, supra note 2, at 342 (concurring in this view).
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tudes  toward  the  taxation  and  attribution  of income  within  such  social
groups.  In the particular context of marriage that has been our main focus
and  that is the most pressing  such issue in tax policy  today, intermediate
filing  deserves  serious  consideration,  which  is  likely  to  increase under-
standing of our attitudes toward sharing in marriage.246  SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW